


THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH UNITED STATES CAVALRY



PREPARED AND LOYAL

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Lineage and Honors

4th CAVALRY

Constituted 3 March 1855 in the Regular Army as the 1st Cavalry

Organized 26 March 1855 at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri

Redesignated 3 August 1861 as the 4th Cavalry

Reorganized and redesignated 16 April 1942 as the 4th Cavalry, Mechanized

Regiment broken up 21 December 1943 and its elements reorganized and redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 4th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, and the 4th and 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons, Mechanized

After 21 December 1943 the above units underwent changes as follows:

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 4th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, converted and redesignated 1 May 1946 as Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 4th Constabulary Regiment

Reorganized and redesignated 10 February 1948 as Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Troop, 4th Constabulary Regiment

Inactivated 1 May 1949 in Austria

Redesignated 20 August 1953 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Armored Cavalry

4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, converted and redesignated 1 May 1946 as the 4th Constabulary Squadron

Assigned 17 June 1946 to the 4th Constabulary Regiment

Reorganized and redesignated 1 April 1949 as the 4th Reconnaissance Battalion, concurrently relieved from assignment to the 4th Constabulary Regiment

Reorganized and redesignated 1 December 1951 as the 1st Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion, redesignated 1 July 1955 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Armor Group (4th Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion [less Headquarters and Headquarters Company] concurrently inactivated in Austria)

21st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, converted and redesignated 1 May 1946 as the 24th Constabulary Squadron

Assigned 17 June 1946 to the 4th Constabulary Regiment

Relieved 1 May 1949 from assignment to the 4th Constabulary Regiment and assigned to the United States Constabulary

Inactivated 15 December 1952 in Germany

Redesignated 21 April 1953 as the 521st Reconnaissance Battalion

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Armored Cavalry; the 524th Reconnaissance Battalion; and the 4th Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion (less Headquarters and Headquarters Company) then designated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Armor Group consolidated, reorganized, and redesignated 15 February 1957 as the 4th Cavalry, a parent regiment under the Combat Arms Regimental System

4th CAVALRY

(Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Armor Group, inactivated 1 April 1963 in Germany; concurrently redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 14th Squadron, 4th Cavalry)

Withdrawn 16 June 1989 from the Combat Arms Regimental System, and reorganized under the United States Army Regimental System with Headquarters at Fort Riley, Kansas

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

Indian Wars

Comanches
Apaches
Little Big Horn
Cheyennes
Kansas 1857
Kansas 1860
Mexico 1873
New Mexico 1882

Civil War

Bull Run
Mississippi River
Peninsula
Antietam
Frederickburg
Murfreesborough
Chickamauga
Atlanta
Franklin
Nashville
Missouri 1861
Kentucky 1862
Mississippi 1862
Mississippi 1864
Tennessee 1863
Tennessee 1864
Alabama 1864
Alabama 1865
Georgia 1864
Georgia 1865

Philippine Insurrection

Manila
Malolos
Laguna de Bay
San Isidro
Cavite
Tarlac
Jolo
Luzon 1899
Luzon 1900
Luzon 1901

World War II

Normandy (with arrowhead)
Northern France
Rhineland
Ardennes-Alsace
Central Europe

Vietnam

Defense
Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase II
Counteroffensive, Phase III
Tet Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV
Counteroffensive, Phase V
Counteroffensive, Phase VI
Tet 69/Counteroffensive
Summer-Fall 1969
Winter-Spring 1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase VII

4th CAVALRY

DECORATIONS

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered BOGHEIM, GERMANY

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered BINH LONG PROVINCE

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered TON SON NHUT AIR BASE


Valorous Unit Award, Streamer embroidered BINH DUONG PROVINCE

Valorous Unit Award, Streamer embroidered FISH HOOK

French Croix de Guerre with Silver Star, World War II, Streamer embroidered
NORMANDY

Cited in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action in the
ARDENNES

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:



WILLIAM A. STORT
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Chief of Military History

21 JUL 1989

GENERAL ORDER 109

BATTLE HONOR. As authorized by Executive Order 9896 (sec. I, WD Bul. 22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec. III, WD Bul. 11, 1942), citation of the following unit in the general order indicated is confirmed under the provisions of section IV; WD Circular 833, 1943, in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction. The citation reads as follows:

The 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized), is cited for conspicuously distinguishing itself in battle against the enemy on 20 and 21 December 1944. The Squadron's mission was to attack in its zone and secure Bogheim. Germany, and the high ground to the southeast of the town. Previous actions in the Hertgen forest had reduced the troops to between 55 and 70 men each. Nevertheless, two battle groups of the 942nd German Infantry Regiment, 353rd Infantry Division, and one company of the 6th Parachute Regiment, which then represented one of the finest fighting units of the German Army, was completely destroyed during the course of this action. On the morning of 20 December 1944, in dense fog and under heavy concentrations of enemy artillery, the Squadron forced an entry into Bogheim. Resistance was fanatical, necessitating tortuous house-to-house fighting. By 1400 hours all resistance in the town had ceased, but the troop commanders of all troops directly committed had either been killed or seriously wounded, and five of the nine platoon leaders of the reconnaissance troop evacuated. Twenty-five percent of the enlisted personnel had also become casualties. Again, on the morning of the following day, still under heavy artillery saturation, at times reaching a density of 1000 rounds per hour, the remainder of the Squadron drove and fought its way to the top of the ridge to the southeast, held by vastly superior enemy forces in excellent defense. Almost completely exhausted from the heavy fighting of the previous day, the troops nevertheless attacked at a dead run over 200 yards of open ground, up hill to the ridge. Only the gallantry and esprit de corps of the officers and men, above and beyond the call of duty, enabled the Squadron to reorganize again and again after losing many troop commanders, platoon leaders, and other key personnel vital to the continued functioning of a tactical unit. The gallantry and supreme devotion to duty of the officers and men of the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized) and the magnificence of their performance are in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Cavalry and the United States armed forces. (General Order 450, Headquarters Seventh Army, 28 August 1945, as approved by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, European Theater (Main).)



By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States I have today awarded

THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (ARMY)

FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM

TO

THE 1ST SQUADRON, 4TH CAVALRY, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION

The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division distinguished itself by extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against hostile forces in Binh Long Province, Republic of Vietnam during the period June to July 1966. On 8 June 1966, Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry was moving north along Highway 13 to the vicinity of An Loc to conduct area reconnaissance and offensive operations. The lead tank was hit by a command detonated mine which was the signal for three Viet Cong battalions to open a full-scale attack from both sides of the road. The three Viet Cong battalions occupied defensive fortifications and were heavily equipped with recoilless rifles, automatic weapons and a variety of small arms. Troop A immediately closed with the insurgent force in a fierce assault. Maneuver room was limited due to marshy terrain on either side of the highway. Continuous, multi-direction assaults were attempted by the desperate insurgent forces, but in each case they were halted by accurate tank, automatic, and individual weapons fire. With an indomitable fighting spirit, continuous fire and movement was used to steadily close on the insurgent force. The courageous fighting of the cavalymen routed the Viet Cong from their emplacements. The gallant actions of Troop A in this six-hour battle was an eminent success. In addition, the armed helicopters of Troop D, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, the supporting artillery, and Air Force fighter aircraft contributed immeasurably to the success of the battle by bringing devastating fire on the Viet Cong. The actions resulted in a count of 105 insurgents killed and a large number of Viet Cong weapons captured. On the morning of 30 June 1966, Troops B and C were conducting armed reconnaissance north of An Loc on Highway 13, when they were struck by a Viet Cong regiment. The insurgent force poured a volume of mortar, recoilless rifle and automatic weapons fire into the column from the front and two sides. Fire was immediately returned by the Squadron, engaging the Viet Cong at point-blank range. The insurgents, concealed next to the road, made repeated attempts to overrun the Squadron by use of hand grenades at close range, point-blank firing, and fanatical assaults. Maneuver by the cavalymen was again severely hampered by dense brush and marshy soil and they were forced to conduct their fight from extremely vulnerable positions. Although four platoon leaders were killed or wounded in the first hour, the gallant stand of the cavalymen resulted in total defeat of the hostile force, whose scattered survivors fled from the battlefield. On the morning of 9 July, the Squadron's B, C, and D troops deployed southwest of An Loc to lure the insurgents into contact. The reinforced Viet Cong regiment, again covered in the heavy growth along the road, launched a powerful attack under the cover of intense mortar, small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades and .50 caliber machine gun fire. The intensity of the three-hour fight equaled the two earlier and longer engagements. The lack of proximate landing zones for the infantry delayed the planned reinforcement and required the Squadron to bear the entire force of the numerically superior insurgent force attack for two hours. The cavalymen, with immediately responsive and continuous support by air and artillery, heroically stood their ground and broke the Viet Cong attack. The determination displayed by the 1st Squadron, 4th United States Cavalry during the three decisive battles of operation El Paso II resulted in significant victories. The Squadron's indomitable courage resulted in 712 confirmed hostile dead, an estimated 850 additional killed, and large quantities of captured weapons and equipment. The conspicuous gallantry and extraordinary heroism of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division is in keeping with the finest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon all who participated in these significant battles.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Lyndon B. Johnson", with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke at the end.

GENERAL ORDER 69

THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (ARMY). Award of the Presidential Unit Citation (Army) by the President of the United States of America to the following units of the Armed Forces of the United States is confirmed in accordance with paragraph 194, AR 672-5-1. The text of the citation, signed by President Richard Nixon, 8 October 1969, reads as follows:

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I have today awarded

THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (ARMY)

FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM

TO THE

3RD SQUADRON, 4TH CAVALRY, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

AND

BATTERY C, 6TH BATTALION, 77TH ARTILLERY

UNITED STATES ARMY

On 31 January 1968 in the Republic of Vietnam, the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, supported by Battery C, 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery, distinguished itself by singular and extraordinary heroism in combat, thereby preventing destruction of a vital allied base and virtually destroying a vastly superior enemy force. Before dawn the Squadron was alerted to move to blocking position on expected enemy routes of withdrawal following a major assault on Tan Son Nhut Air Base. However, the ferocity and initial success of the enemy attack necessitated immediate deployment of C Troop to the threatened air base complex. After a rapid, cross-country, night move of approximately 25 kilometers, C Troop, supported by aerial elements of D Troop, launched a violent night counterattack which succeeded in separating the insurgents inside the base from the main body of the enemy force reinforcing through the breach in the base's perimeter defense. Although temporarily disrupting the enemy attack, C Troop was heavily outnumbered, and additional combat power was urgently required. Accordingly, the remainder of the Squadron's available fighting strength, to include B and D Troops, elements of A Troop, and the supporting artillery of Battery C, 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery, was skillfully marshaled to support the embattled troopers. In the early morning hours, B Troop raced 47 kilometers over enemy controlled roads, smashing through five ambushes en route, to launch a counterattack in conjunction with the beleaguered C Troop. The rapidity of deployment, the ferocity of the attack, and the accuracy of heavy volumes of supporting gunship and artillery fire caught the enemy by complete surprise, trapped major elements of his force, and eventually resulted in his defeat.

Throughout the engagement, the Squadron's supporting aircraft and its medical and supply personnel moved into about the fire swept area in a magnificent display of courage, dedication, and professionalism. By late afternoon, the 3rd Squadron had broken the determined Regimental attack, forcing the survivors to flee the area. Despite the long hours of heavy fighting endured throughout the day, D Troop's gunships were ordered in pursuit, inflicting additional casualties on the demoralized enemy who left over 325 dead and wounded, numerous individual and crew-served weapons, and great quantities of ammunition on the battlefield. The men of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry and Battery C, 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery, by their outstanding bravery, determination, esprit de corps, and devotion to duty prevented the capture of a key allied installation and, in so doing, brought great credit on themselves, their units, and the United States Army.

HISTORY OF THE FOURTH U. S. CAVALRY

Under authority of act of Congress, dated March 3, 1855, the First Regiment of Cavalry was organized. This designation was later changed to the Fourth Cavalry. Recruiting, under officers assigned to the regiment, was carried on in various localities in the different states of the Union, and the troops were recruited and organized at the following places: A Troop, New York City; B Troop, Rome, New York; C Troop, Lexington, Kentucky; D Troop, Indianapolis, Indiana; E Troop, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; F Troop, Columbia, South Carolina; G Troop, Detroit, Michigan; H Troop, Quincy, Illinois; I Troop, Newman, Georgia; K Troop, Springfield, Missouri, all in April 1855. Troops L and M were not organized until November 1862 in the field near Murfreesboro, Tennessee.

By August 1855 the troops were all assembled at Jefferson Barracks, Saint Louis, Missouri, and there the Regiment was organized under the first Regimental Commander, Colonel E. V. Sumner, who remained in command until March 16, 1861.

During the year 1856 the Regiment was called out by the then Territorial Governor of Kansas, Shannon, and was used to prevent fighting between the sympathizers of both North and the South. These opposing parties were each trying to control and usurp the territorial government so as to make Kansas either a slave or free state according to the success of either side. The Governor with the help of the regular soldiers was able to prevent either side from overthrowing the government, which was at that time in the hands of the President who administered through the territorial governor. The Regiment was, by War Department orders, subject to requisition by the Territorial Governor, and it assisted the sheriffs and the United States Marshals in serving warrants on outlaws who resisted arrest. These outlaws were in many instances taken from the sheriffs and marshal by the inhabitants of different localities.

In the year 1857 the Regiment was actively engaged with the hostile Indians, for which purpose it was originally organized and ordered into Kansas Territory. During this year the most important fight took place at Solomon's Fork, Kansas River, Kansas, of which Lt. J. E. B. Stuart, who afterwards became the famous southern cavalry leader, wrote to his wife *****"Yesterday, after seventeen days steady march from Camp Buchanan we overtook about three hundred Cheyenne warriors drawn up in line of battle, and marching boldly and steadily toward us. We fronted into line as soon as possible (six companies of cavalry), the Infantry being too far behind to take any part in the action, also Bayard's Battery, which the Colonel stopped three of four miles back was unable to keep up. It was my intention, and I believe that of most of the company commanders, to give a carbine volley and then charge; but much to my surprise, the Colonel ordered, "Draw Saber!" "Charge!" When the Indians were within gunshot. We set up a terrific yell, which scattered the Cheyennes in disorderly flight, and we kept up the charge in pursuit*****but very few of the company horses were fleet enough after the march, besides my own brave Dan, to keep in reach of the Indians mounted on fresh ponies*****but after a chase of five miles*****I overtook the rear of the enemy.

From 1857 to about the middle of 1860 part of the Regiment was stationed at Fort Riley under command of Major John Sedgwick who became famous in the Union Army during the Civil War, and the remainder was at Fort Leavenworth. During these years detachments and sometimes Companies had fights with the Indians, the most notable of engagements were: Caddo Creek, near Fort Arbuckle, Indian Territory, with the Choctaw Nation, Two engagements occurring near this place only three days apart, one near Pawnee Fork, Kansas, and one at Blackwater Springs near Bents Ford, Nebraska, and at Cottonwood Creek, Kansas, in which six companies were engaged. During the summer of 1860 the Regiment took the field to make a demonstration against the Comanches and other hostiles and when near the headwaters of the Arkansas River they received instructions to select a site for a fort. Fort Lyon was begun and there the Regiment spent the winter of 1860.

The year 1861 found the Regiment scattered in the middle west, in Kansas, Indian Territory, Arkansas and Colorado. Colonel Robert E. Lee had succeeded Colonel Sumner in command. This was Lee's dream come true-only to be ended with the war between the states when his loyalty took him back to Virginia. About the middle of that year General McClellan asked that the troops of the First Cavalry, (Fourth Cavalry) stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, be assigned to him. He was at the time in command of the Department of the Ohio. Due to his request two troops were sent east and later took part in the First Battle of Bull Run. Here, with other troops of the cavalry, they tried to stop the green men on the right of the Union line from turning away, but soon a general retreat was in progress. It was said of the Cavalry that they retreated in good order and discipline.

While part of the Regiment was in the east fighting, the remainder was giving good account of itself in the west. It was engaged in Missouri, not only with the Indians but with the Confederates. Part of the Regiment was at the engagements at Springfield and Wilson's Creek, Missouri.

During the month of August 1861 when the troops were heavily engaged in Missouri, Congress passed an act which was promulgated in G. O. No. 55, August 10, 1861, joining all the Dragoons and Cavalry Regiments into one corps. The Regimental designation was then changed from the First Cavalry to the Fourth Cavalry.

In December of this year the troops were engaged at Blackwater Creek, near Milford, Missouri.

Early in the year 1862 four companies of the Fourth Cavalry were ordered to "the seat of war in Tennessee, stopping long enough at Saint Louis to get a full supply of ordnance stores, and at Cairo and Paducah for orders." Soon after this, part of these troops were engaged at Fort Donelson. While some troops were doing duty in Nebraska Territory others were engaged at many places in the east. Part of the Regiment saw service at Pittsburg Landing. Siege at Yorktown, Virginia, capture of Island Number Ten, and the advance upon the siege of Corinth, Mississippi. Throughout this year the different components of the

Regiment were actively engaged in both small and important engagements, such as Chapin's Hill, Perryville, Kentucky, and the year was successfully ended by the Battle of Stone's River, Murfreesboro. It was just prior to this engagement that Companies L and M were organized and recruited to full strength. This battle was hard fought one where the Union leaders claim that the cavalry did good service and the Confederate leaders claim that they were easily scattered; nevertheless the enemy was driven out of Murfreesboro.

The next year, 1863, was full of exciting events. Parts of the Regiment were engaged in twenty-two fights of that number the entire Regiment was engaged in five, the most important ones being the Battle of Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the Battle of Chickamauga, Georgia.

Of the eighteen engagements participated in during the year 1864, the entire Regiment took part in sixteen. Most of this year was spent in Alabama and Georgia. On December 12, 1864, 1st Lieutenant Joseph Hedges at the head of his Regiment, charged a field battery with strong infantry supports, broke the enemy's line and with other mounted troops, captured 3 guns and many prisoners. This battle was fought near Harpeth River, Tennessee. For this gallantry he received the Medal of Honor. 2nd Lieutenant Peter M. Boehm became a recipient of the Medal of Honor when acting as the Aide to General Custer, took a flag from the hands of the color bearer, rode in front of a line that was being driven back and, under a heavy fire, rallied the men, re-formed the line, and repulsed the charge. This battle occurred at Dinwiddie Courthouse, Virginia on March 31, 1865.

When General Wilson made his raid into Alabama and Georgia with the Cavalry he chose as his personal escort the Fourth Cavalry. His reports throughout praise the splendid work of the Regiment. It was present at the capture of Jefferson Davis, the fugitive Confederate President. General Wilson describes in his book, "Under the Old Flag," the work and the many charges of the Fourth Cavalry, when he was fighting against Hood, and again the work and the charge at the capture of Selma (this is the battle replicated in Don Stivers print "Wilson's Charge"). Of the fighting against Hood, he says: "In the gloom which was now rapidly settling upon both sides, Hatch's advancing detachments had become so intermingled with the sullen and disorganized enemy that, doubting the force in front was really the rebel rear guard, Hatch hesitated to order the charge. The delay which followed, though scarcely perceptible, gave Forrest time to swing his battery in position and strengthen the weak points of his line, but, fortunately, I was close enough to see plainly that the soldiers at the front, although clad in bluish overcoats, were really enemy. Our own men, well closed up, were ready for the fray. Without an instant's hesitation, I ordered my bugler to sound the charge, sang out for Hatch and Knipe to advance on both flanks, and ordered Lieutenant Hedges, commanding my escort, the Fourth Regular Cavalry, two hundred strong, in column of platoons, to charge the enemy's center, head on, with drawn sabers. Hedges was a true hero, and with only enough hesitation to satisfy himself as to what was really required, dashed to the front, with the regulars thundering at his heels down the turnpike.

He had hardly got fairly under way when the enemy opened on him with canister at point blank range, but failed to check his onset. Hatch's Chicago Board of Trade Battery, always in the advance, replied from the roadside and, under its diagonal fire sweeping the ground to the front, the regulars broke through the enemy's line, sabering the cannoneers and forcing the guns to withdraw at the gallop, which Hatch's division and Hammond's brigade with their deadly Spenceers swept the rest of the field before them, overthrowing both flanks and driving the whole line from its chosen position to the other side of the west Harpeth in the utmost disorder. Hedges, outstripping his men, was captured three times, but waving his hat and yelling as though frightened out of his wits: "The Yankees are upon us, run for your lives," succeeded in escaping in the confusion and rejoining his command before his men missed him."

Of the work of the Fourth Cavalry on his day General Wilson has also written as follows: "And in addition there was the Fourth Regular Cavalry, my escort, under the daring Lieutenants Davis, O'Connel, and Rendelbrook, every one of whom gave assurance of success. They had been burning bridges, stations, and cotton warehouses and tearing up railroads all day, but were as eager as fresh troops for the fray. It was a day of intense interest and anxiety to no subordinate more than to myself. While we had only nine thousand sabers, with two field batteries, every man was a veteran and knew that he was before the first objective of a great campaign involving the military considerations of the highest order."

Of the charge at the capture of Selma he speaks thus: "The whole plain for a mile and a half was covered at once with a whirlwind of battle. Without waiting for the result, I promptly dismounted the horse I had been riding all day, sprang onto my splendid gray gelding, "Sheridan," and, turning to the Fourth Regulars, bade them follow at the charge. Regarding it as one of those emergencies which occur but once in a soldier's life and realizing that I had not another man to put in, I felt it my duty to show myself on my most conspicuous horse with staff, escort, and red battle-flag in the thickest of the fight. Not a man faltered. Straight down the turnpike, through the first line of works we rode all together, every man with saber drawn and nerves strained to the utmost, as though his personal example was essential to victory. My escort was badly scattered in the charge, but, responding to the stirring calls of my Indian bugler, it reformed at once and followed me at a rattling pace through the entrenchments at the highway. As the guard was clear of obstructions from that point, I sent the Regiment again headlong after the enemy and had the satisfaction of seeing it disappear in the mass of broken and fleeing Confederates." This took place in April 1865 and the rest of the year was spent in the duties of guarding and assisting in reconstruction. Thus, the Fourth Cavalry Regiment became the only Regiment, during the war between the states, to defeat superior cavalry, large masses of artillery, and entrenched infantry.

January of 1866 saw the Regiment again in the west where they aided in the reconstruction and in other minor but important tasks. After reaching Texas the command was stationed in and around San Antonio. With the exception of two troops which were left in Louisiana the Regiment was occupied on various works such as scouting, escorts, couriers and assisting the Freedom's Bureau.

The years 1868 to 1870 were full of marches, pursuits of Indians, and outlaws, and assisting at intervals in the reconstruction work of the government; the main object being to help keep peace and prevent killings both by the outlaws and the Indians. No engagements of any great importance occurred, although the troops took part in many minor engagements in their work of guarding mails and elections. The troops were greatly dispersed and it is difficult and unnecessary in this account to follow all their movements in detail. With this activity the Regiment was in most excellent condition of morale and discipline which is characteristic of it throughout its existence from early in 1855 to the present day.

In 1870 a most distinguished young officer took command of the Regiment. Colonel Ranald Slidell Mackenzie, who was in active command for twelve years, (which turned out to be twenty-five percent of his lifetime). He had graduated from West Point in the second year of the war and with a capacity for command, quick decision, and action which was seasoned by judgement and common sense, he rose to the wartime rank of brevet Brigadier General of Volunteers. He enjoyed the confidence of such eminent leaders as Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan. It was through the efforts of General Grant that Mackenzie obtained command of the Regiment to which he transmitted his energy and enthusiasm. In his Memoirs General Grant wrote of him, "I regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the Army. Graduating at West Point as he did, during his second year of the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its close. This he did on his own merit and without influence." When he joined the Regiment he made a resolution as follows: "I intend that it shall not be on account any laziness of mine if it falls below any other," "a resolution," as Captain Dorst writes, "that not a single officer or man of the Regiment will say he failed to follow to the letter." The history of the Regiment from 1870 to 1882 is well told by the history of the man who for twelve years guided it through a most trying period and imbued it with the high standard of his personality and energy. Captain Joseph H. Dorst, for some time the Adjutant of the Regiment under Mackenzie, tells the story in an admirable way. "At that time (1871) all of that portion of Texas west of the one hundredth meridian, particularly the region known as the Staked Plains, was over-run by various bands of Indians, who were constantly making depredations upon the settlements, further east. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes roamed over northern Texas, Kansas, and Colorado, and the Red River to the Platte, while the Comanches, Kiowas, Mescalero Apaches, Kickapoos and Lipans had actual control of western Texas and eastern New Mexico, and wandered from the southern boundary of Colorado to many miles south of the Rio Grande. The bands of Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches were the ones that gave the most trouble on the Texas frontier, and were comfortably located on the Stakes Plains south of the Canadian River, a region that had never been fully explored, and that, to the troops, was unknown. Secure in their retreats, they were constantly prowling about the settlements in small parties, mainly for the purpose of stealing horses, but also ready to attack any persons that came in their way, provided the danger was not too great to themselves. In some of these expeditions the Indians have been known to penetrate the settlements to the Gulf of Mexico. The troops intended to protect the settlers were scattered among the frontier posts, sometimes hundreds of miles apart, and employed in small detachments in trying to overtake and punish

the raiders. Although the troops were constantly in a state of activity, their efforts were usually fruitless and without effect. If the Indians were followed to the vicinity of their homes, they would receive such reinforcements as to make it necessary for the small detachments of troops to turn back. Mackenzie concluded that the only plan to be followed to bring the Indians to terms was to send one or more large columns of troops, each strong enough to take care of itself, into the country occupied by the Indians and make it untenable for them. Accordingly in the summer of 1871 he conducted an expedition to the Staked Plains. He considered his expedition very unsuccessful, as he was not able to surprise any large party of Indians, and only a few were killed. Still, the experience gained and the knowledge obtained of the topography of the country were of the greatest value to him subsequently. In this campaign, during an affair with a few Indians, Mackenzie became concerned about the safety of a daring young officer who had gone well to the front, and while ordering him back he was himself shot in the leg with an arrow.

Just after reveille on 12 March 1872, a frantic settler staggered into Fort Concho with word of an Indian raid on cattle in the vicinity. Sergeant William Wilson left immediately with a corporal and 20 privates. He found the trail of stolen cattle and followed it all day northwestward into Colorado Valley, Texas. It was there that the 22 troopers engaged and killed 4 Indians, causing both the Comancheros and Indians to flee. For gallantry, Sergeant William Wilson received the first of two Medal of Honors.

On 29 September 1872, Mackenzie led a surprise raid on 262 comanche lodges along the Red River in the Texas Panhandle, capturing 130 warriors and 3,000 Indian ponies and killing at least two dozen Indians. In the late autumn, he smashed the remaining Comanches on the Llano Estacado. The following troopers received the Medal of Honor for gallantry in action during this campaign; First Sergeant William McNamara, Sergeant William Wilson, Second Award, Sergeant William Foster, Corporal William O'Neill, Corporal Henry A. McMasters, Private Edward Branagan, Private William Rankin, Blacksmith James N. Pratt and Farrier David Larkin. In the spring of 1873, flushed with victory, he was confronted with the greatest (and most controversial) challenge of his career.

In a secret meeting at his headquarters, Sheridan ordered him to cross the Mexican border and destroy Kickapoo Indian raiders who had been committing atrocities in Texas and then using Mexico as a sanctuary. Both President Grant and Sheridan had concurred that due to the inability of Mexican authorities to interdict the Indian raiders, the American forces would have to deal with them. Despite the risk of war with Mexico, Mackenzie dutifully took 400 trooper and "Buffalo Soldiers" from Fort Clark, Texas, and force-marched them across the Mexican border.

Thirty-two hours later, the column recrossed the Rio Grande. In that incredibly brief period of time, Mackenzie had led the first American military force into Mexican territory since the Mexican War, ridden 160 miles through Mexico at night with no rest or food, successfully raided a large Kickapoo encampment in a daylight assault, and returned with 40 captured Indian prisoners and 200 ponies. For this expedition the following was published by the Department of War:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS
San Antonio, Texas, June 2, 1873.

GENERAL ORDERS,
No. 6

It is with great pleasure the Department Commander announces to his command the gallant and successful attack by Colonel R. S. Mackenzie, 4th Cavalry, with a portion of his Regiment, upon the combined camps of hostile Kickapoo and Lipan Indians. Having ascertained the location of these tribes, parties of which had just made a devastating raid on the Rio Grande frontier of Texas, Colonel Mackenzie assembled six companies of his Regiment on the evening of May 17th, marched all night, encountering and overcoming the difficulties and obstacles incidental to such marches in a strange country, and struck the Indians at 7 o'clock on the morning of the 18th, killing nineteen warriors, capturing Costilietos, principal chief of the Lipans, forty women and children, and about sixty-five ponies, and destroying three villages with their accumulated property. His own loss was three men wounded-one mortally.

The companies and officers engaged were as follows: Companies A, B, C, E, I, and M, 4th Cavalry; Captains N. B. McLaughlin, Clarence Mauck, John A. Wilcox, E. B. Beaumont, William O'Connel; First Lieutenants W. C. Hemphill, G. A. Thurston, C. L. Hudson, D. Lynch, Jr.; Second Lieutenants O. W. Budd, R. G. Carter, U. G. White, C. A. P. Hatfield, H. W. Martin, all of the 4th Cavalry, and Second Lieutenant and Adjutant L. O. Parker, 4th Cavalry, and acting Assistant Surgeon Donald Jackson.

Colonel Mackenzie reports that all of these officers acted handsomely and deserve consideration, and that every soldier showed, after the terriley hard ride, a creditable eagerness to attack. The following extracts from Colonel Mackenzie's report are published here as a carefully considered and deserved tribute to his command:

"It was however the good fortune of Captain N. B. McLaughlin and his company (I, 4th Cavalry), to be in the advance of the column, and I feel called on to mention the very gallant manner in which himself and Lieutenant Hudson led the company, the men of which acted gallantly, to the extent of rashness. I also wish to mention Lieutenant Bullis, with the Seminole Scouts, who behaved, under command of that gallant officer, very well. I wish it understood, in making special mention of these officers, that others very probably would have acted quite as handsomely, but from leading the advance they attracted notice more especially. In an Indian fight officers and men soon get so scattered in the pursuit that is perfectly impossible to give to each his proper credit. I mentioned Lieutenant Hudson specially this time, and should have done so before for gallantry on the North fork of Red River. I also wish to mention my Adjutant Lieutenant Parker, and Doctor Jackson for gallantry and good conduct.

"My loss was three men wounded. Private Peter Carrigan, Co. D, 4th Cavalry, who happened to be here on detached service, and was attached to Company I, was mortally wounded; Private William Pair, of I Company, 4th Cavalry, a splendid old soldier who has served in the regiment since its organization, losses his right arm near the shoulder; Private Leonard Kippenbarger, Co. E,, 4th Cavalry, slightly wounded in the face, is now on duty."

Colonel Mackenzie also specially commends the conduct of Captain Mauck, who was quite ill at the time, but insisted upon going with his company when informed, that it was likely to get into a fight.

He also expresses himself under obligations to Lieutenant Colonel Shafter, 24th Infantry, commanding Fort Duncan, for his cordial cooperation and his active support throughout.

The Commanding General tenders to Colonel Mackenzie and his gallant command his thanks and congratulations for the very handsome manner in which they accomplished this perilous and difficult work. The cheerful and ready conduct of the men under the unavoidable privations, having nothing to eat for nearly two days but a little hard read, is quite as creditable to them as their gallantry in the fight. It is believed that few repetitions of this effective and summary punishment would give quiet to that portion of the Rio Grande frontier so long outraged by these Indians.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL

C. AUGER:

CHAUNCEY McKEEVER,

Assistant Adjutant General

OFFICIAL:

Cohn Augur

Aide-de-Camp.

For this action the Legislature of the State of Texas met in extra session and by a joint resolution thanked Colonel Mackenzie and his men for their work. It is said that this is the only instance in the history of the Army where a commonwealth met in extra session for the sole purpose of duty of this nature.

The picture of this determined commander is continued by Capt. Dorst as follows: "This affair caused a great deal of excitement at the time, and was the cause of considerable correspondence between our government and that of Mexico, but Mackenzie had the assurance of the support of General Sheridan and also of the Secretary of War, and in time the matter was amicably adjusted.

In 1874 many of the Comanches, Kiowas and Cheyennes on their reservations in Indian territory, became discontented and joined the renegades who lived habitually on the Staked Plains. Mackenzie launched a major campaign against the large gathering of Indians. The subsequent burning of the Indian stronghold at Polo Duro Canyon shattered Lone Wolf's control over the combined tribes. Sheridan personally commended Mackenzie, referring to the operation in an official report to the President as "the most comprehensive and successful campaign in this country since its settlement by whites." There were one thousand and forty horses captured during this campaign. The following day all captured horses were destroyed to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Indians. Several other small engagements took place in November and December, after which the troops returned to their posts.

From September 26 through September 28, 1874, 3 troopers received the Medal of Honor for Gallantry in an attack on a large party of Cheyennes in Red River, Texas; Private Gregory Mahoney, Private William McCabe and Corporal Edwin Phoenix.

On November 3, 1874, Farrier George Ernest Vauve earned the Medal of Honor in a gallant manner in which he faced a desperate Indian during the Staked Plains Campaign. Two days later, Corporal John W. Comfort earned the award during the same campaign when he ran down and killed an Indian. A month later, 3 more troopers received the Medal of Honor for Gallantry in a long chase after the fleeing Indians across the Staked Plains; Private Frederick Bergerndahl, Private John O'Sullivan, 2LT Robert Carter and 1LT Lewis Warrington for combat with 5 Indians.

In 1875, the Fourth Cavalry was ordered to take station in Indian Territory with headquarters at Fort Sill. On March 22 they rode into Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Mackenzie also commanded the troops at the Cheyenne Agency, where Fort Reno has since been located, and those at the cantonment on the present site of Fort Elliot. The Indians had returned to their reservations, but owing to the depredations of white horse thieves on the Indians' herds, it was a difficult matter to hold them there. It was not an unusual thing for a hundred head of ponies to be stolen from an Indian Camp in one night, and horses belonging to officers and picketed near their quarters, were stolen at midday. Before the year was out, the energetic measures taken by Mackenzie produced a complete change in that condition of affairs.

After Custer was killed in 1876, Mackenzie was ordered with six troops of his regiment to Camp Robinson, Nebraska, and on arrival was assigned to the command of the District of the Black Hills, which placed under his orders the Indians at Red Cloud and Spotted Tail Agencies. As Chief Red Cloud had shown a disposition to ignore his authority, and failed to obey the instructions to move camp close to the Agency, he was awakened one morning by the troops, who had ridden forty miles during the night and surrounded his camp. He was required to surrender his arms and horses, and the latter were taken away and sold, while he was deposed by General Crook from his position of authority in his tribe.

From November 1 to December 31, 1876, Mackenzie commanded the Cavalry force of the Powder River expedition under General Crook. On the morning of November 25th, after a night march, the cavalry surprised a hostile camp in the Big Horn mountains, destroyed 173 lodges, captured 600 ponies, and killed and wounded 100 Indians. Mackenzie's loss was one officer and six men killed and twenty-five wounded." This fight was known as the Capture of Dull Knife's Village and is

described by Captain John G. Bourke, U. S. A. Third Cavalry whose account is said by Doctor Grinnell to be "by far the best narrative that we have of this fight, but written wholly from the military point of view." On November 25, First Sergeant Thomas Hall though dangerously wounded, maintained his ground with a small party against a largely superior force rescued his commanding officer after he had been shot and a comrade from the enemy. The following is a description of the fight taken from Doctor Grinnell's book. The Fighting Cheyennes: "The grey dawn of November 26th was just breaking when the order was given to charge, and the column rushed out into the wider valley, where were seen standing the white lodges of the Cheyennes. Soon the thunder of many hoofs and loud war songs of some of the Indian scouts, which their officers could not check, reached the ears of the people in the camp, many of whom had just gone to bed. Warning cries were heard, and as the shooting began, men, women and children rushed from the lodges.

The Pawnees had been ordered to keep up the left bank of the stream until they had passed the village, and then to swing across the stream and meet the cavalry that was coming up the right bank, thus surrounding the village. Just before they reached the lodges, an English-speaking Pawnee, Ralph Weeks, who was with Mackenzie, shouted across the creek to the Pawnees to cross over to the right bank, as there was no trail up the side the Pawnees were on. "Major North," who commanded the Indian scouts, "at once turned down the bank into the stream and crossed, and the Pawnees moved along abreast of the Shoshoni, who at length turned to the left, and went up on the mountain side that overlooked the village. The Pawnees kept on into the village.****

A group of Cheyennes had taken possession of a ravine, and were seen hurrying through the mist, and trying to get in front of and to hold back the troops. Lieutenant McKinney, with his company of the Fourth Cavalry, was sent to this place to dislodge them. He set out, but presently, before reaching a ravine with cut banks which could not be crossed and which he could not yet see, the Indians fired upon him and his command, killing McKinney, wounding a number of men and killing several horses. Lieutenant McKinney received seven wounds, four of which were fatal. The troops dismounted, and, charging into the ravine, killed all the Cheyennes who were still there.****

Meantime, the troops of Captain Wirt Davis of the Fourth Cavalry and Captain Hamilton, Fifth Cavalry, were hotly engaged, and might have suffered severely but that Lieutenant Schuyler took his Shoshoni scouts up among the rocks above the Cheyennes, and by a hot fire drove them away. Captain Hamilton showed great bravery and even sabred one or more of the Indians.****

About two o'clock Major North and the Pawnees were ordered "to return" to the village and camp there, and destroy it. The lodges were pulled down, the lodge-poles heaped together, and clothing, weapons, dried meat, robes-all were piled together ready for burning.

'In the village were many articles which had belonged to the Seventh Cavalry or its members, for Dull Knife's village had taken active part in the Custer fight.****

When the Pawnees kindled their fires for cooking supper the Cheyennes from the hillsides began to shoot at them at long range, and to drop bullets close to the fire. One Cheyenne had a heavy gun, and at intervals of about ten minutes would fire a shot at the Pawnee cook-fire. While Major North and his brother were sitting on a log near the fire a shot killed a mule about twenty feet in front of them. More than once dirt knocked a tin cup off a log on the other side of the fire. At length Major North has the Pawnees build a breast work of bundles of captured dried meat on the other side of the fire, and behind his shelter they ate their food in quietness. That night the village was fired, and from the Hills the Cheyennes saw their property destroyed. * * *

The morning after the destruction of the village no enemies were to be seen, and Indian scouts sent out found that the Cheyennes has gone away to a distance of six miles. On November 27, therefore, the troops moved away carrying, under the special charge of Lieutenant Wheeler, their dead on the backs of pack mules, and their wounded on travois made of lodge poles taken from the village. Two or three days later they reached the main camp."

To continue Captain Dorst's story: "In May, 1877, he (Colonel Mackenzie) was ordered back to Fort Sill, where he remained until winter, when he was transferred to Texas with headquarters at Fort Clark, and placed in the command of the District of the Newces. He crossed the Rio Grande with a large force in June, 1878, intending to operate against raiding Indians and cattle thieves, but the expedition failed owing to the illness of a guide and the failure to find water. While leisurely returning to the nothe side of the Rio Grande, Mexican troops appeared in his front, and demanded that he turn around and return to Teas by the route he came. This he refused to do, but notified them that he intended to return by the road to the nearest ford, which was about thirty distant, and that as they had formed across that road in his front, he would fight if they attempted to stop him. On his advancing the Mexicans retired, though they hovered about till the third day afterward when he re-crossed the river into Texas. The vigilance of our troops during the summer, and the measures taken by Mackenzie soon put an end to the border troubles in his district.

In the fall of 1879, after the murder of Agent Meeker by the Utes, and the death of Major Thornborough, Mackenzie was ordered from Texas to Fort Garland, Colorado, where he was employed during the winter in preparing and expedition, known as the Fort Garland Column. This column was to proceed in the spring to the Los Pinos Agency on the reservation of the Uncompahgre Utes. The following summer was passed quietly in the vicinity of the agency, and in the fall Mackenzie was ordered east. While there, the Department of Arkansas was organized, and the President assigned him to its command, placing him on duty according to his brevet rank.

In that year, 1881, after certain formalities had been concluded as agreed in a treaty, the Utes were to surrender their reservation and move to another in Utah. When the time came for them to go, they at first demurred, and then flatly refused. Mackenzie had made acquainted with their views and disposition, and several months before the time for them to move, saw that their opposition would probably lead them to take this step. The military has no authority to assume control over them until they committed some act of taking place. A refusal to go would merely be a matter between the Indians and the Interior Department, but if they felt strong enough to defy the government to that extent

and were not at once taken in hand by the troops, it was extremely probable that they would commence hostilities. Mackenzie repeatedly represented this danger to his military superiors, and asked for instructions to govern him, but could get no satisfactory answer. The only one he got was that when the Indians refused to move he should refer the matter to Washington, where the case would be laid before the Secretary of the Interior, who would decide what should be done. Mackenzie replied that when the emergency arose there would be no time to refer to the Secretary of the Interior or to anyone else, but that action would have to be taken at once, on the spot, by the officer in command of the troops; that the responsibility for such action would therefore have to be borne by himself, and by himself alone, which placed him in a false position, for if the blame should afterwards attach to any one, he would be the one that would have to bear it; but as the responsibility was to be forced upon him, he would assume it and do the best he could. Then, in a spirit of perfect subordination and in order to reduce to a minimum the danger that would result from the laying to exercise military control over a tribe of hot-tempered Indians, while waiting orders from Washington, he hurriedly constructed eighty miles of telegraph lines that put him in communication with that city, and had it completed only three days before the Indians were to start. When they finally refused, the agent asked them to wait till he heard what the Secretary of the Interior had to say, to which they consented. The Secretary at once turned them over to the War Department, and the next day when the chiefs and head men came to the agency to get their answer, the agent told them that General Mackenzie would give it to them, and was waiting to receive them at the cantonment, about four miles distant. Accordingly they went over to see him, about twenty in number, with their arms in their hands, their bows strung and in a very ugly humor. After the talk began, it soon became evident that the Indians were trying to temporize and to avoid committing themselves, proposing all sorts of expedients and compromised, and that they had no intention of moving at all. At this point Mackenzie told them that he had no time to waste words; that he was ordered to see that they moved to their new reservation and he was going to see that they did; that there was no other question under discussion; that it remained with them to decide whether they would go peacefully or by force and he wanted an answer as to whether they intended to go peacefully, yes or no. He would save them alone in his office to come to a decision, and when they had reached it, if they would send for him he would come to hear it. With that he put on his hat and went and went to his quarters. The Indians were dumfounded. They were unaccustomed to such summary treatment, and were so impressed by his decision, his coolness, his daring, his strong personality, that in less than ten minutes they sent for him, their air of defiance all gone and the Ute question in Colorado was sealed. It was an emergency, and Mackenzie had been equal to it. He considered what he did on this occasion as the greatest deed of his life. The scene was intensely dramatic. Mackenzie, with a few officers, all unarmed and surrounded by about twenty armed and defiant warriors, by his earnestness, by his determined manner, by his bold attitude, by his great force of character, in one moment struck the Indians with awe, and inspired the officers with profound admiration.

As he rose to leave the meeting it seemed as if there were no one present but him, and the silence was that of death. There was hardly another man in the army that could have done it. An Indian war, with the loss of many valuable lives and millions of property was averted.

On April 23, 1882, 2 troopers received the Medal of Honor at Horseshoe Canyon, New Mexico for assisting, under fire, to rescue a wounded comrade; 1LT Wilber Elliott Wilder and Wagoner John Schnnitzer.

Mackenzie was ordered to Fort Apache, and on his arrival was placed by General Sherman in command of all the forces in the field, but he did not see that he could be of any use and asked to be recalled, which was soon done. He was then sent to Santa Fe to command the District of New Mexico, where he remained till the fall 1883. In October, 1882, he was promoted to the grade of brigadier-general, and in November 1883 was placed in command of the Department of Texas, thus leaving the 4th Cavalry. He departed leaving the Regiment as the only unit to never loose a battle to the Indians. A few weeks afterwards his health gave way, and in March, 1884, he was placed on the retired list for disability contracted in the line of duty. He later died, attributed to seven war wounds, and is buried at West Point. His nickname given by the Indians, lives today, "Bad Hand - Chief of the Long Knives."

In the year 1884 Geronimo, the Apache, went on the war path and was followed by 4th Cavalry troops all over Arizona and into Mexico. On May 15, 1886, Sergeant Samuel Henry Craig received the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry during an attack on a hostile Apache Indian camp in the Santa Cruz Mountains. Geronimo was finally captured by Troop B under command of Captain H. W. Lawton, assisted by other troops consisting of Infantry and a large detachment of Indian scouts. The capture was effected on September 5th, 1886. Troop B under Captain Lawton left Fort Huachuca, the station of their Regiment, for station at Fort Myer, Virginia, and in the same year attended the Philadelphia Centennial celebration. On March 7, 1890, Sergeant James Thomas Daniels received the Medal of Honor for untiring energy and cool gallantry under fire in an engagement with Apache Indians. The Regiment remained in Arizona without and particularly important happenings until 1890 when it was moved to California, Washington, Idaho and Wyoming stations where it remained until the beginning of the Spanish American War.

When war with Spain was declared in 1898 the troops of the Fourth Cavalry were located in different posts in California, Washington, Idaho and Wyoming. These stations were so far from the seat of war in Cuba that the outlook for active participation was most discouraging. After Admiral Dewey had defeated the Spaniards at Manila Bay, he called for troops to protect the Islands. This changed the whole situation. The Regiment changed from last place to first place on the list of troops to be sent to the front.

The troops recruited to full strength of 100 men each were ordered to the Presidio of San Francisco. The first of the regiment to sail were Troops C, E, G, I, K and L under the command of Major Kellogg. This squadron, as it was called, stopped at Honolulu for about ten days, because of a rumored native uprising, and until the U. S. Cruiser, "Philadelphia" could arrive for the Flag raising in Hawaii, which had recently been declared part of the U. S. Territory.

On landing at Manila in August the troops were quartered in the Spanish Marine Barracks, where they learned of the concentration of the Philippine forces around the walled city. General Merritt refused to allow the Philippine forces to enter the "walled city." This caused them to distrust the Americans and it soon developed into a mutual antagonism and distrust. The first actual bloodshed occurred when two American soldiers after shooting up a joint were killed by a patrol of Philippine soldiers. For this the troopers turned out but soon everything was quiet. From this time on the self-control and discipline of the troopers were sorely taxed by the continual insults from the Philippine soldiers, the exhausting climate and the heavy outpost and guard duty. In writing of the events of those days, Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant J. R. Malsbury says "too much praise cannot be given to our seasoned non-commissioned officers for their successful restraint of the impulsive recruits; the latter could not understand orders that required them to swallow insults for which they would fight at home."

Meanwhile the treaty with Spain had been signed and in interpreting the provisions of the treaty General Merriam, in command of the U. S. forces, ordered the horses, which had been shipped for the regiment, unloaded and issued to the troops in Hawaii. Troops I and K had been issued native ponies which turned out to be of excellent service to the troops.

The Filipinos had become more and more insulting an active and they could be seen digging entrenchments and throwing up works. They finally provoked a fight by one walking across the outpost line and not answering to the challenge. The sentry fired on him and a volley from the insurgent line followed. Intermittent firing along the line continued throughout the night and at 8 a. m. the order came for the U. S. Army forces to attack. The troops attacked with courage and swept the insurgents back to the hills. At the first alarm part of the troops were given the duty of patrolling the streets of the city to prevent an uprising and only half of the troops were fortunate enough to get into the action.

The insurgent capital was at Malolos, which lay north of Manila on the railroad. When the movement on Malolos became apparent the insurgents concentrated on the north side of the city, which left the south side comparatively peaceful. The mounted squadron of the Fourth Cavalry consisted of Troops E, I and K and was commanded by Captain Wheeler. It moved north against the insurgents saving the dismounted squadron, consisting of Troops C, G and L behind. The mounted squadron took part in the capture of Malolos. The dismounted squadron was with General Lawton at the capture of Santa Cruz.

After the capture of Santa Cruz, General Lawton returned to Manila where he was placed in command of another independent column, which was to move north up the right of the river. This route practically paralleled the railroad, and relieved the pressure in front of General McArthur, who was moving north up the railroad. First one objective and then another was reached, but not without the

utmost difficulties. The troops lived on half rations most of the time. The transportation of supplies was most difficult on account of poor condition of the roads during the rainy season, and the rivers were used as much as possible to transport the supplies. The native population had to be furnished food as well as the troops, so that the rations were always low.

During this movement up the river the troops engaged in many skirmish of more or less importance. It was during this movement that eleven enlisted men and two officers were recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor, one first sergeant was recommended for a commission and two officers were given brevet ranks for bravery.

In August, 1898, the mounted squadron was ordered back to Manila to comply with War Department orders to discharge all men enlisted for the war. Then followed months of hard work for the depleted troops.

August 1899 saw the whole regiment on duty in the Islands. The part of the regiment which had remained in the United States at the outbreak of the war had been ordered for Philippine duty and sailed in June of that year. On May 13, 1899, Private Peter H. Quinn received the Medal of Honor for taking 11 other scouts, without waiting for the supporting battalion to aid them or to get into a position to do so, charged over a distance of about 150 yards and completely routed 300 of the enemy who were in line and in a position that could only be carried by a frontal attack.

In the fall of 1899 the Fourth was again a part of the expedition to move north under General Lawton which had as its objective the capture of the Insurgent President Aguinaldo and his Headquarters at Tarlac. This movement was over about the same ground as the former one, which was to relieve the pressure in front of General McArthur. Many severe fights took place and the usual difficulties of transportation had to be overcome, but the Regiment acquitted itself with its usual energy and success. Colonel Hayes commanded it on this expedition. When he assumed command the men were inspired by a confidence which comes from being led by an experienced soldier. On August 26, 1899, 1LT Matthew A. Batson and Captain Hugh J. McGrath received the Medal of Honor for swimming the San Juan River in the face of the enemy's fire and drove him from his entrenchments.

The northern expedition along with its success and well remembered happenings suffered the loss of two officers who had gained personal success and glory as well as official recognition while members of the command. Captain McGrath who had been awarded the Medal of Honor on the previous expedition, died of wounds at Manila. He was grieved by all. General Lawton was killed at the capture of San Mateo. This town had been taken twice before, once by Troop B. General Lawton was a First Lieutenant and Captain in the Fourth Cavalry from 1871 to 1888 and was in command of Troop B when Geronimo was captured. The loss of these two officers was keenly felt by all in the Regiment.

In January 1901, the Fourth Cavalry was assigned to duty with the expedition in southern Luzon. This part was for the subjugation of the insurgent forces in the southern part of the Island. This too was accomplished after some severe fighting which became less severe as the troops progressed and by March everything was comparatively quiet.

In August 1 of 1901 the Regiment embarked for the United States on the Transport "Hancock." At Nagasaki the Regiment departed itself so well on shore leave that the discipline was on universal comment. Just before landing in San Francisco the men were issued a new khaki uniform, new hat and leggings and when they marched downed the gang-plank they were pronounced the "Neatest outfit that's landed." The Colonel received many on the conduct of the men at San Francisco. The excellent discipline exhibited was gratifying to all members of the Fourth Cavalry which had the most trying service in the Islands. During this tour of duty it had engaged in one hundred and nineteen skirmishes and battles.

The Regiment soon entrained for their new stations in the west, the three squadrons being stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. There they remained until the fall of 1905 when they were again sent to the Philippine Islands, and in 1906 took part in the famous fight at Bud Dajo. The Regiment remained in the Philippines until 1907 when it was again returned to the United States and was stationed at Fort Meade, South Dakota, except the Third Squadron which was sent to Fort Snelling, Minnesota. The next two years were spent on the Mexican border and in 1913 the Regiment sailed for Honolulu, Hawaiian Territory where it stayed until 1919 when it again was sent to the Mexican border.

In 1925, after about six years' border duty, the Regiment was ordered to the north. Regimental Headquarters and Second Squadron went to Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming, and the First Squadron to Fort Meade, South Dakota, where it was joined by the remainder of the Regiment in 1926. The regiment remained at Fort Meade, South Dakota until January 1943.

However, during the ensuing years, up to 1935, many important peace-time movements were made; much military strategy along modern lines developed. It was a period of intensive training and development for officers and men.

Under command of Col. W. L. Luhn, during the year 1930, the annual practice march was completed during the month of July, when the troops, with full accouterments, marched over a wide territory, visiting various towns in the Black Hills.

Colonel O. W. Rethorst was in command of the Regiment during the years 1931 and 1933. In 1931 the Regiment maneuvered for a thirteen-day period visiting the following spots in South Dakota: Deadwood, Spearfish, Belle Fourche, Orman Dam, Vale, and back to the Fort. Maneuvers in the vicinity of Orman Dam were seriously disturbed by a serious dust storm which disrupted the encampment as well as the morale of the men. During 1932 similar maneuvers were performed, the Regiment visiting the following places: Deadwood, Pactola, Hill City, Custer, State Game Lodge, Keystone, Sheridan and Rapid City.

In 1932, Troop A was made the show troop of the Regiment, an honor which had been held for several years by Troop F. Troop A featured a combined mounted and dismounted sham battle attack which was considered by military authorities to be an outstanding military exhibition.

With the coming of 1933, a new and very important duty was assigned to Fort Meade officers, when the U. S. Army assumed charge of the Civilian Conservation Corps throughout the United States. The Fourth Cavalry eventually had direct camp supervision over some twenty-five camps scattered over vantage points throughout the state of South Dakota.

In 1933, Colonel W. R. Pope, executive officer for two years, advanced to command. He remained at the head of the military organization until he was assigned, in July, 1935, to duty in the Panama Canal Zone.

During the months of October and November, 1934, the one and one-half ton cargo trucks and Scout Cars were received and placed in active service. In the Regimental organization which followed immediately, Headquarters Troop strength was increased by the addition of the Transportation and Scout Car Platoons. Wagon transportation, for field service, which the regiment had long since become accustomed to, was entirely abandoned and the new methods of truck service were inaugurated instead.

With the orders directing Colonel W. R. Pope to duty in the Canal Zone, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Barry was assigned as commander of the Fourth Cavalry, in July, 1936, pending the arrival of Colonel R. Mc C. Beck.

As war swept Europe in 1940, the 4th Cavalry Regiment began to organize for modern warfare. A new type of Cavalry came into existence: one squadron of horse and the other mechanized. They were called the Horse-Mechanized Corps Reconnaissance Regiments. The 4th Cavalry became one of these regiments and participated in the great maneuvers of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee in 1941.

By 1942 the Army had decided that all Corps Reconnaissance Regiments should be completely mechanized. So it was that the Regiment turned in the last of its beloved horses at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, in the Spring of 1942.

The 1st Squadron was issued M-5 Light Tanks, and in January 1943 the Regiment left Fort Meade, South Dakota for the last time and headed for the Mojave desert to prepare for the North African Campaign. In July they moved to Camp Maxey, Texas, but the 4th never entered the North African Campaign. Instead, in the fall of 1943 the Regiment moved to Camp Shanks, New York and prepared to go overseas to England.

The 4th Cavalry sailed for England in the late fall of 1943, arriving just before Christmas. Immediately upon arrival, the Regiment underwent a designation change. The 1st Squadron became the 4th Reconnaissance Squadron and the 2nd Squadron became 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. Regimental Headquarters was renamed the 4th Cavalry Group Mechanized. The group was assigned as a reconnaissance unit for the VII Corps and conducted extensive training in preparation for the Invasion of Europe.

The Normandy Campaign 6 June - 14 July 1944 marked the first appearance of elements of the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in combat during WWII. Rehearsed plans called for a piecemeal commitment of the Squadron with three separate missions assigned for the initial phases of the invasion. Elements of Troop A, 4th Squadron, together with elements of Troop B, 24th Squadron, were formed into an especially trained Task Force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Dunn. A reduced operation headquarters was selected from the 4th Squadron's normal headquarters staff. The mission of this force was to seize and hold the Isles of St Marcouf, 6000 yards off the portion of the beaches where American Forces would invade the Continent.

For the second mission, Troop B was detached from the 4th Squadron and attached to the 82nd Airborne Division. One platoon was to land on Utah Beach shortly after H-Hour and fight its way inland to effect a link-up with the parachute and glider force near STE MERE EGLISE. The remainder of Troop B was ordered to land on D plus 1 and join the advance platoon in the same area. Following the junction, all elements would be employed as directed by the Division Commander. Troop C, attached to the 101st Airborne Division, had a somewhat similar mission. The troop was to land on UTAH BEACH on D plus 1, contact the 101st and be used thereafter as the Division Commander should direct. Remaining elements of the Squadron were scheduled to land on UTAH BEACH on the 16th of June, after which the Squadron would be consolidated, with the exception of Troop B, to function as one unit on whatever missions the VII Corps Commander directed.

As the first wave of bombers and gliders swept overhead and before naval guns opened up on shore defenses, the Task Force commanded by Colonel Dunn boarded assault craft and headed for the islands. At 0430, two hours before H-hour, this task force effected a seaborne landing.

The landing craft waited off shore in the early morning darkness, broken only by the brilliant flashes of crashing artillery. Corporal Harvey S. Olsen and Private Thomas C. Killoran, Troop A, 4th Squadron, and Sergeant John W. Zanders and Corporal Melvin F. Kinzie, 24th Squadron, each armed with only a knife, swam ashore to mark the beaches for the assault force. These four men thus became the first American Ground Force troops to invade French soil. The two islands were taken without opposition other than a thick network of mines and sporadic shelling from coastal batteries. With the positions consolidated, Colonel Dunn dispatched the first message to be received aboard the VII Corps Command Ship reporting the mission accomplished. The Task Force secured the islands until the arrival of a friendly anti-aircraft unit on the following day.

The 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron seized the Iles St Marcouf and was employed as the Corps security from the time they reached the mainland until the 15th June. During this period, the force had also patrolled aggressively from the Corps Command Post in the vicinity of Audouville la Hubert. By the 18th of June, the Squadron had been consolidated with the exception of Troop B, which was still engaged in patrolling missions west of the Douve River.

The Port of Cherbourg was the new objective. The Squadron was ordered to relieve the Third Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, in the vicinity of Vasteville. From this position, the Squadron could protect the left and rear flanks of the 9th Division which was preparing for the final assault on the prize port of Cherbourg. On the 21st of June the Squadron was relieved and moved to new positions to probe enemy defenses in the vicinity of St Croix. The 4th Cavalry Group Commander selected fifteen successive objectives, capture of which cleared the western coast of the peninsula and deprived the Germans of an opportunity to escape by sea. Over 400 prisoners were captured by the Squadron. The Squadron assisted the 101st in the mopping up of scattered German forces in the Cape Hague Peninsula. On July 15th, the Squadron was pulled back out of line to refit in preparation for the impending mission, The Breakthrough at Marigny. Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Dunn was transferred to Group Headquarters to act as that unit's Executive Officer and Lieutenant Colonel John F. Rhoades assumed command of the Squadron. The hedgerow fighting of the Cherbourg Peninsula Campaign had drawn to a close and every element of the Squadron had been introduced to actual warfare in thirty-nine furious days of combat. The Squadron's first campaign had been tiring and costly; 138 casualties, including 24 officers and men killed in action.

Enemy resistance in the Cotentin Peninsula had ended and two American Armies, the First and Third, were now poised, ready for the "Breakthrough at Marigny," from 15 July - 1 August 1944. The two armies were ready to smash out of the hedgerow country. Following the massive aerial bombardment, the First would open a gap to allow the Third's armor to break out into the flat, open "tank country" south of Marigny. Combat Command "B", 3rd Armored, moved south in one column on the Lis Champ - De Losque - Marigny road and seized Marigny and pushed southwest on the Marigny - Coutances highway. The 4th Squadron followed immediately behind CCB and peeled off to the north and west to screen the armor's spearhead. The screen then extended to tie up with the attacking 9th Infantry Division, which was ordered to sweep south on the right flank of the 1st Infantry Division. The 18th Infantry Regiment (Motorized) was to follow the 4th Squadron with the mission of relieving CCB in the Camprond Le Breton Vicinity. Troop C, 4th Squadron was attached directly to the Assistant Division Commander with the mission of turning southwest from Marigny to effect a screen in the vicinity of Cametours.

With American armored spearheads racing south to exploit the breakthrough of the First Army, strong enemy forces were putting up a stiff fight for Mortain from 2 August thru 14 August, 1944. The veteran 1st Infantry Division had taken the town several times against bitter resistance from elements of the elite 7th German Army entrenched on the high ground east of the city. From the 2nd to the 7th of August the 4th Squadron continued its screening mission along the right flank of the 1st Division. While the Division was engaged at Mortain the Squadron established a 15 mile-long screen line south of the city to secure the eastern fringe of the gap through which other American forces passed as they pressed the attack southward. Massed northeast and east of this flank was the powerful 7th German Army which on the 7th of August launched an all-out assault in an effort to cut across the base of the peninsula and to trap Third Army spearheads striking south and east.

Pushed back into the Falaise pocket, the German Seventh Army now faced encirclement. The rapid American thrust to the east and the British-Canadian advance south threatened to close the enemy's last escape corridor at Falaise. Racing to close the gap, the First Army swung northward in a huge pincer movement designed to join up with the British Second Army. 1st Infantry deployed along the southern base of the pocket to prevent the enemy escaping to the south into our lateral lines of communication. The Squadron's mission was to screen the Division's left (west) flank in the zone Juvigny - Domfront, mop up enemy forces in that zone and maintain contact with XIX Corps units on the division's left. From the 15th to 18th of August, the Squadron advanced through the Andaine Forest keeping abreast of the 1st Infantry and by nightfall of the 16th, held an 8 mile line stretching from Le Ferriere to Dompierre. Enemy resistance had been negligible. On 17 August the advance of friendly elements on both flanks pinched out the 1st Division and the Group's mission was cancelled. The entire 4th Cavalry Group was then placed in Corps reserve to rest and refit prior to commitment on any further mission.

The "rest period" was to have lasted for one week, but the rapid eastern sweep of American armored and infantry forces had left lengthy supply lines that would have to be safeguarded. On the 19th the Group was ordered to outpost La Loupe and protect the vital supply installations in the town.

The Germans defenses in France had been shattered and the enemy, in complete chaos, was streaming back to the Siegfried Line. The entire western front had become a turmoil of armor racing across France as tank and infantry columns stretching for miles rumbled over every passable road leading Germany. Those were the days of ringing churchbells and wildly cheering crowds....flowing Champagne and Mademoiselles...candy hungry kids who tossed apples, flowers and what have you as the tide of war swept dizzily past their homes and villages.

The 4th Cavalry Group was ordered to proceed from La Loupe to west bank of the Seine River to an area between Melun and Corbeil. The 69 mile road march was made using the secondary and primary roads reserved for the 3rd Armored

Division. The VII Corps was ordered to cross the Seine in the zone right (S) Boundary: Melun, Chaumes en Brie, Monteaux and Les Provins, left (N) Boundary, Corbeil, Meaux, and Chateau Thierry.

The 4th Cavalry Group reinforced by the 759th Lt Tank Bn, reconnoitered the Corps Zone and screen the perimeter Chaumes en Brie - Coulommiers - La Ferte Sous Jouarre - Meaux - Corbeil. The 4th Squadron moved rapidly along the Corps' right flank, initiated reconnaissance northeast from the line; Fontenay Tresigny - Meaux. The 3rd Armored Division was given the first priority in crossing the Seine because the Germans still held Melun on the east bank of the river. The 24th Squadron was given second priority and the 4th Squadron third priority on the engineer bridge near Ponthierry. The Squadron crossed the ridge shortly after midnight on the 26th of August and make a night road march to an assembly area north of Melun on the road to Chaumes en Brie. Each line troop had been reinforced shortly after midnight on the 26th of August and made a night road march to an assembly area north of Melun. Striking northeast toward Fontenay Tresigny, Troop A, fought through mounting enemy opposition to the approaches of the town. After receiving heavy resistance the German Panzerfaust fire, Troop A responded with tank and artillery fire and the Germans abandoned their positions. Troop's C, E and F continued their movement northward severing highways, one of which was the main artery for the German Seventh Army back toward the Siegfried Line. Four German staff cars, six trucks and two motorcycles were blasted off the road as they blundered into the concealed blocks during the night.

On the 28th of August, the Squadron's mission was to recon in advance of the Corps reaching Rheims. It was apparent that the Germans were incapable of offering any organized resistance to the Allied advance.

There was one crossing available to handle the mass of American troops and armor streaming across the Marne River. The Group Commander ordered a rapid search along the river's southern bank for possible fording sites. Troop A, moving along the river east of La Ferte, surprised a group of enemy engineers preparing a small bridge for demolition. Opening up with 37 millimeter cannon and .50 caliber machine gun fire, the troop drove off the Germans and the bridge was captured intact. The demolitions were removed and the bridge was repaired. Troop A crossed the bridge. Troop C crossed the bridge at Meaux. The Squadron continued to move northward along the clogged roads of armored vehicles from the 3rd Armored Division. Troop A was halted after an advance of almost seven miles when leading elements encountered strong forces blocking the highway with dug in tanks and anti-tank weapons. The troop bypassed the positions and continued towards Heuleu. Troop B still moving with 3rd Armored, reached the important rail town of Fismes. The trainmaster reported that an eastward bound German troop train was due in Fismes. The Troop deployed along the road facing the railroad track. As the train ground to a stop, a tremendous barrage of 75 and 37 millimeter cannon, 40 millimeter ack-ack, machine gun and small arms fire blasted the train off the tracks and hundreds of dazed Germans were annihilated as the coaches went up in flames.

The Squadron continued to reconnoiter the Aisne River for crossings. Troop C crossed the Aisne River after a short fierce fight capturing the bridge intact. Troop B clashed briefly with German forces in Soissons, capturing thirty prisoners and knocked out six vehicles, including four halftracks, before it was recalled to the river crossing at Bourg.

Movement northward continued, with the Squadron capturing Montcornet, Rozoy, and Seraincourt. On September 1st, the 4th Squadron was reinforced by Company A, 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion and established a fifteen mile long screen between Rethel and Maranwez. Resistance was almost nonexistent up until reaching Charleville. The Germans defended the approaches to Charleville. The 24th Squadron was ordered to take the town. Charleville was captured but all of the bridges along the Neuse River were destroyed by the fleeing Germans.

Following the capture of Mezieres, the Squadron received orders to march to an assembly area at Phillipville, thirteen miles north of the Franco - Belgian border. The Allied forces continued their pursuit into Germany from 3 September thru 18 September. The Squadron was ordered to determine the German's main line of resistance west of the Siegfried Line between Kalterherberg and Rocherath. Troop A reinforced by a platoon of tanks from Troop F, swung north from camp Elsenborn. This force was the first 4th Cavalry Group unit to cross the pre-war German frontier. Troop C probed the defenses near the town of Rocherath where one platoon suffered heavy losses from a German counter-attack. From the 14th through the 19th of September, the 4th Squadron probed the defenses of the Siegreid Line in this sector in the face of repeated enemy thrusts designed to establish a solid line along the Warche River.

From the 19th of September to the 10th of November, the Group was up against the Siegfried Line. The Squadron's line was comparatively weak as the south flank was wide open with a three mile gap between the flanks of the 4th and 24th. The problem was made more complex by the fact that it was feasible to use only a few vehicles in the defense of the line because of the intensity and regularity of German artillery. Without vehicles, the Squadron's fire power was greatly reduced. Despite these handicaps, the Hofen - Alzen line was held without yielding an inch of territory.

Faced with a tactical problem of holding this wide area in a position that offered no depth, and with absolutely no reserve to ward off a counter-attack, the 4th Squadron tackled its hardest mission since Normandy. On October 3rd, as a thick fog blanketed the front, the Germans attacked the Squadron's extreme north flank and succeeded in driving a platoon of Troop B from an isolated knoll of a densely wooded cliff. The 102nd Cavalry Group took over the positions and on the 10th of November, the 4th Squadron pulled back to Aachen and Eynatten for its first rest period since D-Day.

The rest lasted thirteen days and the period was spent in maintenance, refitting, and entertainment. Aachen and the vaunted Siegfried Line had finally fallen to the First Army, the tide of battle was now drawing up to the Roer River, but progress was tantalizingly slow as American troops edged their way through the damp and gloomy Hurtgen Forest. On the 23rd of November, the 4th Squadron moved into Schevenhutte to take up its role in one of the most dramatic campaigns in World War history...The Battle of the Hurtgen Forest. Assigned a 2000 yards belt of thickforest between the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions, the Squadron attacked dismounted abreast of those units for a net gain of 5000 yards in fifteen days. By December 10th, 84 Officers and men had become casualties. The tired and battered 1st Infantry Division was relieved by the 9th Division on December 10th. The 4th Squadron, despite its heavy casualties, remained alongside the fresh infantry until it reached the edge of the Hurtgen Forest on the 13th of December. After a day's preparation, the Squadron moved into dismounted positions north of Bogheim. Initially taking up defensive positions on the 5th Armored Division's right flank, the Squadron sent nightly patrols to probe the defenses of a small German force still holding out on the west bank of the Roer River in Bogheim and Untermaubach.

On the 16th of December, Von Rundstedt plunged into Belgium with two "crack" Panzer armies. The counter-attack had broken easily through the American thin crust of defense stretching from Malmedy to the Luxembourg border and German armor was slicing through Belgium with alarming rapidity. The U. S. First Army, striving to establish a solid front along the Roer River, was initially ordered to continue its push to that barrier and at the same time prevent the Germans from extending their right flank near Malmedy and Monschau. By the time the Roer's western bank had been cleared Von Rundstedt's winter offensive had driven dangerously close to the Meuse and threatened the American lines of communication at Dinat and Liege. On the 22nd of December, the entire VII Corps was relieved in positions along the Roer and rushed south to help check the offensive that was jeopardizing the entire Allied front.

For the Squadron, The Battle of Bogheim, was the most costliest single operation. Bogheim controlled all approaches to Unteraubach and Obermaubach and had been made into a veritable fortress by elements of the 6th German Parachute Regiment. Troop A was following Troop's B and C, through the fog along one of the approaches to Bogheim, became engaged when the fog lifted. An enemy strongpoint on the eastern outskirts surprised A Troop. A Troop was pinned down under withering machine gun and Panzerfaust fire, and hit the ground in the midst of a mine field. The A Troop commander and several other men were seriously wounded. Troop F was ordered to support Troop A with its tanks and broke from the wood line across an open field where they were engaged by the German 88's. The commander of Troop F was killed and the rest of the crew were critically wounded when their tank was hit. The Troop Commanders of every troop were either killed or seriously wounded and nine platoon leaders evacuated as casualties, besides a twenty-five percent loss in enlisted casualties.

On the morning of the 23rd of December, the 4th Squadron started a long march back into Belgium after the exhausting ordeal at Bogheim. The forward assembly area located in Haversin. Soon after arriving in their assembly area and preparing their defense, an armor and infantry unit attacked and were unsuccessful in penetrating the 4th Squadron's defense.

As 1945 got under way, Von Rundstedt's winter offensive stalled and began to crumble under massive weight of allied aerial and armored assaults. The weather, which until then had been the German's greatest ally, cleared and great fleets of bombers and fighters roamed the sky.

The Squadron had made the long march back to Aachen on the 4th of February. There it underwent a strenuous three-week training and refitting period. The new M-24 had replaced F Troop's old light tanks and it was imperative to retrain nearly 75% of the Troop's personnel on the use of the new weapon system. The M-24 mounted a 75 millimeter gun and carried an operating crew of 5 men.

On the 23rd of February, the 4th Cavalry Squadron crossed the Roer River with the 1st and 9th Division and onto the Cologne Plain. The Squadron seized both Esch and Angelsdorf testing the abilities to fight against the German Tiger Tank. The attack on Esch with the combination of artillery fire from Corps, 87th and Troop E, direct fire from the 635th Tank Destroyer guns and the M-24 tanks were an overwhelming force for the 200 Panzer and Tiger tanks. In the day long battle the 119 Germans had been captured and almost 75 killed. The 4th Squadron had lost three men.

By March 3rd, the German Roer and Erft Canal defenses had crumbled like a piece of dry bread and Allied armor was rolling across the Cologne Plain toward the Rhine.

The push was now for crossing the Rhine River. Troop A and B overran a large German force bivouacked in the textile factory northeast of Hackenbroich and over 100 enemy soldiers, most of them caught sleeping, were captured without firing a shot. Three heavy German tanks came lumbering toward the factory and were destroyed by Troop F armor. The small task force drove into Dormagen after artillery fire disrupted German defense and the town completely cleared it of enemy. From Dormagen, patrols were sent to the bank of the Rhine where they spotted German barges ferrying troops across the river. The patrols called for and adjusted fire on the barges destroying all but two with direct hits. On the 10th of March, Troop E was attached to the 87th Field Artillery and joined that unit to fire on German armored and infantry units moving down the eastern bank of the Rhine in an effort to contain the First Army's Remagen bridgehead.

By March 21st, the Remagen bridgehead was ten miles deep and had been expanded to a width of 23 miles. The 4th Squadron was ordered across the Rhine to take up positions along the Sieg River on the northern fringe of the bridgehead. Troop A launched an assault to eliminate the German foothold south of the river but the attack was thrown back by enemy force estimated to be at least a company size. This did not last long for on the 23rd of March, Allied Armies in the north, including airborne units, swept across the Rhine and the battle of Central Germany was on.

The 4th Squadron marched to Leuscheid on the 27th of March where it relieved 1st Infantry elements holding the southern sector of what was destined to become Ruhr Pocket. On the 30th of March the Squadron moved in one column to Dillenburg closing the ring around the huge German forces holding out in the Ruhr Valley and cutting off the last large war materials.

The Squadron started a long drive north toward Laasphe but was slowed by enemy forces blocking every road to the north. The enemy line was being held by an estimated force of three Panzer Grenadier battalions. The deadly 88 millimeter anti-tank weapons covered every road. Supplied with operational maps by air, Troop C was able to bypass two Panther tanks supporting a road block supporting approaches and completely destroyed the enemy forces in the town. 150 enemy were captured, 36 killed and 30 wounded.

The Squadron received a change of mission after the fall of Hemschlar. Marching sixty miles over roads clogged with freed slaved laborers streaming out of concentration camps, the Squadron reached Brilon and discovered it was already in American hands. The Squadron went to seize in quick succession, Rixen, Wuffte and Willingen.

On April 9th, the 4th Cavalry Squadron was relieved of responsibility in the Brilon sector and moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Dringenburg. The push was on to capture Zellerfeld, a large industrial center. The Squadron was attached the 1st Infantry Division and ordered to push reconnaissance in advance of the Division. The Squadron encountered disorganized German troops which capitulated without a struggle on the outskirts of Zellerfeld. The Squadron met a stiff defense in Zellerfeld, which stymied their advance.

On the 15th of April, the Squadron reverted back to Group control and was ordered to relieve the 413th Infantry in defensive positions between Scharzfeld and Walkenreid. The Squadron built a network of road blocks two miles out of town. These positions were held until the 18th of April.

From the 19th through the 21st of April, the 4th Squadron swept through hundreds of dazed Germans to reach and secure a foothold across the Bode River at Quedlinburg, Warnstedt and Mohringhen capturing 136 Germans before the war ending on the 22nd of April.

Thus ended eleven months of combat for the Fourth Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.... Eleven months of action in the most brutal war in the history of the world...From the blood stained Normandy beaches on D-day, men of the Fourth Cavalry had fought and died together in acts of heroism that will forever be hidden between the lines and words of this composition...known only to those who performed or witnessed them...These were the men that carried the 4th Squadron through the Hedgerow country...the breakthru at Marigny...sweeping the path of the VII Corps' drive across France...Belgium...Germany...These were the men who helped defeat Von Rundstedt's winter offensive and then pushed on to the Rhine and beyond.

On March 1, 1946, the 4th suffered its second designation change. This one was more severe than the first, for the Regiment lost the title of 4th Cavalry. The 4th Cavalry Group became the 4th Constabulary Regiment. The 4th Cavalry Squadron was redesignated the 4th Constabulary Squadron, and the 24th Cavalry Squadron became the 24th Constabulary Squadron. Although the Regiment carried the 4th Constabulary title, it was not a tactical part of the U. S. Forces Austria. The Squadron Headquarters was at Camp McCauley, Linz, Austria (named for Captain McCauley from B Troop) and spread out from PASSAU to ENNS along the Russian Sector.

The Regiment pursued its normal occupation duties in Salzberg until 1949, when the Regiment, as such, was inactivated. The 24th was transferred to Germany to serve with the U. S. Constabulary, until it, too, was inactivated in December 1952. The 4th Constabulary Squadron underwent another designation change. This change saw the unit lose its last bit of cavalry designation, as it became the 4th Reconnaissance Battalion. The troops were called companies.

In late 1951, the 4th was again subject to another designation change. This time it saw the name Cavalry inserted back into its title. Its new designation was the 4th Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion. The Battalion continued its occupation duties until 1955, where the signing of the Austrian Peace Treaty caused the Battalion to be inactivated. The colors and trophies of the 4th Regiment were shipped to Germany and given to newly activated 4th Armor Group.

In the short span of twelve years the 4th Cavalry had been redesignated five times and as a result, all that it retained from its historic title was the numeric designation.

The Department of the Army realized the valuable tradition, history, and the esprit de corps that was being lost through redesignation, and that further losses would result from reorganization under the Pentomic Concept. Under this concept all regiments would become obsolete as tactical organizations.

In order to halt further losses of tradition, the Army introduced the Combat Arms Regimental System in 1957. This system provided for certain number of historic regiments to be retained as parent regiments of Infantry, Artillery, Armor, and Cavalry units. The regiment itself became a group of tactical units bearing the regimental name.

On 15 February, 1957, the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 4th Cavalry was activated as a part of the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas. From 1957 to 1965, the "Quarterhorse" took part in wide variety of training, including a stint as a basic training unit, and one of the earliest deployments to Camp Irwin, California.

The 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry departed the United States for Vietnam in September 1965. The first troops landed at Vung Tau, Vietnam, on 7 October 1965.

Deploying immediately, the Squadron established a base camp at Bien Hoa and later moved to Phu Loi. Each man set out to uphold and continue the traditions of those who had carried the guidons before and through the mud and heat, the muck and slime of the past fifty-four months, the men of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry have courageously striven to do just that.

Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Fisher upon their arrival in Vietnam, the Squadron conducted long range reconnaissance patrols, search and destroy, route security, convoy escort and air cavalry missions. They fought in operations with names like SILVER CITY, BUSHMASTER, MALLET, and ROLLING STONE. The Squadron in addition to its outstanding combat record participated in numerous combined US-ARVN pacification operations such as LAM SON. Many of these were characterized by Medical Civil Action Programs (MEDCAP) which are conducted among the Vietnamese population in need of medical assistance.

On 12 November 1965 at a small village called Bau Bang the Squadron tasted its first war blood. Troop A and the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry (2/2 Infantry) engaged a reinforced Viet Cong Regiment. The first VC attack was in the form of a large probe but was repulsed. A second and third attack followed, but these too were thrown back.

A final attack came within spitting distance of the tanks and armored cavalry assault vehicles (ACAV's), but withering fire from the fifty caliber machine guns and 90mm canister cracked the Viet Cong assault wide open. The enemy relinquished the bloody field of battle leaving behind 198 of their dead.

Troop B fought a courageous battle at Cau Dinh against a Viet Cong Regiment in the early morning hours of 24 February 1966. Once again the Viet Cong suffered severe casualties from the devastating firepower of the cavalry.

In April 1966 Lieutenant Colonel Fisher departed the Squadron to become executive officer of the 1st Brigade and Lieutenant Colonel Leonard L. Lewane assumed command. Under his command, they continued to contribute to the successful combat record of the 1st Infantry Division. They fought in Operations BIRMINGHAM, EL PASO and SHENANDOAH with faraway names like Srok Dong, the Ming Thanh Road and Beach Mark 69.

On 8 June 1966 Troop A, while moving to An Loc, engaged the 272nd Viet Cong Regiment along a desolate stretch of Route 13. For five hot dusty hours, 148 cavalymen with air support fought and defeated a thousand of the enemy. On the following day Troop A saddled up as victors of the battlefield and resumed their march to their original destination at An Loc. This marked the first time that any type of road column had survived a full scale enemy ambush, and inflicted such heavy enemy casualties to boot. For their magnificent courage, Troop A was decorated with the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry.

On 30 June, 1966, Troops B, C, D and HQ with C Company 2-18 Infantry attached, conducting a reconnaissance in force north of An Loc on Route 13, engaged the 271st Viet Cong Regiment. For seven hours, these gallant units attacked the enemy with splendid support from the 8-6th Artillery and US Air Force fighter aircraft. Close to 300 of the enemy fell on this fiery battlefield. SGT Donald Russell Long, Troop C, while conducting the reconnaissance operations along Route 13, was suddenly attacked by a Viet Cong Regiment, supported by mortars, recoilless rifles, and machine guns, abandoned the relative safety of his armored personnel carrier. Sergeant Long braved a hail of fire to come to the aid of the wounded, carried them to evacuation helicopter. He repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire at point blank range by standing unprotected to repel the enemy by rifle fire. He disregarded his own safety to carry the severely wounded members of a disabled carrier to safety. As he was reorganizing his men to press the attack, an enemy grenade was hurled up on top of the vehicle. Realizing that his crew was exposed to the danger, Sergeant Long threw himself over the grenade, absorbing the blast, and saving the lives of eight of his comrades. Throughout the battle, Sergeant Long's extraordinary heroism, courage and supreme devotion to his men were in the finest traditions of the military service, and reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Army. For this extraordinary heroism, Sergeant Russell Long received the Medal of Honor.

Still relentlessly seeking out the enemy Troops B, C, D and HQ with B Company 1-2 Infantry attached, met the enemy on the Minh Thanh Road on 9 July 1966. Firepower from the tanks ACAV's and gunships together with "walls of fire" provided by the artillery and air force so overwhelmed the 272nd Viet Cong Regiment that they broke and fled from the battlefield within two hours after the first enemy were sighted. In this battle, the Squadron was credited with over 250 enemy dead. As a result of these three battles, the Squadron was awarded the United States Presidential Unit Citation.

One month later, on 25 August, in full day and night of fierce fighting Troops A and C, with that 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division engaged the VC main force Phu Loi Battalion, killing 171 and capturing six in a thick jungle base camp area approximately four miles east of Lai Khe and 25 miles north of Saigon off Highway 16.

Members of the 1st Squadron, 4th United States Cavalry have compiled an impressive record of courageous fighting and combat proficiency. High courage, boldness and battlefield endurance have been necessary traits since the Vietnam War first began. It has lived true to the words of General DePuy, the Division Commander, when on 15 April 1966, he said, "I expect this cavalry squadron, if it doesn't already have motto, to adopt that motto of ATTACK."

LTC Thomas W. Fife assumed command in December 1966. Under his direction, the Squadron continued to strike at the Viet Cong. During January 1967, the Fourth Cavalry participated in Operations Niagara Falls and Cedar Falls. The Squadron successfully completed assigned search and destroy, security, and road clearing missions. The Squadron was credited with 37 enemy kills and 96 detainees in the Iron Triangle. These operations had a wider significance in that they relieved VC pressure on Binh Duong Province and facilitated pacification efforts by Vietnamese officials.

The mobility of the Squadron was employed in a series of fastmoving operations from February to April. During the first weeks of February, the Squadron conducted Operations Williston and Tucson Delta at Bau Bang and Minh Thanh respectively. These operations were followed by a lightning move across the Saigon River to Suoi Da in Tay Ninh Province for Operation Junction City. From late February until 15 April 1967, the Fourth Cavalry cleared and secured roads, established fire support and patrol bases, and escorted convoys. The Squadron's northern limit of advance was Katum, practically on the Cambodian border.

The latter part of April found the Squadron at Dau Tieng, participating in Operation Manhattan. The objective was to deprive the VC of safe havens and supply bases before the monsoon season began. In furtherance of this aim, C Troop conducted a search and seal mission at AP14 Chanh. During this action, C Troop surprised a small VC force, killed 12 VC and detained 36 prisoners.

LTC John W. Seigle assumed command of the "Quarterhorse" in the field on 2 June 1967. The Squadron next participated in Operation SHENANDOAH II. Elements of Troop C fought in the battle of Loc Ninh and helped to hand the VC one of the bloodiest defeats of the war. At the conclusion of the operation, the Squadron permanently opened Highway 13. On the 10th of December, C Troop helped fight in the defense of Fire Support Base Caisson 6. This engagement later became known as the battle of Xa Cat. The courage of the men of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry contributed in sending 143 members of the 26th Battalion 165th NVA Regiment to their graves.

The New Year, 1968, brought the Squadron a new commander. LTC Thomas B. Tyree assumed command at Phu Loi. On the 31st of January, during the festivities surrounding the Vietnamese celebration of their Lunar New Year (Tet), the VC initiated a series of attacks against South Vietnam's major cities and Allied military installations, including Lai Khe. Troop C moved into the Ben Cat area, and counterattacked the NVA unit hitting the ARVN compound there. The enemy body count was 45. During the night of 1 February, C Troop conducted a forced march to the battle of An My, and took part in the sweep through the village. Joining B Troop, who was already there, they helped account for the VC battle dead, numbering 132.

The 17th, 18th, and 19th of April found the "Quarterhorse" engaged in a series of heavy battles in the area known as the Catcher's Mitt. During these days the enemy used CS gas, RPG rounds and automatic weapons fire in an attempt to destroy the US forces opposing them. At the end of the fighting, however, there were 100 VC dead.

The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry was engaged in some extremely heavy contact on the 5th and 6th of May. While conducting Recon-in-Force operations north of Di An, B Troop made contact with a commenced in which A Troop also became involved. Heavy fighting continued throughout both days, and as the enemy withdrew, he left 340 dead on the battlefield behind him.

On 11 July, the reins of the Cavalry were handed over to LTC John C. Faith. The 10th of October was a moving day for the "Quarterhorse." They departed Phu Loi, their home for the past three years, and set up a new base camp at De An. Only D (Air) Troop remained at Phu Loi. Their major role for the rest of the year was one of pacification in the area.

January, 1969, saw the appearance of LTC William Haponski as Commanding Officer, the men of the Quarterhorse ranged over a wide area in the early months of the year, patrolling roads, and providing security. In March, they participated in Operation Atlas Wedge. On 30 March, in the Michelin rubber Plantation, west of Lai Khe, the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry contacted the 7th NVA Division in heavy fighting. The clash resulted in 72 VC killed in action, and the capture of 22 AK-47 rifles.

Late Spring, the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry moved north from Di An to Lai Khe base camp. That move facilitated operations in the Division Area of Operations. Reconnaissance in-Force continued in the Iron Triangle and the Trapezoid. On 11 July, LTC John T. Murchison, Jr., assumed command of the unit. Late in that month A Troop moved up to Quan Loi and worked under the Operational Control of the 1st Cavalry. On the night of August 12, 1969, they stopped a large enemy force enroute to attack the Quan Loi base camp, a pitched battle resulted in the rout of VC forces in which 66 VC/NVA were killed. Thus the base camp was saved from a direct assault that night.

September and October saw the men of the "Quarterhorse" providing security for the Quan Loi convoys, on highway 13, and working the road to Song Be.

The "Quarterhorse" operated in the Chanh Luu area from November to 6 January. The emphasis during this time was placed on effective combined operations with ARVN and Regional Forces. These combined operations included extensive road and convoy security missions, as well as ground reconnaissance in force.

Troop D Air provided air cavalry support to the 1st Infantry Division in tactical operations throughout the division area during this year of combat. The troop demonstrated its capability to provide Division wide support at multiple locations on short notice many times throughout the year.

During the year, Troop D Air conducted varied and extensive missions. The main mission of the troop was visual reconnaissance accomplished by "Hunter-Killer" teams, made up of an AH-1 gunship and an OH-6A, light observation helicopter.

The Aero-Rifle-Platoon was inserted in many areas found by air reconnaissance and was very successful in destroying enemy positions and capturing enemy supplies and weapons. The platoon was used many times as a blocking unit and proved successful as a support and reconnaissance force.

Troop D Air mobility and courage was aptly demonstrated during the months of July, August, and September 1969 when led the entire Division in enemy killed, a total in excess of one hundred per month.

All members of Troop D Air fulfilled the mission of the troop, "To Fly and To Fight."

On January 4th, the Squadron changed of command. LTC Frederic J. Brown assumed command and simultaneously received an new mission. The Squadron moved into the C-61 jungle, southwest of Lai Khe. The enemy had used the area as a staging ground for rocket attacks on Lai Khe. The "Quarterhorse" faced the mission of interdicting enemy rocket fire and successfully accomplished this goal.. The threat of Tet 1970 saw the Squadron deploying in platoon size ready reaction forces from Chanh Tanh south to Di An, an area of 50 KM by 30 KM.


In February the Squadron was assigned the mission of screening the redeployment of the Division and thereby became the last maneuver element of the 1st Infantry Division deployed on combat operations in Vietnam. During the time there, the Squadron had inflicted over half the losses on the enemy attributed to the 1st Infantry Division. The Squadron accepted the mission with honor, and accomplished it with distinction until the colors returned to the United States on April 5, 1970.

The Squadron returned to Fort Riley, Kansas in September of 1970. Along with the rest of the 1st Infantry Division. It became a unit whose mission called for it to be ready to reinforce NATO's troops in Europe. In constant training for this mission, the Squadron has participated in numerous REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) Exercises in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Squadron holds the distinction of being dual based, with A Troop assigned to the 1st Infantry Division's 3rd Brigade Forward in Germany.

The Squadron underwent a change of organization in 1986. Opting for a lighter cavalry, the Army transitioned all Divisional Cavalry Squadrons from H-series to J-series. The organization changed to two ground troops and two air troops. Gone was the large D Troop (Air). This organization left the Quarterhorse at Fort Riley with only one ground troop, B Troop, because of the basing of A Troop in Germany.

Through the years, the 4th Cavalry Regiment has gone through changes in redesignation. Up until 16 June 1989, the Regiment consisted of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry located at Fort Riley, Kansas, 2nd Squadron, 4th Cavalry located at Fort Stuart, Georgia, and the 4th Squadron, 4th Cavalry located at Schweinfurt, Germany and A Troop located with the 1st Infantry Division (Fwd). On 16 June 1989, the 4th Squadron, 4th Cavalry was redesignated as the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry. The location did not change.

There is no Regiment in the Army that has finer traditions than the Fourth Cavalry and although the honor and glory is ours by inheritance it is no small task to maintain conduct, discipline and esprit that is in keeping with those handed down to us by the splendid soldiers who have gone before. Therefore let each soldier, now a member of this fine old Regiment, keep ever fresh in his conscience the spirit and meaning of our motto: PARATUS ET FIDELIS - PREPARED AND LOYAL.



NOTE
AFTER ACTION OVERLAYS SUPPLEMENT NARRATIVE
PART AND ARE DESIGNED TO SHOW CRITICAL ZONES
OF ACTION

6 JUNE THRU 20 JUNE

DRAWN FROM GSGS No 4250 - FRANCE 1/50,000
SHEETS 6 E/3 AND 4, 6 E/5, 6 E/6 AND 5 E/4.

TO
SAC, NEW YORK
FROM SAC, PHOENIX
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

THIRD PLAT. TROOP B LAMARCO
9-30 D-BE

THE TROOP A LAMARCO OF
LAW AND ORDER

THIRD PLAT. TROOP C LAMARCO
LAW AND ORDER

MEMBERS OF SOLA
CAME ALMOST ALL
9-17 JUNE

UTAH B

PUTAH BEACH

UTAH BEACH

MONTEBOURG

VALOGNES

Ste MERE EGLISE

St Sauveur
Le Vicomte

BRICQUEBEC

~~2 CAV~~
~~9 DIV~~

19 JUL 1961
BATTLE OF ROCKVILLE
ROCKVILLE


19
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AA-2


EXPLOITATION

7 JUNE THRU 25 JUNE

DRAWN FROM G909 4250 - FRANCE. SCALE 1/50,000
SHEETS 6E/3, 6E/6, 5E/4 AND 5E/6



ENGLISH CHANNEL




A/A-3
COTENTIN "CLEAN-UP"

20 JUNE THRU 10 JULY


DRAWN FROM GSGS 4250 - FRANCE 1/50,000

SHEETS 5E/2 AND 6E/1



A/A-5 VILLEDIEU LES POELES 29 JULY THRU 1 AUG


DRAWN FROM G508 4260-FRANCE 1/50,000
SHEETS 6F/3 AND 6F/3-5



**DEFENSE OF MORTAIN
(GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACK - 7 AUG)**

2 AUG THRU 11 AUG

DRAWN FROM GSGS 4250 - FRANCE 1/50,000
SHEETS 66/2 AND 70/1




A1A-7

SCREENING VII CORPS

11 AUG THRU 19 AUG

DRAWN FROM 6SGS 4230 FRANCE 1/50,000

SHEETS 00/2-66/4-76/1 and 70/3



A/A-8 PURSUIT ACROSS FRANCE

21 AUG THRU 23 AUG

DRAWN FROM GSGS 2738 - FRANCE 1/250,000 SHEET 30/B
AND GSGS 4042 - FRANCE 1/250,000 SHEETS 14 AND 15

FALAISE

ARGENTAN

PARIS

DREUX

VERNEUIL

CHENNEBRIEN

LA FERTE VIDON

MOULINS
LA MARCHE

RCN

SEES

COUTRAIS

ST ANDREAS
COUTRAIS

ALENGON

VILLAINES

FRESNAY-SUR-SARTHE

MORTIGNY

LOMBRY

LA LOUPE

AUG 19-20

21 AUG

20 AUG

21 AUG

21 AUG

21 AUG

21 AUG

CHARTRES

NOGENT-LE-BOTROU

BELLEILL


CHAMPIGNEY

CHAMPIGNEY

CHAMPIGNEY

CHAMPIGNEY

CHAMPIGNEY




A/A-10

PURSUIT INTO BELGIUM

1 SEPTEMBER THRU 9 SEPTEMBER

DRAWN FROM 6969 4042 NORTHWEST EUROPE

SCALE 1/250,000 SHEET 6




PURSUIT INTO GERMANY


10 SEPTEMBER THRU 10 NOVEMBER 44

DRAWN FROM GSGS 4336 BELGIUM AND
FRANCE SHEETS 9 AND FROM GSGS 4416

GERMANY- SHEETS R-10 S-1

SCALE: 1/100,000






A/A-13

"THE BULGE"

22 DECEMBER 44 THRU 3 JANUARY 1945

DRAWN FROM GS09 4336 BELGIUM AND
NORTHEAST FRANCE - SHEETS 12 & 13
SCALE 1/100,000



FOURTH CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON
TROOPERS KILLED AND MISSING IN ACTION
1944 - 1945

KILLED IN ACTION

EDWARD B. ABDO	ARVID C. ANDERSON	GEORGE B. BAASE	WILLIAM H. BIRDHORSE
MARTIN J. BIRINGER	NEAL B. BIVINS	ROBERT L. BLAHA	BANKS R. BOSTIAN
FRANCES W. BREWER	JAMES A. BRINDISI	JESSE J. BROWN	WILBERT P. BRYANT
EMIL A. BUKOWSKI	WILLIAM F. BURGESS	JERRY BYARS	EARL F. CHMELA
ARTHUR CLOWERY	WAYNE CLOYD	CHARLES H. COOPER	JOHN J. COYNE
MARTIN R. DAHL	FREDRICK N. DAVIS	PETER DeBOER	GLEN S. DeBOISE
EDWARD J. DESMOND	WAYNE O. DUNCAN	PAUL W. DUNLAP	CHARLES E. EARHART
RAY G. ELLIOTT	JAMES E. FALON	FRANCIS A. FEE	ANDREW FIERLIT
LEWIS F. FOLEY	CHARLES W. FOOS	GEORGE W. FORBES	LESLIE W. FOSTER
LOUIS M. FOSTER	ALFRED C. GAGNON	R. K. GICZKOWSKI	RALPH C. GLAND
GEORGE GRAY	IRWIN GRITZHANDLER	CHARLIE T. GUY	EDWARD F. HANLEY
ERNEST R. HART	WARREN L. HAWKS	RAYMOND HAZEL	CHARLIE L. HOLLEMAN
GEORGE H. HOLMES	ROBERT HORLICK	WILLIAM S. HORTON	OSCAR HOWELL
GEORGE E. JACKSON	VICTOR S. JERZEWSKI	GEORGE C. KELLEY	LEHMON KILBY
ALVIN L. KING	NORMAN J. KLINKE	JOHN J. KLOCKOWSKI	JOHN J. KOMATAR
GUS LEONDEDIS	WILLIAM J. LIDDELL	ROBERT S. LOGSDON	JACK D. LYNN
ENRIETT W. McGEHEE	MILO F. MANION	ERNEST B. MESSER	MANUEL J. MENDEZ
ELMER W. MIDDAGH	MELVIN G. MISSLING	ALBERT J. MORETTI	WILLIAM MOSS
KNUTE MYHREN	GEORGE L. NYBORG	NORBERT J. OCONNELL	LEN O. OLSEN
JOHN C. F. ONKEN	LOW PARTON	RICHARD J. PICORE	ROBERT F. POEHLING
ALFRED RAWN	PAUL E. RHOADS	LEONARD W. RICHTER	ALEXANDER G. ROBERTS
THOMAS W. ROBINSON	VERNON W. RYAN	FREDERICK SCHROSKY	REUBEN O. SCHULTZ
ELIAS SERRATO	ROY R. SKAJA	HARLAN F. STEELE	MILO G. STEVENS
GODFRIED STURM	ARNOLD J. THOMPSON	JOHN C. TISI	EDMUND R. TUSZYNSKI
WALTER J. VAN DUSEN	WILLIAM T. WALTER	CHARLES F. WARDEAN	DAVID WEINBERG
ROBERT J. WHALEN	KENNETH R. WILLIAMS	GEORGE W. WILSON	EUGENE L. WODYNSKI
DONALD D. WRIGHT	PHILLIP R. ZIEGLER	HARRY J. ZIELINSKI	LEONARD M. ZILKA
KENNETH E. BERGGREN	CLAYTON H. BETTING	WENDELL L. CLEMENSON	CECIL H. CORLEY
DAVID F. CUNNINGHAM	JACK B. DOHERTY	LAWRENCE L. ELMAN	RALPH B. DOHERTY
LAWRENCE L. ELMAN	RALPH B. GREEAR	PAUL B. HARRISON	WILLIAM S. McCAULEY
JAMES W. McGEE	GERALD H. PENLEY	ARTHUR M. RIDER	CLYDE P. WILLIAMSON
WILLIAM H. YEISLEY			

MISSING IN ACTION

JOHN C. GRESS	FAY E. JANSON	MARTIAL J. ROUSSEL	CASPER A. SCHERER
ROBERT E. SCHNEIDER			

OPERATIONS


1. TEA KETTLE	20 OCT 1965
2. BUSHWACHER	25 OCT 1965
3. VIPER	1 NOV - 8 DEC 1965
4. ROAD RUNNER	10 NOV - 15 NOV 1965
5. BUSHMASTER	14 NOV - 22 NOV 1965
6. BUSHMASTER II	28 NOV - 9 DEC 1965
7. BLOOD HOUND	1 DEC - 9 DEC 1965
8. CRIMP	7 JAN - 14 JAN 1966
9. QUICK KICK II	11 JAN - 14 JAN 1966
10. BUCKSKIN	12 JAN - 31 JAN 1966
11. MALLET & MALLET II	28 JAN - 15 FEB 1966
12. ROLLING STONE	10 FEB - 2 MAR 1966
13. MASTIFF	21 FEB - 27 MAR 1966
14. COCOA BEACH	3 MAR - 6 MAR 1966
15. SILVER CITY	7 MAR - 23 MAR 1966
16. ABILENE	3 APR - 15 APR 1966
17. BIRMINGHAM	24 APR - 16 MAY 1966
18. EL PASO II	23 AUG - 1 SEP 1966
19. TULSA	6 OCT - 16 OCT 1966
20. SHENANDOAH	16 OCT - 2 NOV 1966
21. ATTLEBORO	6 NOV - 20 NOV 1966
22. CEDAR FALLS	9 JAN - 25 JAN 1967
23. WILLISTON	1 FEB - 12 FEB 1967
24. TUCSON DELTA	12 FEB - 17 FEB 1967
25. JUNCTION CITY I	21 FEB - 14 MAR 1967
26. JUNCTION CITY II	18 MAR - 15 APR 1967
27. MANHATTAN	20 APR - 11 MAY 1967
28. DALLAS	16 MAY - 22 MAY 1967
29. BLUEFIELD	1 JUN - 9 JUN 1967
30. LAM SON	12 JUN - 20 JUN 1967
31. PAUL BUNYAN	21 JUL - 13 AUG 1967
32. ROAD SECURITY & SECURITY FOR VIETNAMESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS	14 AUG - 11 SEP 1967
33. SHENANDOAH	29 SEP - 19 NOV 1967
34. LAM SON 68	1 FEB - 10 MAR 1968
35. QUYET THANG	11 MAR - 7 APR 1968
36. TOAN THANG I	7 APR - 31 MAY 1968
37. TOAN THANG II	1 JUNE 1968 - 31 JAN 1969
38. MOULTRIE	1 NOV - 11 NOV 1968
39. ATLAS WEDGE	16 MAR - 30 MAR 1969
40. ATLAS POWER	10 APR - 15 APR 1969
41. PLAINSFIELD WARRIOR	18 APR - 25 APR 1969
42. IRON DANGER	18 JAN - 4 FEB 1970

BATTLES

A.	BAU BANG	12 NOV 1965
B.	CAU DINH	24 FEB 1966
C.	BENCH MARK 69	8 JUN 1966
D.	SROK DONG	30 JUN 1966
E.	MINH THANH ROAD	9 JUL 1966
F.	PHU HONG	25 AUG 1966
G.	LOC NINH	31 OCT 1966
H.	XA CAT	10 DEC 1967
I.	BU DOP	24 DEC 1967
J.	AN MY	1-2 FEB 1968
K.	XOM MOI I	2 FEB 1968
L.	TAN HIEP	4 MAY 1968
M.	XOM MOI II	5 MAY 1968
N.	RITA	30 OCT 1968
O.	JULIE	1 NOV 1968
P.	MICHELIN	30 MAR 1969
Q.	QUAN LOI	12 AUG 1969

MAJOR OPERATIONS

OCTOBER 1965. - DECEMBER 1969



1ST SQUADRON, 4TH CAVALRY TROOPERS KILLED IN ACTION
1965 - 1970

BACZALSKI, JOSEPH
SMITH, LLOYD S.
GILLESPIE, ROBERT J. Jr
COURTNEY, JAMES I.
ANDERSON, FRANKLIN V.
SERIO, ROBERT F.
HERRERA, JESSY E.
HARCHBARGER, ERIC T.
DYER, WILFORD L.
BOSWORTH, RAYMOND P. Jr
HOLIEN, RICHARD P.
VAD, HENRY J.
GUTHRIDGE, JOHN H.
HIGHTOWER, GEORGE M.
ALFORD, ULYSSES
BLOYER, SHELDON E.
HUFFMAN, EDDIE G.
PHILLIPS, BURTON K. Jr
SIEGLER, ANDRIAN E.
PATRIZIO, CHARLES J.
BROWN, WALTER W.
HALL, GEORGE M.
HIGHT, DAVID K.
LONG, DONALD R.
BUCKLEY, WILLIAM R.
TERRY, FREDERICK G.
BRENNER, DAVID A.
PAPKE, THEODORE A.
QUESENBERRY, JOHN Q.
POTTER, JAMES R.
LILE, JOE C. II
HANSON, WILLIAM K.
MENSCH, CHARLES R.
WICKWARD, WILLIAM J.
MORDEN, BOBBY L.
KRAFT, MICHAEL A.
NYMAN, MICHAEL S.
VIGGIANO, ROBERT E.
MENSING, STANLEY R.
JEDNAT, ERIC J.

SMITH, GERRAL A.
DUPERE, JOSEPH R.
FERNANDEZ, JORGE L.
CARAWAY, JOHNNIE J.
MCAFEE, CARY G.
NILLS, CHARLES H.
MCMILLON, JACKIE
EADEN, WILLIAM H.
BAKER, STANLEY W.
BRADLEY, SYLVAN K.
FEEHERRY, RICHARD J.
DOWNING, JAMES L.
HENRY, BERNARD J.
GENTLE, CLYDE G.
DARLING, LARRY W.
NICKERSON, CURTIS C.
DUGGAN, GARY L.
SIEGLER, WILLIE J.
SCHLINGER, JAMES I.
DRESSLER, EMMETT L.
BRETSCHNEIDER, HANS K.
HUGHES, JAMES K.
HUDSON, GEORGE A. Jr
FERGUSON, DEWEY L.
HAYES, THOMAS J. IV
FERGUSON, FRANK F.
BURROWS, MARVIN E.
TEAS, CLARENCE
RUMMEL, FRANCIS C.
KING, BOBBY
JOHNSON, HAYWOOD Jr.
THARP, CLAUDE W.
WARTHAN, ALBERT W.
WOODS, JAMES R.
SHIPLEY, WALTER W. Jr
SHCHREST, JAMES R.
MAXIE, CHARLES L.
PETERSON, TERRILL G.
MCDONALD, CHARLES J.
LE MAY, RICHARD D. Jr

SMITH, DONALD R.
HILL, GARY
VAN BEBER, ELTON C.
AMEIGH, JAMES K.
COUCH, JULIAN W.
BRANNON, WALTER L.
GAJDOCIK, ERNNEST W.
GIORDANO, JOSEPH C.
DE BUTZ, DANIEL F.
COLLINS, MARK P.
SZAHLENDER, JULIUS
SOHRADA, TERRENCE
GARRICK, JERRY A.
DARTY, OMER G.
DIPERT, MARVIN
KRAMER, RAYMOND E.
MCAFEE, CARY F.
ALONGI, MICHAEL P.
MARCONI, FRANK J.
DRINAN, ARTHUR W.
BENOIT, ROBERT C.
GUNTER, ALVIN F.
HUGHES, JESSE H.
FOSTER, JIMMIE L.
EVANS, CLARENCE L.
DAILY, THOMAS E.
HARRELL, LOVETT L.
TETREAULT, ROBERT N.
SCOTT, JOHN W.
KOLB, CALVIN W.
LAINE, WAYNE K.
DRIGGERS, JERRY T.
GRAY, JIMMIE D.
LANGE, HANS D.
SEXTON, ANDREW B.
MATLOCK, MCKENLEY O.
FUNKHOUSER, CLARK T.
PROPSON, MARVIN N.
SIRAIT, BENNIE H.
MILLSTEAD, ANTONIA

WESTCOTT, FREDERICK D.
WILLIAMS, ROOSEVELT
BROWN, DIKROTHR
TORZOK, JOSEPH
CURRAN, DANIEL J.
LAWSON, THOMAS J.
ADAMS, GEORGE E.
DILLOW, JERRY W.
PHILLIPS, RICHARD G.
CROPPER, RAY D.
DEBO, WILLIAM L.
BARKLEY, LAWERENCE W.
HOWTON, HOY G. Jr

TAMS, ROBERT M.
FERRO, JOSEPH
CALVIN, STANLEY D.
BARNETT, BILLIE J. Jr
LYON, CHRISTOPHER E.
ALBRIGHT, PETER H.
BALDWIN, WILLIAM M.
COLLINS, CLAYTON
ALLEN, JACK L.
CARLTON, JERRY D.
STROSHANE, MICHAEL A.
DIETZ, LEWIS R.
NUNEZ, RUDOLPH A.

WOODARD, HARRY D..
SCOTT, MICHAEL J.
LARKIN, SAMUEL J.
BAKER, GEORGE A.
HAMILTON, AUGUST F.
POLLOCK, GARY J.
SMITH, PHILLIP R.
CROOK, JAMES P.
ACREE, ROGER L.
AKE, HOMER L. Jr
HOLMES, NORMAN W.
AMICK, FREDDIE L
POOL, GARY G.

3RD SQUADRON, 4TH CAVALRY IN VIETNAM

1965 - 1970

In late 1965, the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry deployed to the Republic of Vietnam with the 25th Infantry Division. American forces up until late 1966 employed "fire brigade tactics," reacting to enemy initiatives with limited troop resources. In 1967, with troop buildup, more emphasis was placed on tactical mobility and increased flexibility, improving reaction forces. The Squadron in 1967 participated in what was to be a successful operation, "CEDAR FALLS - JUNCTION CITY." The target was an extensive enemy base and logistical center with a geographical shape with a strong defense known as the Iron Triangle. The operation uncovered base camps, food, equipment, and ammunition. The operation's success was not based on the number of enemy casualties but the 500,000 pages of enemy documents it captured. The documents exposed the command structure and battle plans of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army hierarchy.

In May 1967, the Squadron operated almost continuously along Route 1 from Saigon to Tay Ninh. The Squadron's air cavalry troop worked with it, providing first and last light reconnaissance along main routes. By mid-1967 the Squadron was escorting an average of 8,000 vehicles per month. In late summer it began so-called night thrust missions sending out mock convoy escorts at night to test the enemy reaction. After a month-long test without significant enemy action, the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, began escorting night logistical convoys from Saigon to Tay Ninh, a mission that continued through 1967.

On 30 January, 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Glenn K. Otis, commander of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, was ordered to send one troop to aid Tan Son Nhut Air Base on the north side of Saigon. LTC Otis directed Troop C to block a Viet Cong Regiment that had attacked Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The troop was on its way in fifteen minutes and while it was en route was ordered to destroy enemy forces attacking the air base itself. To avoid ambushes along Highway QL-1, LTC Otis flew over the unit and, dropping flares to discourage the enemy, guided it cross-country to Hoc Mon bridge. As Troop C approached the air base it came under heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and rocket grenade fire. The Cavalrymen attacked to split the enemy force where Highway 1 passed the southwestern gate of Tan Son Nhut. In the first few minutes several tracked vehicles were hit and troop casualties were heavy. Captain Virant, Troop C Commander, was seriously wounded to the head. Troop C slowed the enemy assault, but were forced out of their vehicles into a nearby ditch. Unable to communicate with the Tan Son Nhut Commander, the troop called the Squadron at Cu Chi for help. LTC Otis then directed 1st Platoon, Troop C to leave its mission of guarding the Trang Bang bridge, and move to Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The Air Troop was ordered to support 1st Platoon's movement. Troop C was extended in a column formation with four tanks and five personnel carriers burning. The Air Troop was able to get ammunition to Troop C, with gunship support attacking enemy positions. 1st Platoon arrived at Tan Son Nhut relieving some of the pressure.

LTC Otis ordered Troop B, commanded by Captain Malcolm Otis, to leave the Trang Bang bridge and move down Highway 1 to Tan Son Nhut. Troop B traveled forty-seven kilometers in forty-five minutes. Troop B positioned themselves on the enemy flank

of what was estimated to 600 enemy soldiers. The surprise into the enemy flank caused many of the enemy soldiers to flee. Captain Otis sent 3rd Platoon and Troop D gunships to cut off their escape. The combination of Troop's B and C, artillery fire, and air support pinned the Viet Cong in place. The battle produced over 300 enemy dead, 24 prisoners, hundreds of enemy weapons of all kinds, and enough equipment and ammunition to fill a five-ton truck.

The movement of Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, to Tan Son Nhut Air Base was a difficult night maneuver that achieved tactical surprise. The fact that the battle was fought by one unit and directed by one commander greatly facilitated control, but the deciding factor was the cavalry firepower that dominated the action.

LTC Otis's cavalrymen were to have no rest after Tan Son Nhut, for the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, was soon involved in its second battle in as many days. This time it had help from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, which, after constant fighting throughout Saigon, was sent to Tan Son Nhut under operational control of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry.

For the battles in Saigon during Tet period, the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, was awarded a U. S. Presidential Unit Citation. Four of its members received the Distinguished Service Cross, seven of them Silver Star, and many the Bronze Star.

In 1968, the Squadron was one of two units to receive the Sheridan. Colonel George S. Patton suggested that the Sheridan be tested by a Divisional Squadron and Regimental Squadron. Both the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry and 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry started training in January 1969. The Sheridan replaced the M48 tank in cavalry platoons one for one. On 15 February 1969, in the first combat action involving the Sheridan, struck a 25-pound pressure-detonated mine. The explosion ruptured the hull and ignited the combustible case ammunition of the main gun, causing a deadly second explosion that destroyed the vehicle. The effectiveness of the Sheridan was continually suspect in the 4th Cavalry following the mine incident.

On 1 February 1970, First Lieutenant Russell A. Steindam received the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. 1LT Steindam, Troop B, while serving as a platoon leader, led members of his platoon on a night ambush operation. On the way to the ambush site, suspected enemy movement was detected on one flank and the platoon's temporary position was subjected to intense small arms and automatic weapons fire as well as a fusillade of hand and rocket-propelled grenades. After the initial barrage, 1LT Steindam ordered fire placed on the enemy position and the wounded men to be moved to a shallow bomb crater. As he directed the return fire against the enemy from his exposed position, a fragmentation grenade was thrown into the site occupied by his command group. Instantly realizing the extreme gravity of the situation, 1LT Steindam shouted a warning to alert his fellow soldiers in the immediate vicinity. Then, unhesitatingly and with complete disregard for his safety, 1LT Steindam deliberately threw himself on the grenade, absorbing the full and fatal force of the explosion as it detonated. By his gallant action and self-sacrifice, he was able to save the lives of the nearby members of his command group. The extraordinary courage and selflessness displayed by 1LT Steindam were an inspiration to his comrades and are in the highest traditions of the U. S. Army.

The 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry redeployed to the United States in late 1970.

3RD SQUADRON, 4TH CAVALRY TROOPERS KILLED IN ACTION
1966 - 1970

TABER, JERRY D.
MERRILL, HUGH W.
BRADSHAW, THEODORE J.
JOSLYN, JAMES E.
SHRUM, KENNETH E.
NEUMAN, RONALD M.
HARM, JOHN W.
SANDERSON, JOHN D.
REYNOLDS, GEORGE R.
SOMBELON, ALBERT E.
HAMPTON, JOHN E.
WHITAKER, RUDOLPH
LUNA, FRANCISCO
OWEN, ROBERT D.
WALKER, HOLLIS A.
WOOD, ARTHUR M.
TISCHLER, HOMER E.
MILLER, MICHAEL C.
MEECE, MAC H.
PEARSON, JAMES R.
JENSEN, DENNIS R.
BLESSMAN, WILLIAM S.
WHITE, DONALD E.
CARMACK, JOHN E.
GIBBS, RAYMOND A.
HUSK, CLARENCE R.
BRAY, ERVIL T.
ROLAND, CHARLES E.
McILVRY, RONALD E.
DRAKE, EARLE A.
AMOROSO, FRANCIS B.
KEELEY, FREDDIE J.
HARRIS, LYNN A.
STALTON, LYLE G.
SHARPE, THOMAS H.
KRESSE, WOLFGANG
JOHNSON, CHARLES L.
RUTIGLIANO, ANTHONY
LIVELY, BOBBY D.
TURKSEY, HAROLD
CLARK, DAVID L.
MAROON, JAMES W.
QUILLERY, BUD A.
LOPEZ, MAX A.
MEACHAM, JACK B.

WHITTFIELD, RICHARD M.
DENNIS, PAUL J.
MILBRANDT, CHARLES J.
SMITH, LONNIE L.
McCARROL, IVY M.
ADNA, BARRY L.
GONZALES, JUAN
TAUSESE, VALENTINO
WIGFALL, HERBERT Jr
KLAMMER, TIMOTHY M.
KOS, ERHARD K.
MILLER, CLAUDE P.
BOWMAN, PAUL Jr
OJILLO, RICHARD
PURDY, LOUIS J.
STEPHENS, CLYDE J.
CROSS, RONNIE L.
SMITH, BENNIE A.
HEUSE, RICHARD A.
McDONNELL, MARTIN
ZUNIGA, GUADALUPE
SPENCER, JAMES P.
LAIRD, ERWIN L.
THOMPSON, DENNIS H.
DUFF, CHARLES
COY, BEN
SCHMIDT, MARK V.
ANDERSON, HOWARD
HENSON, ROGER L.
BARSCH, JOHN P.
WILDERSPIN, VERNON
PEKNY, CHARLES D.
LANGSFORD, ALVIN R.
FAIRCLOTH, JULIUS
GARRETT, LAWRENCE O.
DIEHL, DANA
BROWN, DONALD C.
KOSEL, GENE M.
SWALLEY, ROBERT
PARHAM, JAMES W.
ELIA, GARY L.
ESTEM, JOHN E.
MICHAUD, LEO E.
MOORE, JOHN J.
CARNICA, ANDY

PAGE, LUTHER J. Jr
JOHNSON, THOMAS A.
TSCHERTER, VERNON S.
CONLEY, WILLIAM T.
BROWN, JAMES D.
RAY, DAVID LAYMAN
PENNY, CHARLES O.
LLOYD, DONALD L.
EVERETT, ROCKFORD
McVAY, THOMAS M.
TEJERENA, ARTHUR
TAYLOR, FREDERICK
RUGAR, STEVEN D.
SAULS, OLLIE L.
KLIPPEL, DAVID J.
VEARA, JOHN V.
HODGES, TERRY A.
KEVER, DWAYNE E.
SEXTON, LEONARD E.
HARBAUGH, ROY A.
PARKER, PAUL E.
KING, GILBERT
SANDERS, ROBERT B.
RASMUSSEN, DAVID
KING, LEWIS
SPINLER, RAYMOND
GRIFFIN, JAMES T.
KOVACH, PETER F.
HAMMS, ADOLPH B. Jr
SARVELA, MERREL G.
CAPUTO, RICHARD P.
FITTS, GERALD L.
JOHNSON, EVERETT V.
MOORE, DONALD E.
MAY, ROBERT W.
CONANT, GREGORY
MANELLO, FRANK
HARDING, WARREN G.
SCHUFTIER, JAMES
EGOLF, KLAUS D.
PLEASANT, EDDIE L.
CHARLES, DAN E.
DARBY, JAMES M.
PENSON, DANIEL

LANNARD, BENJAMIN
DILLER, GEORGE A. C.
FOX, BERNARD L.
PAIRIS, ARNOLD
WEBB, JOHNNY R.
McDONOUGH, JAMES R.
DAVIS, JOHNNY W.
LEWIS, BARRY W.
RESENBUSCH, CHARLES
SANCHEZ, RALPH Jr
SOMMERS, STEVEN A.
FISHER, JAMES R.
NAVARRO, FRANK G.
OGELSBY, JOHN R.
BOWMAN, REGINALD A.
MOSLEY, DAVID W.
SAMPLES, LARRY J.
GUERRA, GEORGE Jr
HUGGET, RICHARD T.
WOODS, ROBERT
HEREFORD, BASIL L.
HOLMES, BILLY R.
McCLAIN, ROY H.
RIFFLE, JOSEPH H.
SALEM, VINCENT R.
PISZUTI, JOHN
COINSKI, RONALD A.
JACKSON, TODD R.
PICKETT, MORRISON
SUIAUNON, FUALALELE
MABRY, RALPH E.
WARNER, ROBERT A.
MOORE, JAMES A.
TRAW, JIM S.
MARCHLEWICZ, ARNOLD
FILLIPPELLI, JOHN M.
PHILLIPS, GREGORY
WHITE, BARNEY J.
GREEN, KENNETH G.
BIEKER, CARL J.
PRIEST, JOHN H.
NEAL, RONALD F.
AYRES, CHARLES H.
FEENEY, JAMES T.
RAMSEY, ALAN R.
McKINNON, CLARENCE
BENDER, GARRET
POGGI, MICHAEL L.
BROWNING, GEORGE

WENSEL, MILFORD H.
PHILLIPS, ALTON R.
CHANDLER, ROBERT L.
DIECKMAN, JAMES H.
RIDEOUT, DAVID J.
RUSH, DAVID C.
MOHRHAUSER, WILLIAM
CALLISTER, ARTHUR
JOHNSON, PHILIP A.
PENDERGRASS, JAMES
EVANS, GEORGE T.
CURTZWRIGHT, LARRY
THOMPSON, THOMAS D.
HYATT, MICHAEL D.
SMITH, HAROLD J.
FORD, ERNEST D.
CLEMENTS, ROBERT A.
BROWN, ALEXANDER C.
DORNELLAS, RICHARD
HOBBS, GARY L.
RISK, JOHN S.
WINK, MELVIN R.
WINTER, MELVIN R.
YAMASHITA, SHOJIRO
ANDLER, MARION B.
DAVIS, JAMES H.
CARVER, JERRY D.
TINDALL, BRUCE G.
LEE, MILAN L.
STEINDAM, RUSSELL
SANTA CRUZ, JOSE
CATINO, STEVEN L.
ESTEVEZ, FERNANDO B.
CHISKE, JOSEPH J.
MOON, LOWELL E.
KEASLING, ELMER L.
CLYMER, DENNIS L.
NORRENBROCK, WILLIAM
ALBRIGHT, TERRY R.
CARTER, LINWOOD C. Jr
SMITH, DALE G.
MILLER, WILLIAM H.
CLARK, LARRY R.
GERNERT, EDWARD H.
HARLOW, REX
MITCHELL, MICHAEL T.
BRITT, WYMAN G.
RICE, CALVIN C.
THOMAS, MARSHALL

QUERY, ROBERT
VARGAS, RAUL J.
CASTILLO, ARTHUR J.
STARKEY, KURT
WARNER, THOMAS C.
LEVETT, WILLIM J.
JOHNSON, VICTOR
CRABBE, JOHN
JACKSON, ROBERT
HOCUTT, LARRY K.
SCHWICHOW, RICHARD
EATON, GEORGE E.
McCARTHY, JOSEPH F.
CLOUSE, DUANE L.
PAYNTER, THOMAS B.
CARLSON, GARY W.
LARMER, KEITH W.
VAN DYKE, STEPHEN D.
LAMBERT, HENRY M.
ADAY, ROBERT L.
FLORES, EDWARD
FERGUSON, EARL
ATKINSON, GLEN
CASSIDY, MICHAEL
DOBASH, JOHN E.
HAYES, THOMAS E.
JOHNSON, DALE L.
JACKSON, MARK
PIERCE, DARREL G.
RANDOLPH, MICHAEL
CASTELLO, PHILLIP
CLARK, HENRY P.
SCHALK, THOMAS M.
ELLIOTT, ANDREW J.
SWINSON, LONNIE M.
BILLINGS, WILL
PETTITT, JOHN
RAMEY, JOE D.
WILLIAM, RUSSELL
WILSON, RUSSELL
DOBRY, STEPHEN L.
McGLOTHAN, JERRY W.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, United States Army Forces Central Command
Personnel Command
APO New York 09772

PERMANENT ORDERS 101-01

4 May 1991

1st Squadron, 4th Armored Cavalry Regiment, (WAHMAA), APO New York 09310

Announcement is made of the following award.

Award: Valorous Unit Award


Date(s) or period of service: 17 January 1991 to 3 March 1991

Authority: Paragraph 9-19, AR 672-5-1

Reason: For valorous actions while conducting combat operations in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations during the period 17 January 1991 to 3 March 1991. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry led the 1st Infantry Division's attack across Iraq and Kuwait, cutting the Iraqi army's escape route along the Kuwait City/Basrah Highway. The squadron continued its rapid advance, culminating with the capture of the Safwan Airfield, Iraq. During this drive, the Squadron destroyed 65 tanks, 66 Armored Personnel Carriers, 66 trucks, 91 bunkers, and captured 3,010 enemy soldiers. These valorous acts bring distinct credit to the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the United States Army.

Format: 320

FOR THE COMMANDER:



JOSEPH R. SIMBER
Colonel, AG
Chief, Personnel Service
Support Directorate

DISTRIBUTION:

AFRD-PC-S-AD, (10)

Cdr, 1st SQ, 4th Cav, (20)

Cdr, VII Corps, (20)

Cdr, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), (20)

HQDA (DAPC-ALA) Alexandria, VA 22332-0400 (2)

HQDA (DAMH-HSO) Washington, DC 20314-0200 (3)

HQDA (DAAG-HDU) Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314-5050, (20)

DEACTIVATION/ACTIVATION A TROOP

The changes in Europe caused the United States to demobilize units from Germany. The first of those units was the 1st Infantry Division (fwd), Boeblingen, Germany. A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, was deactivated on 17 July 1990. The memorabilia was sent to the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division (Mech).

On 8 November 1990, the 1st Infantry Division (Mech) was alerted to deploy to Southwest Asia. On 9 November 1990, creation of a second ground troop was approved and immediately equipment and personnel were requested.

On 19 November 1990, 1000 hrs a ceremony was conducted on the Squadron Parade Field, officially activated A Troop into the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Riley, Kansas. CPT Kenneth W. Pope, Commander, began the task of creating a troop from ground zero.

On 21 November 1990, the first of A Troop's property arrived at Fort Riley. First combat elements of the troop created, mortar platoon, received three M106A2 mortar tracks. The tracks joined the Squadron in Junction City as they moved through the paint line, changing the familiar green camouflage to sand.

Between 21 November 1990 and A Troop's deployment on 10 January 1991, two Mil Vans loaded with equipment were loaded and shipped to Southwest Asia. Personnel to start the troop came from the sister troop, B Troop. A Troop deployed with 97 personnel, combination of scouts, mortars, maintenance and headquarters personnel.

Training for the troop was provided by Fort Knox. A team from the Scout Platoon Leaders Course arrived on 27 December 1990 and put together a condensed course, taught from 28 December to 4 January 1991.

A Troop deployed on 10 January with the remaining troops; C, D, and E. The troop arrived on 11 January 1991.

A Troop received an additional 36 personnel in Saudi Arabia; eighteen 11M, twelve 19K, and six 19 D's increasing the troop strength to 136. Creation of a troop prior to possible conflict with little training and familiarity was indeed a task to complete. The Leadership of CPT Pope, 1LT Raynal and 1SG Taylor allowed A Troop to form and become an established unit.

SOUTHWEST ASIA
DEPLOYMENT

15 December 1990 - Deployment begins

The Advance Party, consisting of the SXO, MAJ Wimbish, the SMT, CW2 Kovach, the S-4 NCOIC, SFC Hughes, and the SXO's driver, PFC Harper moved by bus to Forbes Field, then departed via C-5 for Saudi Arabia. They arrived at King Fahd International Airport 23 hours later. Their mission was to arrange for a smooth Squadron transition into Saudi Arabia. MAJ Wimbish and SFC Hughes worked a multitude of supply issues with various theater-level logisticians. Much time was spent with supply actions effecting the newly formed A Troop and integration of nine M1A1 tanks. Their two month-long effort contributed significantly to the SQDN's combat readiness.

18 December 1990 - Deployment Continues

At 1000, the SQDN encased its colors on the SQDN parade field at Ft Riley, Kansas. In Saudi Arabia, the SXO conducted a reconnaissance of TAA ROOSEVELT and arranged for life support for the SQDN.

28 December 1990 - Deployment Continues

At 2300, the lead element of the SQDN Main Body departed Ft Riley, under the control of the SQDN SMO, CPT Johnson.

29 December 1990 - Deployment Continues

Lead elements arrived at King Fahd International Airport, and moved to Al Khobar (Cement city - MGM Grand). At Ft Riley, HHT and B Trp formed up at 0800 hrs in the SQDN area and were bused to Marshal Army Airfield, where they were processed for overseas movement. The preparation for overseas movement (POM) took place in the 4-1 AVN hanger. The plane's mechanical difficulties and bad weather caused the TRP's to remain overnight in the 4-1 AVN hanger.

31 December 1990 - Deployment Continues

HHT and B TRP departed from Forbes Field enroute to Saudi Arabia. They flew on a United 747 with stops in Philadelphia and Brussels, Belgium.

1 January - Troops Arrive

HHT and B TRP celebrated New Years at 33000 feet over Shannon, Ireland. The SQDN arrived at King Fahd International Airport at 1200 hrs. The SQDN colours were uncased in a ceremony on the airfield. The SXO met the soldiers at the airfield and escorted them to Al Khobar. HHT and B TRPs were housed at the MGM Grand, with a SQDN forward element in Warehouse 18, Dammam Port.

Note, the MGM Grand was a housing complex erected by the Saudis for the nomadic Bedouins. The Saudi government was initially reluctant to allow the US to use the complex, however the complex ended up housing almost 15,000 soldiers. The facilities at the port were austere with soldiers sleeping on cots inside warehouses, on the docks or in a tent city on the outskirts of the port.

3-4 January - Equipment Begins to Arrive

The SQDN's equipment began to be off-loaded in bulk from arriving ships.

5 January - SQDN Begins New Equipment Fielding

HHT and B TRP mechanics began M3A2 deprocessing at Dammam Port.

Note: The squadron deprocessed 42 M3A2s: 19 per ground troop, two for HHT, and two floats to be used by cavalry troop XO's.

6 January - Advance Party Deploys to TAA

At 0600, the S-3 departed Dammam Port for Camp MacKenzie with the SQDN Advance Party. At 1830, after a 270 km road march, the Advance Party arrived at Camp MacKenzie (38RPS325365) in TAA ROOSEVELT. [Diagram 1]

B TRP and HHT mechanics continued to deprocess a portion of the new M3A2s.

8 January - Combat Vehicles Arrive

HHT and B TRP's vehicles began to arrive in port. In the following three weeks, the remainder of the SQDN's equipment arrived on eight ships. Not one unit's equipment was all on the same ship.

B TRP prepared its M3s for turn-in. Note, due to the long distance between Al Khobar and Dammam Port, coupled with a lack of dedicated buses, the movement of soldiers between their billets and port was a time consuming and frustrating process.

At 2030, an F-16 crashed near Camp MacKenzie. The Camp went to MOPP IV as a precautionary measure. The SXO was the first person on site. There were no survivors.

9 January - B TRP M3A2 Fielding Begins

B Troop spent the day inventorying and signing for their new M3A2s.

10 January - Vigilance Increases

CINCENT Message required 50% security at all times in TAAs. At 1745, the S-3 conducted a camp defense exercise.

B TRP downloaded its equipment from the M3s and prepared the M3s for turn-in.

11 January - SQDN Closes in Country (Rainy Afternoon)

From 0500-1630, CPT Harmon, SQDN S-4, led a convoy of 7 vehicles to TAA ROOSEVELT. The SQDN received a FRAGO to (on order) establish a defense of LOGBASE A. At 1900, A/C/D/E TRPs arrived in country and moved into Tent City at Dammam Port.

12 January - Build-up Continues (Rain)

A TRP began section training. The SCD visited Camp MacKenzie.

13 January - Build-Up Continues (Rains all day. Tent City flooded)

DMAIN informed SQDN elements at Camp MacKenzie of a possible Iraqi pre-emptive strike. DIV prepared to defend LOGBASE A.

At 0600, CPT Morrison and CPT Bills, led a convoy of 11 M3A2s and Medic tracks to TAA ROOSEVELT. A TRP drew 20 M3A2's and spent the day inventorying and signing for the new equipment.

14 January - Combat Elements Arrive at TAA (Rain)

At 0100, nine B TRP HETs arrived at TAA ROOSEVELT. The vehicles were not issued with radios or Vinsons. At 0630, CPT Bills policed up two lost HETS on Tapline Road 80 miles southeast of TAA ROOSEVELT. The SQDN took radios from non-essential vehicles and placed them into B TRP M3A2s, so that a viable command and control net could be established.

At 1625, in response to a DIV warning order, the SQDN elements in TAA ROOSEVELT prepared to screen the Division TAA.

A TRP continued to train on its new equipment at port. Newly formed M1A1 tank crews conducted training on 3d ACR tanks. Note: The SQDN deprocessed 9 M1A1 tanks. We organized the M1A1s into 3 platoons, each with three tanks and commanded by an SFC. We attached two tank platoons to B TRP and one platoon to A TRP. The SQDN will eventually receive a total of 18 M1A1 tanks, and will allocate three tanks per scout platoon.

15 January - Build-Up Continues
(Rain)

B TRP continued to move to Camp MacKenzie: 9 M3A2s arrived at 0200. The SQDN's combat power in TAA ROOSEVELT was now 19 M3A2s.

At port, A TRP started BGST training and the tankers continued NETT. The SXO acquired radios for A TRP's M3A2's, but were short F and Y cables. Personnel and equipment shortages continued to plague the SQDN. ADC(S) BG Rutherford, ADC(M) BG Carter, COL Bird, and LTC Roth of the DA Fielding Team assisted the SQDN in acquiring CVCs, protective masks, radios and major pieces of combat equipment. Without their help, A TRP and the tanks in the cavalry would have never materialized.

16 January - Build-Up Continues
(Clear and Sunny)

NET Training for tankers and A TRP BGST continued at port.

17 January - War Begins

At 0120, the soldiers in Warehouse 18, Dammam Port, were awakened, put into MOPP II, and ordered to begin taking their PB pills. At 0145, the Allied Air Forces and Navy began the strategic air campaign. This was the first notification of the war. At 0300, the SCO, LTC Wilson, directed that the SQDN prepare to launch aircraft to the TAA. At 0400, air raid sirens at Dammam Port sounded, warning of a possible SCUD attack. Iraq did launch several SCUD missiles into Saudi Arabia near Riyadh, which Patriot air defense missiles intercepted. All soldiers went to MOPP IV for 30 minutes, then remained in MOPP II until 0700 hrs. At 0430 hours the SCO turned port operations and the SQDN logistics effort over to the SXO and left for Camp MacKenzie to join B TRP.

At 0221, DMAIN alerted the SQDN Fwd at Camp MacKenzie that the air campaign had begun. The soldiers could hear the aircraft flying overhead and see tracers and explosions on the horizon to the north. At 0500, G-3 informed the SQDN Fwd, that wartime rules of engagement were in effect. At 0502, DMAIN ordered TAA ROOSEVELT to REDCON 1.

After the initial threat of attack was over, Port operations began to return to "normal". From 0800-1600, the tankers conducted NET Training. A TRP finally received some HETs and began loading vehicles for their movement to Camp MacKenzie.

The DIV CDR visited the SQDN at 0900 hrs and discussed with CPT Tedesco, S-3 Air, the possible movement of B TRP west of Hafar Al Batin to provide security for DSA JUNCTION CITY.

At 1050, the ALO, 1LT Mitchell, linked up with SQDN Fwd at Camp MacKenzie. At 1500, LTC Wilson, SCO, arrived at Camp MacKenzie. Two GSRs arrived from 5-16 IN.

At 0322, Iraq launched SCUDs at Dhahran. The simultaneous wail of air raid sirens and the "boom" of Patriot air defense missiles awoke the soldiers at port. Everyone went to MOPP IV. Patriot missiles in and around port proved to be extremely accurate, destroying all SCUDs prior to impact. The all clear was given 45 minutes later.

At 0403, VII Corps was put on 100% alert in anticipation of an Iraqi pre-emptive attack.

A TRP remained in the staging area awaiting Lowboys to move them to TAA ROOSEVELT. From 0600-2200, CPT Morrison, HHT CDR, led a convoy of two A TRP M3A2s (on Lowboys) and several SQDN trucks to TAA ROOSEVELT.

Meanwhile at Camp MacKenzie, DIV placed 1-4 CAV OPCON to 1st BDE. 1st BDE had the mission to defend LOGBASE ALPHA from an Iraqi ground attack.

At 1105, the S-3 and B TRP CDR, conducted a reconnaissance of the area west of Wadi Al Batin. At 1300, the SCO observed the 1st Bde obstacle breach demonstration. At 1730, CSM Cobb arrived at Camp MacKenzie.

19 January - Build-up Continues

At 0158, there was a SCUD alert at Dammam Port. The soldiers at port went to MOPP IV, remaining in MOPP IV until 0600.

At Camp MacKenzie, SCUDS flew over the camp sounding like WWII V2 rockets. At 0200, "Gas, Gas, Gas" was called over the DIV net because an M8 alarm went off in the 1st EN BN Camp. The SQDN went to MOPP IV. The 1st EN alarm turned out to be false. At 0230, DIV ordered units to go back to MOPP O. At 0635, a Stinger team from 4/B/2-3 ADA reported to the TOC. At 1515, the SQDN returned to DIV control.

At port, A TRP received a badly needed M-88. Critical shortages still remaining were one M577, 19D10s, 19D20s, 19D30s, COMSEC hardware, NBC equipment and batteries. A TRP conducted FLT training at the HET staging area; however, the lack of CVCs hampered crew drills. There were neither HETs nor Lowboys available to move A TRP out of port. At 1600, C Troop's 1SG SantaMaria led the C/D/E wheel convoy to the 4th BDE HAA in TAA ROOSEVELT.

20 January - Air TRPS Deploy to TAA

B TRP and the SQDN Command Group fired their M3A2s at the VII Corps Jayhawk Range. HHT drew nine M1A1 Tanks from the Material Fielding Team at port.

At 0800, the C/D/E vehicles arrived at the 4th BDE HAA. After an initial delay due to fog, the C/D/E aircraft departed for the HAA in four lifts. The aircraft made one refueling stop at BASTOGNE, and all aircraft closed on the 4th BDE HAA by 1530. The SQDN's ground elements remained at Camp MacKenzie. The separation of air and ground elements posed a command and control problem to the SQDN.

A TRP continued to train in the port. Still no HETs or Lowboys available to move them from port.

The DISCOM MSB, 701st, moved west of Wadi Al Batin to DSA JUNCTION CITY. Reports indicated enemy movement to the north. MG Rhame, after receiving authorization from VII Corps, directed the SQDN to move B TRP west to provide security for DSA JUNCTION CITY (38RNS535835). At 1800, the SQDN received a FRAGO to move B TRP to provide security for DSA JUNCTION CITY.

21 January - A TRP Deploys to TAA

At 0040, Iraq launched another series of SCUDs. Again the soldiers at Dammam Port went into MOPP IV. The "all clear" was given at 0200.

A TRP's CDR, CPT Pope, departed for Camp MacKenzie with a convoy of seven M3A2s, three M106s, one M577, and two trucks. The remainder of A TRP was relocated to Warehouse 18. M1A1 inspections and maintenance continued. Two tanks were non-mission capable.

In TAA ROOSEVELT, the SQDN attended a 1000 briefback at DMAIN for Phases II and III of "Scorpion Danger". At 1200, the FSE linked up with SQDN Fwd. At 2100, VII Corps suspended both air/ground maneuver and reconnaissance west of Wadi Al Batin.

22 January - Build-up Continues

At 0700 another A TRP convoy consisting of six M3A2s and HHT trucks departed for TAA ROOSEVELT. At 0900, one M1A1 tank departed with a 1st BDE convoy for the TAA.

At 1000, the Iraqis launched another series of SCUDs into Saudi Arabia. The port went to MOPP IV again. At 1030, the "all clear" was given.

CW3 Weymeyer departed in an OH-58C for Dammam Port to pick up a replacement M242 canon (25mm) for B TRP. One of B TRP's M242s had been damaged on the range a few days earlier. CSM Cobb secured the following badly needed equipment for A TRP: 24 machine guns, 40 GVS-5s, 180 flackvests, CVCs, etc.

23 January - Port Operations Nearly Complete

At 0100 hours, CPT Sauer, S-3 Air, led a convoy with nine M1A1s and four M3A2s to TAA ROOSEVELT. Two HETs rear-ended one another five miles outside of Dhahran; however, the tanks received no significant damage.

At 0900, the 4th BDE told the SQDN rear to leave five soldiers from both A and E TRP to guard B TRP's old M3s and await the arrival of the final ship, the Cape Diamond.

From 1000-1400, C and D TRPs conducted aerial gunnery at Jayhawk Range. All weapons systems were test fired.

At 1600, the SQDN received the "Scorpion Danger" operational and logistic update (Frago 26-91), and the order to execute B TRP's movement to screen DSA JUNCTION CITY.

24 January - Movement to Screen DSA Begins

At 0800, B TRP along with the S-1, ALO, GSR, ADA and FIST moved 127 kms to establish a screen north of DSA JUNCTION CITY. [Diagram 2]

At 0900 hrs., the SCD ordered C/D/E TRPs to deploy from the HAA to Camp MacKenzie. CPT Philbrick, the Flight Operations Officer, issued the movement order. At 1800, the SXO arrived at Camp MacKenzie.

Based on an uncertain enemy situation, the MG Rhame instructed the SCD to move the SQDN's air assets to support DSA JUNCTION CITY operations. The SCD planned to move A TRP forward upon the completion of firing its weapon systems at Jayhawk Range.

A TRP reorganized the troop due to its shortage of 19Ds. 3rd PLT was disbanded to fill 1st and 2nd PLTs to four men Bradley crews. 3rd PLT would consist of 2LT Polomieri in an M3A2 and three M1A1s. The remaining 3rd PLT vehicles were placed in the CBT TRNS until they could be properly crewed and readied for combat.

25 January - Movement to Screen DSA Continues

At 0900, the SCD and S-3 coordinated with the 5th Special Forces Group reference its border ops. Meanwhile, C/D/E TRPs and Flt Ops departed for JUNCTION CITY. The SCD sent the S-3 to direct the SQDN's screen mission until the SQDN's main body closed.

A TRP test fired all weapons at Jayhawk Range.

26 January - First Contact

B TRP destroyed a light pick-up truck that penetrated the screenline and was suspected of spying on JUNCTION CITY. Upon capture, B TRP turned the Saudi Arabian over to the MPs, who held him for interrogation. The MPs subsequently interned him in the EPW camp.

A TRP conducted its PCI in preparation for movement to JUNCTION CITY.

27 January - SQDN Closes on Screen (Continual Rain, 40 degrees)

At 0600, the SQDN (-) moved to DSA JUNCTION CITY. B TRP pushed its screen line north of a proposed Corps ASP site, but short of the berm separating Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

Logistically, the SQDN operated at the end of a supply line that stretched almost 150 kms. This was a difficult operation, but the SQDN remained combat ready.

A Counter-Intelligence Team from 101 MI linked up with the SQDN.

The SQDN was critically short of maps. Many of the scout sections went without any maps. Often this meant using blank paper with 1:50,000 grid squares drawn on it. Contour lines were of little significance.

The Corps' LRSU was deployed vicinity the border in our sector. Communications with them was a problem because their OPs reported directly to a corps control cell in the town of Quasimah.

28 January - Screen Expands

At 1030, A TRP assumed a 15 km wide screen on the SQDN's left flank. Even with A TRP, the 45 km wide DIV sector required that the eastern 15 kms be covered with air assets. B TRP linked-up twice daily with the eastern flank, 1-7 CAV (1st CAV DIV). [Diagram 3]

After darkness, the Field Trains reported an unidentified tracked vehicle with dismounts, passing by its location and continuing north.

29 January - Screen Continues

Both TRPs' OPs reported nightly parachute flares north of the border. Later G-2 reports determined that these flares were used to guide Iraqi dismounted patrols to and from their objectives. The TRPs' OPs also reported observing Air Force bombing of enemy positions to the north.

30 January - Screen Continues

A GSR/OP reported vehicle movement 4000 meters in front of screen line. A TRP could not visually verify the contact.

31 January - Screen Pushes North

The Corps CDR and DIV CDR visited the SQDN. The Corps CDR was concerned about the LRSU's break in communications with VII Corps and decided to pull them out. The DIV CDR informed the SCO that he would try to fill the 19D shortages with 11Ms/11Bs. He said he was also working on moving 3-37 AR, 1-5 FA, 101 MI, DTAC into sector under the command of "Combat Command Carter."

That afternoon, the SQDN moved closer to Iraq, 5-8 km south of the border. During the night, the GSR again reported vehicle movement.

1 February - First EPWs Taken

In the early morning, A TRP detected and detained 52 Saudi border guards with weapons and vehicles. The Saudis reported being attacked the night prior by Iraqi soldiers (ground and artillery) in the town of Markaz Samah Al Jadid 38RNT510230. Their higher headquarters told them to seek US protection; they found it. The Saudis were released to continue south. The CI Interrogation Team aided greatly in communications with the Saudis, and later with EPWs.

At 0630, B TRP's GSR (OP 16) detected enemy dismounts. Upon visual verification, the OP moved forward with two M3A2s. After firing a burst of coax on either side of the enemy dismounts, the Iraqis displayed a white flag and the scout section captured four EPWs. The EPWs had hand grenades, but no weapons. They stated that they left their weapons in a town called Tafin, and walked south for seven hours. The S-2, CPT Seelinger, and the CI Team Chief, CW2 Markovic, believed they were a recon patrol. SSG Cowden and crew later received a Big Red One coin from the DIV CDR for their gallantry and discipline.

The SQDN was probed by Iraqis along the A-B TRP boundary during the night. The OP/GSR's reported three heavy vehicles north of the SQDN's FLOT but south of the berm. The SQDN received three Apaches OPCON from 1-1 AVN. The SCO briefed LTC Hayles, the 1-1 AVN CDR, and monitored the Apache mission on the SQDN command net. No enemy vehicles were found forward of our FLOT. The Apaches did, however, report enemy tracked vehicles among our positions. LTC Hayles reported locked on a ZSU-23-4. After plotting the target as one of A TRP's GSRs, the SCO put the Apaches at a cease-fire. The SCO decided to risk enemy vehicles in our lines before taking a chance on fratricide. Note, CPT Bills received machine-gun fire on his vehicle during this incident. No confirmed enemy contact was made throughout the night.

The following day, the SQDN and 1-1 AVN determined that the GSR [type-AN/PPS-5(A)] could give the AH-64's on-board APR-39 a false alert. If the GSR was slight off frequency and at a range of 1500 meters or closer, the APR-39 read the radar scan as a ZSU-23-4. In all future AH-64 operations, the SQDN would turn off the GSRs until friendly aircraft left the sector.

2 February - First TOW Kill

The 4th BDE CDR took CPT Tedesco (S-3 Air) and SFC Cain (S-2 NCOIC) on a recon flight to look at the border berm. Concurrently, the SCO sent a SWT to destroy an armored engineer attack vehicle (Bulldozer) north of berm. The AH-1 fired two TOWs, destroying the vehicle and shooting some nearby suspected enemy positions. At 1630, the SCO sent a SWT to destroy a radar tower and two buildings located along the berm inside Iraq.

At 1230, TF 3-37 CDR arrived at the SQDN to coordinate the relief of 1-4 CAV in the 2nd BDE sector. Note the DIV had decided to strengthen our positions along the border by adding a tank TF and FA BN for defense of DSA Junction City. Both A and B TRP would shift their screenlines to the west to accommodate the sector change. A TRP and B TRP inserted the DIV's LRSD 3-4 kms south of PL VERMONT.

3 February - Combat Command Carter Formed

MISSION: Conduct security operations to protect DSA JUNCTION CITY and screen the movement of the DIV's maneuver BDEs NLT 031200 FEB91. [Diagram 4]

(Big Sandstorm)

A big sandstorm precluded a B TRP ground patrol from reaching the border north of the town of Markaz Samah Al Jadid. The 2-34 AR CDR visited the SQDN in order to recon the sector. Because of poor visibility, his recon was degraded.

Upon the arrival of the ADC(M), BG Carter, the SQDN became OPCON to Combat Command Carter. The TOC published a revised OPORD for "Scorpion Danger." The SQDN inserted two additional LRSD teams. The SQDN had no contact on the screen other than the pattern of flare activity established earlier.

4 February - Sector Shrinks

By 0500 the SQDN extracted the LRSD. The DIV LRSD continued to be a consistent problem. They had no support base and reported directly to DIV.

At 0600, TF 3-37 and B TRP CDR linked-up for relief in sector. B TRP slid to the west.

The Corps CDR issued guidance for no engagements north of the berm without Corps' approval. The DIV CDR ordered the screen to pull 2kms south of the border. Very disappointing!

A SWT detected and reported an AML north of the border. The ADC(M) gave destruction authorization. CW2 Copeland, Darkhorse 27, destroyed the AML with an I-TOW at a range of 3200m. C Troop (Commanche 26) confirmed the kill. Nighttime GSR reported and higher intelligence sources confirmed that the Iraqis were moving armored vehicles in the vicinity of Markaz Samah Al Jadid.

5 February - Border Operations Continue

At 0841 the SQDN inserted via Bradley, three LRSD teams just south of the border berm.

At 2140, a B TRP GSR reported heavy and light vehicles vicinity the town of Markaz Samah Al Jadid. In addition the OPs observed numerous parachute flares throughout the night.

6 February - Raid on Markaz Samah Al Jadid

After numerous GSR contacts, the SCO launched the OPCONed Apaches to the town of Markaz Samah Al Jadid. At 0305 the aircraft acquired a truck and three dismounts moving north of the berm and three dismounts in the town. At 0457, higher intelligence sources reported 10 Moving Target Indicators (MTIs) vicinity of the same town.

At 0700, LTC Wilson led a recon mission to the town of Markaz Samah Al Jadid with two OH-58s and two AH-1s. Aerial observers saw many track marks in area. The SCO instructed the AH-1s to recon the town by fire. The aircraft's fire forced an Iraqi soldier carrying a white flag from the major building. The SCO and the other OH-58 landed near the Iraqi soldier. The AO dismounted and covered the EPW with his rifle.

Seeing that he had no means to secure the EPW, the SCO flew to nearest ground OP. He instructed a B TRP scout section (BCs-SSG Burnett and SSG Fugate) to accompany him to the town.

The SCO flew back to the town, dismounted, and directed that the ground scouts clear the building. The SCO accompanied the dismounts into the building and discovered communications gear and a ledger. The SCO instructed the dismounts to secure the radios and papers. The captured commo equipment was American made by Harris Technology. Soldiers found no other enemy soldiers.

Back outside, the EPW kept pointing at the Cobra on the ground, who was sitting with its 20mm gun pointing at him, motioning "no more, no more". The EPW relayed that three armed Iraqi soldiers were in the town. The SCO instructed SSG Burnett to secure the EPW in an M3A2 and to move through the town, reconing by fire attempting to flush out the other Iraqi soldiers. After clearing the town, and finding no additional personnel, B TRP returned the EPW and equipment to the CBT TNS. The pilots returned to the SQDN TOC for their debrief.

At 1300, the A TRP Commander reported enemy activity in the town. At 1400, the SCD led an air raid party into the town to conduct a more thorough search. The raid party, consisting of one SWT and a UH-1 with 5 A TRP soldiers, was led by SSG Wehage. A TRP provided the reaction force. The party captured radio equipment and documents, but found no other Iraqis.

The SCO flew to DTAC and received an "ass-chewing" for being up front and on the ground. When the SCO informed the DIV CDR that he brought two M3A2's forward for fire power, he received another reprimand for having Bradleys north of PL CHERRY.

At 1930, B TRP's GSR reported five heavy vehicle targets vicinity of the town of Markaz Samah Al Jadid. The SCO launched the Apaches, but found no targets. At 2220, higher intelligence sources reported 10 Moving Target Indicators (MTIs) vicinity of Samah. The Apaches, which were still airborne, sighted no vehicles and returned to the HAA at 2350.

7 February - Markaz Samah Al Jadid Activity Continues

During the early morning hours, the B TRP's GSR continued to acquire vehicle targets around the town. The Apaches swept the area and did not acquire any targets.

The town of Markaz Samah Al Jadid was the center of attraction for quite some time. Nightly the SQDN received reports of flares followed by vehicle movement acquired by the GSRs. When the SQDN employed the Apaches based on these GSR contacts, they never acquired any vehicles on the south side of the berm.

The Troops conducted platoon maneuver training during the day, while maintaining vigilance along the screenline.

Throughout the evening and the following morning, the GSRs continued to have contacts with wheeled and tracked vehicles. The OPs did confirm two of the GSRs contacts. The M3A2's thermal sight acquired one unidentifiable "hot spot" and one dismount standing atop the berm. B TRP reported parachute flare activity throughout the night, with some possible artillery or mortar fire in front of the berm. This fire was most likely registration fires.

8 February - Border Operations Continue

At 1430, B TRP identified three dismounts at NT6016. One dismount appeared to act as a look-out. B TRP CDR dispatched A SECT/2d PLT to move forward and capture the dismounts. The dismounts ran across the SQDN/TF 3-37 boundary, then north across the berm.

During the evening, the B TRP GSR again reported 10 light vehicles around the town. The COLT, forward with A TRP's OP6, reported seeing new antennas atop a building in Samah. During this same time, both 1-4 CAV and TF 3-37 reported Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) flying in the DIV sector.

Many Corps units sighted RPVs throughout the evening. One RPV hovered over the TOD and appeared to be taking pictures. The Field Trains reported seeing two RPVs flying circles around its location. Shortly thereafter, both A and B TRPs reported an RPV flying up and down the screenline.

The DIV initially prevented the SQDN from engaging any of these RPVs until it could determine if any friendly Corps RPVs were in sector. The identification of friendly versus enemy RPVs continued to be a problem. Hypothesizing that the antennas may be controlling the RPV's, BG Carter gave the SQDN permission to use its Apaches to destroy the antennas.

At 2242, the Apaches acquired a "hot spot" atop the building, but could not identify the antennas. After the COLT confirmed that the AH-64s acquired the correct building, the aircraft fired one Hellfire missile and 150 rounds of 30mm into the building. The COLT team stated that the Apaches hit the building and some, but not all, of the antennas. [A later inspection showed the "hot spot" to be the building's water cistern, which heated-up during the day. Closer inspection revealed, it had a large hole in its side].

At 2345, B TRP reported one RPV. After receiving authorization from DIV, B TRP engaged the RPV, which turned and flew north. After the RPV's departure, the Apaches returned to sweep the berm but, acquired no targets.

9 February - Border Operations Continue

The following morning, DTAC granted the SQDN permission to destroy the remaining antennae on building north of town. D Troop (Darkhorse 13) fired 2.75 rockets from his AH-1 without effect on the antennae. The aircraft fired two TOWs and destroyed the antennae.

Between 1930 and 2230, the TOD, FLD TNS and the screenline reported two RPVs. The GSR had contacts with light and heavy tracked vehicles in the area of Samah. A and B TRPs reported sighting parachute flares and ground explosions.

The COLT sighted another antennae atop a building in the town. The SCO launched the Apaches which destroyed the antennae and most of the building with Hellfire missiles.

10 February - Border Operations Continue

At 1745, a SLAR aircraft reported 70 MTIs approximately 30 kms to our northeast (NT8052). Corps sent two sorties of A-10, which identified and engaged numerous armored targets.

B TRP inserted via M3A2s two LRSD teams vicinity NT8617 and NT5519. Both teams were set by 1934.

The OPs sighted numerous parachute flares throughout the night and some ground explosions. After B TRP's OP16 acquired five "hot spots" in the town of Samah, the SCD launched the Apaches. The Apaches identified one thin skin vehicle north of the berm, but chose not to engage. The aircraft did not observe anything south of the berm.

DIVARTY fired one copperhead round at a bunker along the berm. A TRP's COLT lased the target. The Apaches still on-station reported the round landed 2 km short of the target. Later, DIVARTY investigated and adjusted the range for maximum charge munitions.

11 February - Border Operations Continue

B TRP captured 7 EPWs, and one had an AK-47. The SQDN had little activity during the night.

12 February - Border Operations Continue

B TRP inserts an LRSD team at NT6019. Normal flare activity during the night.

13 February - Border Operations Continue

DMAIN reported there would be friendly bombing along the berm in 2 ACR's sector (DIV's left boundary). 1st CAV DIV (DIV's right boundary) would conduct artillery raids.

The DIV ordered the SQDN (TF IRON) to establish a screen 2 kms south of PL VERMONT NLT 141615 FEB. During the ground TRPs move forward, a SWT (one OH-58 and two AH-1s) would screen forward and provide artillery observation. Additionally, the DIV would OPCON D/2-16 IN (TF 3-37) to the SQDN to clear the town of Samah.

B TRP executed false LRSD insertions to determine if the tracked vehicle movement generated any flare activity. During the false insertions, the OPs did not sight any flares. However, during the night, OPs reported normal flare activity and one artillery/mortar explosion south of the berm.

14 February - Assault on Samah/TF IRON

At 0500, A and B TRPs extracted the DIV LRSD teams.

At 0730, D/2-16 IN became OPCON to SQDN with the mission to clear the town of Samah. A TRP would provide back up fire support. The S-3 conducted a briefback/rehearsal with the A TRP CDR and D/2-16 CDR, CPT Hammond. The S-3, per BG Carter's directions, had personally simplified the company commander's plan to preclude the possibility of fratricide. D/2-16 left their attack position enroute to the LD at 1145 hrs. At 1215 hrs A TRP reported seeing three dismounts in the town on a roof, with

a radio. The SCD ordered A TRP to engage the insurgents with mortar fire. At 1250 D/2-16 attacked the town of Samah. Despite clear engagement criteria to fire only if fired upon, the D CO CDR lost complete control of his attack. Three of his soldiers were wounded by friendly fire. The company fired 25mm main gun, coax, SAW and threw hand grenades into aluminum buildings. The SCD put company at cease-fire. A TRP assisted in Medevac requests. SCD instructed D/2-16 IN CDR to rejoin his unit (TF 3-37) and report to the battalion commander. After A TRP's relief of D/2-16 IN in Samah, the remainder of A TRP and B TRP moved forward to establish a screen 2 kms south of PL VERMONT.

At 1615, the SQDN was OPCONed to 2nd AD FWD (3rd BDE), under TF IRON. TF IRON consisted of, 1-4 CAV, 1-41 IN, 1-5 FA, 3-5 FA, 8th BN, two BTY MLRS. TF 1-41 relieved TF 3-37.

MISSION: Continue to conduct security and reconnaissance of the Saudi-Iraqi border. On order, reduce the border berm and conduct a zone reconnaissance north of the border. [Diagram 5]

The TF IRON CDR ordered the TF to breach the berm and push 2-3 km into Iraq on 15 Feb 91. During the night, the SQDN had flare activity and GSR contacts with light vehicles north of the berm.

15 February - Breach of the Berm

Prior to executing the breach of the berm, the 1st BDE TAC, in order to prepare for future operations, co-located with the SQDN TOC. The SQDN would be OPCON to 1st BDE for the execution of Phase III of "Scorpion Danger."

At 1130 the SQDN fired three artillery targets. At 1200, the SQDN began engineer operations to reduce the berm. A TRP was responsible for four 20 meters wide cuts through the berm. B TRP was responsible for six cuts. A TRP was the first BIG RED ONE unit to cross into Iraq at 1215. SFC Cyphers led the first M1A1 into Iraq.

A TRP had no contact. 3rd PLT/B TRP received small arms fire prior to the reduction of the berm from a sand fort (NT580232). B TRP quickly returned fires with three TOW's, which destroyed the fort and one truck. A and B TRPs also fired upon and destroyed several bunkers. Upon searching the bunkers, the TRPs policed up communications equipment, mortar ammunition, grenades, etc. LTC Wilson and crew, HQ-66, captured the first Iraqi flag at 1325 hrs from an enemy bunker (38RNT607228).

Overall, the SQDN's execution went well. The entire operation of breaching the berm at 10 different points took only 90 minutes. During the following days, the Engineers widened the berm cuts to a width of 100 m, and added two additional cuts.

At 1437, the SQDN established its screen line along the 24 grid line; A TRP set from NT461253-NT530246, and B TRP set from NT567250-675253. SQDN initially received orders to continue the attack to PL IOWA, but later received a 24 hr delay notification.

During the night, A-10s attacked the Iraqi defensive positions to our north. The OPs reported flare activity during the night.

16 February - Maintained Screenline Inside Iraq

TRPs conducted daylight dismounted patrols along the screen line. These patrols and the SWT reported no contact.

The SQDN made face-to-face contact with 2d ACR on the DIV's western boundary, and established contact points for future operations. 2d ACR would remain one km west of the boundary to prevent possible fratricide.

The OPs reported flare activity throughout the night. TF 1-41 reported some dismounted activity. The move to PL IQWA was delayed again.

17 February - Maintained Screenline in Iraq

During the early morning, the TOC listened as TF 1-41 lost an M3A1 and M113 to Apache Hellfire missiles. Some of the wounded were GSR soldiers who had worked with the SQDN just 24 hours prior. The SQDN mourned for the KIA/WIA.

During the day B TRP engaged two BRDMs with TOWs. Upon searching this area, B TRP found a recently vacated mortar firing point, as well as numerous tracked and wheeled tracks. During the night, both A and B TRPs' OPs reported enemy dismounted and flare activity to the front of their screenline.

At 1651 the SQDN was notified that the DIV was ordered by VII Corps to move south of the Iraqi border and establish defensive positions along the border berm. TF IRON would conduct a rearward passage of lines through 1st and 2nd BDEs, who would maintain defensive positions along the border. The SQDN would move to an AA for rest/re-fit. [Diagram 6]

18 February - Rearward Passage of Lines

At 0800, the SQDN conducted a rearward passage of lines through 1st BDE. During the passage, 1LT Schwartz (attached pilot from FT. Hood) and AO SPC Dunn crashed their OH-58C(S) while screening the ground troops' move. The investigation revealed an engine failure. Their aircraft was totally destroyed but, the crew miraculously escaped uninjured. A TRP quickly dispatched a scout section to secure the site. By 1000, the SQDN was set in AA RESPITE for four days of maintenance and rest. All but one of the SQDN's soldiers received a shot to avoid botulism, a suspected Iraqi biological warfare munition.

22 February - Return to the Screenline

The SQDN completed its rearming and refitting in AA RESPITE. The 2d ACR LNO, CPT Delgado arrived to stay with the SQDN for the attack north.

1st BDE moved the SQDN back on the screenline. 2d ACR moved forward to the berm on our left flank, and 2-34 AR was positioned on our right flank. Engineers removed dragons teeth from the berm cuts. 1st BDE informed the SQDN that the attack would start on 24 Feb 91. The SQDN began taking PB pills at 2000.

The OPs reported parachute flares throughout the night.

23 February - Preparation for the Attack

During the day, the 2d ACR moved 10 km north of the berm. During the night, MLRS fired for several hours to our east. 1st BDE reported tracked and dismounted activity to its north. The Apaches engaged and destroyed the vehicles. The SQDN had no contact.

The SQDN was ready for G - DAY!!

PREPARED AND LOYAL

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Robert Wilson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "R".

ROBERT WILSON
LTC, CAV
Commanding


DIAGRAM #1

MOVEMENT TO CAMP MACKENZIE
(TAA ROOSEVELT)

1. ADV PARTY RECONS TAA
ROOSEVELT 18-30 DEC.

2. SQDN ADV. PARTY, THEN
GROUND TROOPS MOVE TO
TAA ROOSEVELT

3. AIR TROOPS MOVE TO 4TH BDE
HAA VIA BASTOGNE



DISTANCE FROM AD DAMMAM
PORT TO TAA ROOSEVELT
IS 270 KMS.

PL VERMONT	# MARKAZ SAMAH AL JADID	PL VERMONT (IRAQI-SAUDI BORDER)
PL CHERAY		

NORTH
CAROLINA

10

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13414

DSA
JUNCTION
CITY

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2.1

PL St. MINIEL

TAPLINE ROAD

~~HA FAR AL BATIN~~

SP
TAA ROOSEVELT

1-4(0-3)

DIAGRAM #2


INITIAL SCREEN OF
DSA JUNCTION C

1. 24 JAN - B TROOP (+)
SCREENS DSA
2. 25 JAN - AIR TROOPS
JOIN SCREEN OF DSA
3. 27 JAN - REMAINDER OF
SQDN JOINS SCREEN
OF DSA. PUSHES SCREEN
FORWARD


DIAGRAM #3


SCREEN OF D

22 FEB 92



COMBAT COMMAND CARTER



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DESERT STORM

G-Day, 24 Feb 91

The Division's mission was to destroy lead elements of the Iraqi 26th and 48th Inf Divs, establish a breachhead, pass the 1st UK AR Division, and on order continue the attack (DIAGRAM 1). The Division placed its cavalry squadron under the operational control (OPCON) of 1st Brigade (1 BDE) for the operation's initial phase.

At 0420 hrs, we began our zone reconnaissance north of PL VERMONT, which was the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Our center of mass grid at PL VERMONT was 38RPU550225. 1 BDE arrayed 1-4 CAV on the left, TF 2-34 in the center, and TF 5-16 on the right. 3/2 ACR, on our left flank assigned us a Liaison Officer (LNO), CPT Delgado. The Squadron collocated the Field Trains (FLD TRNS) with the 101st SPT BN at 38RPU4212.

We moved forward in zone and remained tied in with TF 2-34. The Scout Weapons Teams (SWTs) reconnoitered forward and maintained contact with our flank units. By 1000 hours, we set along PL PLUM with no contact with enemy. At that time, the Forward Area Support Team (FAST) began refuel operations vic 38RPU591331 under the control of the CSM and the HHT Commander. This operation took little more than a hour.

During refuel operations, CW3 Winters' SWT flew over the Iraqi positions to our front. This single act caused several Iraqis to surrender. By 1030 hrs, B Troop (B TRP) had taken 21 prisoners. The B TRP 1SG consolidated the prisoners at the refuel site. The CSM, HHT Commander and Flight Operations personnel assisted in the evacuation of these prisoners which included several officers. At the same time, CPT Tovsen's SWT, who relieved CW3 Winters' SWT, engaged and destroyed an AML scout car.

Due to the lack of any significant resistance, MG Rhame ordered the Division to continue the attack at 1500hrs. An intense artillery barrage began at 1430, TF 2-34 and 5-16 began breaching operations at 1500hrs. The Squadron consolidated vicinity ATTACK POSITION (ATK PSN) DRAGOON, in preparation for our passage through the breach.

At 1530, 1st BDE ordered the Squadron to follow 1-34 AR through the breach, clear OBJ 15K and secure PL COLORADO. A and B TRPS passed through the breach at 1630, and began to collect several enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) The Iraqi's surrendered as

soon as we approached their positions. A TRP received some indirect fire at the breach site, but continued to drive north.

During the Squadron's movement forward, we did not search all of the bunkers fearing booby traps. The Squadron placed a higher priority on controlling the friendly forward line of troops and preventing fratricide between friendly flank units.

The Squadron set along PL COLORADO by 1730, and tied in with 1-34 AR on the right. We could not tie into any 1 BDE unit on our left, due to the brigade commander's desire not to move TF 5-16 in during darkness. TF 5-16 would attack OBJ 12K the following morning.

Following darkness, the A TRP CP captured roughly 80 EPWs, numerous weapons and assorted equipment. The Squadron captured an additional 34 prisoners, and destroyed 4 trucks, an AML, and 3 AT guns (105mm). Total number of enemy killed is unknown.

Total distance covered was 35 KM. We rearmed/refueled that night.

COMMENTS: DPICM on the battlefield posed severe problems for dismounts and wheeled vehicles. This made refuel/rearm operations extremely hazardous, especially at night. The bomblets injured personnel and destroyed tires. SWT teams were invaluable for reconnaissance operations and maintaining contact on our flanks. The Global Positioning System greatly enhanced navigation.

G+1, 25 Feb 91
Cloudy/overcast day

1 BDE ordered the Squadron to move our screen line NE to screen the Corps Restrictive Fire Line (RFL) no later than 0900 (DIAGRAM 2). TF 5-16 seized OBJ 12K at 0800. We tied into 1-34 AR to our right and TF 5-16 to our left. While the Division passed the 1st UK AR Division and an artillery brigade forward, we maintained the screen and destroyed the enemy equipment abandoned in the area. The B TRP engineers destroyed several bunkers and ammunition stockpiles on OBJ 15K.

At 1500 the Division ordered the Squadron to prepare for Contingency Plan (COP) JEREMIAH II. 1-4 CAV came under Division control and occupied ATK PSNs A and B along PL NEW JERSEY at 1900. At 2000 the SCO briefed COP JEREMIAH II, which required the Squadron to conduct a zone recon forward of the Division, as it moved to contact.

During that evening refuel/rearm actions were minimal due to the extremely hazardous conditions posed by DPICM and CBU bomblets. Bomblet explosions damaged several wheeled vehicles and killed two 1 BDE soldiers.

Total distance travelled was 10 KM. The FLD TRNS remained with 101st SPT BN - 25 to 30kms distant. The SXO in conjunction with the S-4 and HHT Commander, decided to continue the FAST concept. This was a fortuitous decision given events to come.

COMMENTS: 1:250,000 overlays allow to much margin for error among units from different divisions. 1:250,000 maps must be accompanied by a list of points which define boundaries. 1:100,00 maps would be better.

G+2, 26 Feb 91
Cloudy/rainy

During the night, the 1st UK AD to our south had significant enemy contact. In order to give the 1st UK maneuver room and prevent fratricide, the Division's zone was cut half of its width (brigade-size zone). 3 AD was to our north, with 4-7 CAV being the flank unit.

The Squadron departed from its attack positions at 0315 to set along PL OMAHA prior to the Division's LD time at 0500. The Squadron led the Division's movement in zone (DIAGRAM 3). We encountered no initial enemy resistance, only scattered pockets of enemy, who gave themselves up as we approached. The troops disarmed and passed several EPWs to the rear. A TRP encountered a series of enemy bunkers and trench networks that the Iraqis abandoned. Visibility was very limited (500-600m).

By 1000 hours we closed on the rear of 2 ACR along PL ABILENE. 2 ACR was conducting an attack east of PL ABILENE from north to south against what they believed were elements of the Republican Guards Tawakana Division. During the zone recon, A-25 encountered and destroyed an abandoned T-62 and a ZSU-23-4.

At 1400, LTC Wilson, the SCO, met with the CG, who gave the directive to contact 2 ACR and coordinate the night forward passage of the Division. MAJ Burdan, the S-3, coordinated the passage. Additionally, we established and maintained contact with 4-7 CAV/3 AD. The passage began at 2130. The Squadron's mission was to pass the Division's combat elements, then screen the Division's north flank during the attack to OBJ NORFOLK. Total distance travelled was 120 KM.

COMMENTS: CPT Morrison, HHT Commander, directed two critical refuel operations. He timed these to minimize disruption of the Squadron's momentum or the Division's movement. All units completed refueling within one hour. The Squadron was the only unit in the Division to finish the days action with full fuel tanks, prepared to continue the advance forward. At 1700 CPT Morrison returned to the FLD TRNS vic PT7709 to refuel the M978s. He began a hazardous night movement with 1SG Colangelo and 6 M978s to link up with the Combat Trains (CBT TRNS). Total distance, 60km with an uncertain enemy situation. The Division and 2 ACR demonstrated remarkable discipline during the forward passage of lanes. Poor visibility kept the Squadron from fully utilizing the air scouts. We had rain/fog in the morning and a dust storm in the afternoon.

G+3, 27 FEB 91
Still cloudy/much ground fog

We started moving to the Division's northern flank at 0130. The Squadron positioned fuel forward to top off the tanks before our movement east to OBJ NORFOLK. The Division stopped at OBJ NORFOLK (80 GL). The Squadron set at the 70-85 N-S GL, center mass grid PT795980.

The Squadron commander in HQ66, the S-3 in HQ63, the FSO and ALO in HQ34 went forward at approximately 0400 to inspect the screen line in preparation for continued operations. (SEE DIAGRAM 4). B TRP reported engaging and destroying a T-55 to their front.

As the Command Group (CMD GRP) approached the screen line, HQ63 spotted a T-72 at close range in turret defilade, with turret traversing. Upon backing up, HQ63 acquired the T-72 and an additional tank, a T-55, as well as numerous dismounts. Keeping the tanks under observation, the CMD GRP requested assistance from a B TRP tank. After maneuvering to the T-72's right flank, the B TRP M1A1 destroyed the tank. HQ63 destroyed the T-55 with 25mm through the turret and hull. Upon destroying the tanks, the numerous dismounts in the area took cover. The CMD GRP displaced, as B TRP acquired additional T-72 tanks in same the vicinity. B TRP commander sent 2LT Lowndes with 2 M3A2s and 2 M1A1s to search out and destroy the tanks. B TRP reported spotting a red and green star cluster, followed 5 minutes later by artillery fire on their positions. The TRP went to MOPP IV and tested for the presence on any chemical agents. Artillery also landed near the CBT TRNS and FAST. The area had not been cleared by 2 ACR.

While in MOPP IV, 2LT Lowndes' sections maneuvered and engaged 5 tanks. SSG Robinson killed 2 tanks with TOW's, and SGT Marbach killed three tanks at point blank range with his tank's main gun. Upon completion of this engagement, B TRP's test for chemical agents was negative. B TRP commander gave the "all clear."

At 0515, the SCO pulled the screen line back due to contact with the T-72's in prepared positions. The SCO and S-3 decided to attack the positions once all the Squadron's forces were set (DIAGRAM 5). At 0615 the Squadron attacked the enemy position, with A and B TRPS on line. 1st PLT, A TRP was the first with contact, and destroyed two T-72 tanks with TOWs. As A TRP continued the attack, an Iraqi captain moved out of his bunker and surrendered his men. 1st PLT, A TRP disarmed the soldiers and moved them south. 2nd and 3rd PLTs, A TRP continued the attack to the east destroying an apparent 2S1 battery and several towed artillery pieces. B TRP encountered dug-in tanks, BMPS, trucks and numerous bunkers.

By 0715, the Squadron had reached its Limit Of Advance (LOA), as A and B TRPs continued to destroy enemy vehicles in the area. The Command Group went back into the area where they had encountered the tanks earlier in the morning. Both the T-72 and the T-55 were destroyed. HQ63 noticed another T-72 in hull defilade with an Iraqi in the turret. When the enemy dropped down inside the tank, the SCOs vehicle, HQ66, destroyed the tank with a TOW at 150m.

The SCO called off the attack at 0830 hours after it appeared all enemy elements in the area were destroyed. For two

hours the Squadron had methodically moved and destroyed 11 tanks, artillery pieces fuel and cargo trucks. We refueled our tanks while waiting for the Division to resume the attack. The brigade commanders and CG discussed in detail their fuel status and expected rates of advance before halting for resupply.

At 0930, the Squadron resumed the moving flank screen (DIAGRAM 6). A TRP led the screen, followed by B TRP. During the extremely fast paced move, A TRP destroyed 23 tanks, 25 APCs and numerous bunkers, many of which appeared abandoned. Additionally, A TRP disarmed and pushed south over 100 EPWs.

The Squadron arrived at PL Berlin at 1230, where it conducted refuel operations. HQ 66 then noted vehicle movement on a ridgeline 500m from the Squadron. The G-3 ordered B TRP to send a team to investigate. 2LT Karns led the scouts and tankers from B TRP and destroyed 1 BMP, 1 BTR, and a rocket launcher, which were attempting to flee the area.

At approximately 1300, the CBT TRNS passed through what appeared to be an unoccupied defensive position. Seven enemy soldiers surrendered to CPT Harmon and the CBT TRNS. The EPWs indicated that there were more Iraqi soldiers in the surrounding bunkers too injured to walk. CPT Stokes and the maintenance section used the AMV to clear the immediate vicinity, while LT Butler and DR Hanson with escorts proceeded to the wounded in the bunkers and treated their wounds. The CBT TRNS stopped passing ground ambulances from 4-5 FA, which evacuated the wounded. The trains continued forward at 1430 to establish contact with the Squadron ground elements.

At 1330, the CG ordered the Division to continue the attack NE of PL Berlin to prevent the Iraqi army from retreating from Kuwait City north to Iraq. The brigades' objectives were to the northeast along the main Basra-Kuwait City highway. The Squadron would continue to screen the Division's north flank, north of 2d BDE.

The attack continued at 1430. SWTs reconnoitered forward and to our flanks. Mr Perkins' SWT engaged and destroyed several armored vehicles while supporting the Squadron's moving flank screen. The Squadron passed a heavily fortified, but unoccupied, defensive position. The position had reinforced (concrete) berms, trenches, and bunkers. The Squadron lost contact with Division, but relayed thru 2d BDE our position and objective coordinates. At 1500hrs, the TOC, led by the squadron executive officer, MAJ Wimbish, which was moving with 2 BDE, departed into hostile territory to link up with A and B TRPs. Enroute it bypassed numerous fortified areas, captured 3 enemy tanks and disarmed 93 Iraqi soldiers.

Upon approaching our objective at 1630, the SCO directed B TRP to establish a screen line west and A TRP east of the Basra-Kuwait City highway (DIAGRAM 7). A SWT under CPT Peters, scouted ahead of A troop and reported personnel and vehicles moving northward as well as what appeared to be a bunker by the road. As A TRP approached the road, it observed several vehicles and many personnel moving north along the main road. The SCO ordered A TRP to secure the road 10kms south of the Kuwait-Iraq border and cut the line of communications. Upon receipt of the

order, CPT Pope ordered 1st PLT to lead, followed by 2nd, 3rd, mortars, and trains.

At approximately 1700, 1st PLT reported contact with numerous enemy dismounts, tanks, and APCs along the highway (DIAGRAM 8). The Iraqis appeared to have stopped prior to continuing north. Unlike the previous vehicles, the enemy either manned or attempted to man their equipment.

As the enemy spotted 1st PLT, several vehicles attempted to move north. One T-55 attempted to traverse on A14, which immediately destroyed the Iraqi tank. Farther north, A15 destroyed the lead BMP, effectively blocking the road. With the road now blocked, CPT Pope instructed 1st and 2nd PLTs to move northeast across the road, destroying all enemy vehicles in their path.

As 1st and 2nd PLTs continued to engage vehicles, each platoon began to gather a greater number of EPWs. The A TRP commander ordered 2nd PLT to establish an EPW collection point vicinity of his M3A2. At approximately 1830hrs, elements of all platoons began to deliver EPWs to the collection point. During this time, all elements were still engaging vehicles and equipment. Eventually, A TRP collected roughly 450 EPWs. By this time, night arrived, and the situation became even more confusing. With the majority of enemy vehicles destroyed, the commander ordered a section from each of 1st and 2nd PLTs to move north and establish security northeast of the TRP area.

As the scope of the task facing A TRP became too great, the SCO ordered B TRP to abandon its screen line and move to assist A TRP. The Squadron proceeded to set up a hasty defensive position, preparing for either a possible enemy counter attack from the north or a large armored force attempting to break out to the north. Both A and B TRP's temporary EPW holding areas continued to grow. The TOC informed 2d BDE of our position, situation and enemy assessment.

We were informed that the VII Corps commander halted the Division's attack due to confusion in graphics with the 1st UK AD to the south. Once the Division halted, 1-4 CAV was not only the sole controller of this key highway, but also the eastern most unit in VII Corps.

The SCO directed the S-3 to request an infantry company, tank company, and artillery be positioned forward to support our defense. However, the Corps' Commanders orders precluded 2d BDE from assisting us until the next morning. Therefore, the Squadron set up an all around defense with A TRP on the east side, command group in the center and B TRP on west of the highway for the night. The CBT TRNS and FAST, with flight operations, remained 10kms to the southwest. The SCO ordered the aid station to move forward and to set up to treat injured EPWs.

During the night, the HHT commander brought the FAST and CBT TRNS forward, linking them up with A and B TRPs. During movement, the CBT TRNS received and evaded direct and indirect fires. Enroute, CPT Morrison and CPL Hall captured eight Iraqi soldiers. In addition, CPL Hall later single-handedly captured 20 heavily armed Iraqi soldiers.

With the CBT TRNS in position, maintenance, support, and HQ personnel began to secure the area and take additional prisoners walking up the highway. The CBT TRNS assumed control of the EPW site in order to allow A and B TRPs the manpower to better secure the Squadron's perimeter.

The Medical PLT immediately set-up the aid station to treat the wounded EPW's, and summoned the Jump Aid Station from the TOC. MAJ Hansen, CW3 Harston, and 2LT Butler worked diligently to treat over 200 Iraqi casualties. Fortunately, an Iraqi and a Kuwaiti doctor provided much needed assistance. Working throughout the night, this team of professionals saved many lives. Little water or food was available due to the extremely tenuous supply line.

The TOC remained alone and unafraid 10kms to the west in order to maintain communications with 2d BDE and Division, while the sounds of escaping Iraqi armored columns filled the night.

The FLD TRNS remained far to the rear. During its movement, 3 vehicles hit mines causing some damage to vehicles, but no casualties. Secondary explosions in the distance kept the soldiers alert through the night.

Total distance travelled by the Squadron was 150kms.

COMMENTS: The ground troops and CMD GRP moved through the area destroying vehicles and personnel with precision. The darkness, over 1000 dismounted Iraqi EPWs and secondary explosions kept the Squadron alert all night. Discipline and mission focus prevailed, no friendly deaths or injuries were incurred. Squadron engineers, soldiers from the CBT TRNS and FLD TRNS handled EPWs in an exemplary manner. Squadron medical personnel and the Squadron Chaplain treated EPWs as if they were their own. FLT OPS, FARP personnel and the support platoon worked all night repositioning units for future operations. TOC personnel remained calm and in control, while maintaining the vital communications link to the division. Air troops worked all night preparing the aircraft for an early morning launch.

It became obvious upon examining the EPW's that the Iraqis themselves mistreated many of their own countrymen. Some were old men of 50 or 60; others, boys of 13 or 14 years of age, pulled from the streets of Basra and impressed into the service. They had been students, artists, writers and teachers.

The Squadron was lucky that we cut the road to Basra during a period of limited visibility. We were 30km in front of our Division, with an Iraqi division 12 km to the north. Hill 466 was a SCUD site (located beside the airfield), and enemy personnel found on the hill had a commanding view of the Squadron's positions.

G+4, 28 Feb 91

The Division placed the Squadron under the operational control of 2d BDE at 0600. We captured around 1400 EPWs and 700-900 weapons and demolitions. We air evacuated 15 injured

Iraqis. We could not get additional rations food, water or blankets for the EPWs. We gave them what we could. It was announced that a cease fire would go in effect at 0800, later changed to 0723. 2 BDE linked up on the ground with A TRP at around 0900 HRS (DIAGRAM 9). One Inf Co, 2-16, was to help guard POWs. ACES built a POW berm. We pushed out the screen in accordance with the 2 BDE plan and consolidated. There was no Squadron casualties. We hit 3 mines, placed enemy KIA in body bags and continued to police up enemy weapons for destruction. Final count was 2098 EPWs, 1400 weapons, much munitions and many destroyed vehicles.

COMMENTS: Because of the large quantity of unexploded munitions on the ground, no movement was allowed after sunset.

G+5, 01 Mar 91

At 0240 the SCO received an urgent call from the CG to move into Iraq and secure the SAFWAN Airfield (QU550370) for the upcoming cease-fire negotiations. Our mission was reconnaissance, we were not to get decisively engaged (DIAGRAM 10). The Squadron went to REDCON 1. We were instructed to delay our LD until 0615 and received an Apache Co OPCON. Our plan was to move two ground troops abreast preceded by air recce to the objective which was 10 KMs north of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. The AH-64s were placed in a holding area at the TOC, with the company commander monitoring the Squadron Command Net from within the Squadron TOC itself. The SCO moved with B TRP, S-3 with A TRP. A SWT flew in front of each TRP under Squadron control. They provided the Squadron with an initial picture of enemy units. The Squadron crossed the Line of Departure at 0615 hrs and within one hour had already bypassed crossed numerous vacated bunkers and trenches. We observed and reported numerous T-72s, T-55s, MTLBs, AMXs, ZSU-24-3, in the area surrounding the airfield and made face to face contact with Iraqi units in the area. The SCO moved to the point of contact and approached their defensive position. The enemy had an armored brigade in prepared positions with 3 battalions abreast and 1 in depth defending north of the objective. The SCO then ordered B troop to abandon their assigned OPs and move to the line of contact. Additionally, the SCO dismounted his M3 and confronted several Iraqis. At approximately 0900 hrs an Iraqi Colonel arrived in A TRP's sector. CPT Pope dismounted his vehicle and began to explain to the Iraqi Colonel that he must move his unit out of the area. The Colonel refused to move his force without instructions from his higher HQ. The Iraqi officer asked CPT Pope if he knew that he was in Iraq. CPT Pope replied that, yes he knew that he was in Iraq and that his unit was there to secure the site for cease-fire negotiations. The Iraqis had assumed the talks were to be held in Kuwait City. Additionally, the Colonel seemed offended that the American soldiers were giving his people food and responded by directing his men to prepare food and hot tea for A TRP. The A TRP soldiers drank the tea while the Colonel departed to confer with his superiors. At approximately 1020, the Colonel returned and stated he still did not have orders to leave

the area. CPT Pope told the Colonel that in order to prevent a confrontation he must leave the area now. At roughly the same time, a flight of A-10 flew over head and CPT Pope told the Iraqi that the aircraft would attack if he did not leave. At this point the SCO arrived and reiterated to the Iraqi Colonel that he must leave the area. The Colonel finally relented and ordered his unit to leave the area.

In a separate incident the S3, MAJ Burdan, was approached by an Iraqi captain and a major and asked if he knew that the Squadron was in Iraq. They seemed totally surprised at our sudden appearance. The S-3 smiled and replied yes. He told them they needed to leave the area and then asked them what unit they were from. The Major smiled this time and replied "Iraqi Army!" He refused to identify his unit. The Iraqis then drove away in a state of consternation.

Meanwhile in the B TRP sector, CPT Bills put together a small contingent of armored vehicles, 3 Bradleys and 2 tanks, that moved in an inverted "V" towards the Iraqi defense. 1LT Danussi, the XO, led the contingent towards a gathering of Iraqi soldiers. Once the formation came to a stop CPT Bills dismounted and approached the Iraqi Major that had stopped them. He was immediately surrounded by both Iraqi Officers and soldiers. The Major then sent for his Battalion Commander, a LTC, who spoke broken English. His first comment to CPT Bills was "Why are you in Iraq? Are you lost?" CPT Bills replied that he was here to secure the cease-fire negotiations site and that the Iraqis must leave the area in order for the talks to begin. The Iraqi Officer refused to leave without instructions from higher. The enlisted soldiers were told to leave, leaving 15-20 officers surrounding CPT Bills. He started to hand out MREs. One was offered to the BN CDR but he refused to accept it saying "Saddam feeds me well!" CPT Bills then returned to his screen line. A short time later CPT Bills returned to meet again with the Iraqi CDR. This time the BN CDR was angry and asked "Why are you Americans here?" TRP XO, moved forward and established contact with an Iraqi armor battalion in their vicinity. As in the other sector, the Iraqis had to be persuaded to leave their positions and head north. The Iraqi Officer said they would leave in 30 minutes. CPT Bills was escorted back to his vehicle by the Major and another soldier. He was dressed in a camouflage uniform, black leather jacket, scarf, beret, and AK-47. On schedule, 30 minutes late the Iraqi BN began to pull out. By 1200 hrs, most of the Iraqis in the Squadron sector were on the road moving north towards Basra.

After the Squadron had secured the airfield, the CG ordered 2 BDE to move to the airfield and join in its defense. The Squadron was then placed OPCON to 2 BDE. Sectors were adjusted and 2 BDE assumed responsibility to prepare the site for peace talks. CPT Morrison worked all night to clear the runway and assist Corps in setting up the negotiations site. We learned that night that the peace talks had been delayed 24 hours.

COMMENTS: We continued to assist the Division/Corps in preparation for the cease-fire negotiations. The Squadron's

performance in accomplishing this difficult mission was magnificent. Air/ground coordination was superb. Good order and discipline enabled us to move a Republican Guards armored brigade out of their prepared positions without bloodshed.

Squadron Battle Damage Assessment


	<u>HHT</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Total</u>
Trucks	3	21	39	3	0	66
Bunkers	0	70	21	0	0	91
APC	6	40	10	3	7	66
Tanks	5	35	18	0	7	65
Arty	0	11	2	0	2	15
AAA	0	5	0	2	0	15
Radars	0	0	1	0	0	1
Rocket L	0	0	1	0	0	1
POWs						3010
KIA						Numerous



ROBERT WILSON
LTC, AR
Commanding

DIAGRAM #1 G-DAY 24 FEB 91

- 1 ZONE RECON
- 2 BREACH IRAQI DEF
- 3 SCREEN PL COLORADO






DIAGRAM # 2

- 6+1 25 FEB 91
- 1 SCREEN OF BREACH
- 2 MOVE TO ATTACK POS

DIAGRAM # 3

G+2 26 FEB 94

1 ZONE RECON

2 SCREEN ALONG PL ABILENE

3 FLANK SCREEN OF 1ST BDE

A. AS BDE PASSES THROUGH ZONE

B. DURING ATTACK OBJ NORFOLK




DIAGRAM #4
 COMMAND GROUP CONTACT
 270330-0430 FEB 91




DIAGRAM # 5

DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI LOG BASE
270515 - 270830 FEB 91





DIAGRAM # 6
 6+3 27 FEB 91
 1 FLANK SCREEN
 2 OUT OF BASRA -
 KUWAIT CITY
 HIGHWAY

SAFVAN

XX

N ↑

AL JAHRA
 ## KUWAIT CITY




1-4

2

1

3 2AD (FWD)


DIAGRAM # 7
 ATTACK TO CUT THE BASRA-KUWAIT
 CITY HIGHWAY
 271600Z FEB91



A TROOP CUTS BASRA -
KUWAIT CITY HIGHWAY
271700 C FEB 91
38R QU 555 233
DIAGRAM # 8


□ □ □
BLOGS

N1



N1

DIAGRAM # 9
CONSOLIDATION OF BASRA
KUWAIT CITY HIGHWAY CUT






DIAGRAM #10
 645 01 MARCH 91
 CAPTURE OF SAFWAN
 AIRFIELD (QU 555 365)
 1 ZONE RECON
 2 CAPTURE OF
 AIRFIELD

POST WAR

01 MARCH 1991

At 0240 LTC Wilson received an urgent call from the CG to move into IRAQ and secure the SAFWAN airfield (QU550370) for the upcoming cease-fire negotiations. Our mission was reconnaissance, we were not to get decisively engaged (diagram 10). After the SQDN had secured the airfield, the CG ordered 2BDE to move to the airfield and join in its defense. The SQDN was then placed OPCON to 2BDE. Our mission was to secure the Northwestern end of the airfield. We tied into 5-16 IN on the left and 3-37 AR on the right. We also assisted the Division/Corps in preparing the airfield for the cease-fire negotiations. CPT Morrison and an M88 crew worked all night to clear the SAFWAN runway of the debris which littered it.

02 MARCH 1991

The Squadron continued to provide support for the cease-fire negotiations. We provided security to the northeastern side of the airfield. In addition we provided M3s, M1s, and helicopters as part of the show of force display that was being set up for the cease fire negotiations. Under the cease-fire terms, Iraqi forces were allowed to move unhindered north to the military Demarcation Line with their equipment. Also, Iraqi helicopters could fly freely through out sector. Later, this same equipment would be used to suppress the Shiites in Basra and the Kurds in northern Iraq.

03 MARCH 1991

The military cease-fire talks took place today. There were military officers present from all members of the coalition. News reporters were everywhere. B-66 was stationed near the cease-fire talks tent and was designated by the ADC (M) as the escape vehicle for GEN Schwarzkopf should something go wrong. We placed the Squadron Colours in front of B-66. This helped the Squadron gain more than its share of news coverage. The talks began at 1100 hrs and were over by approx 1330.

The Squadron helped provide security for the military

cease-fire negotiations. General Schwarzkopf personally congratulated many members of the Squadron for a job well done, and invited the SCO attend the negotiations.

At 1600 hrs we were informed that the peace time rules of engagement were in effect. 1-4 CAV received the mission to destroy all abandoned Iraqi military equipment and munitions in sector, except T-72 tanks and radar equipments.

04 MARCH 1991

General Yeosock the ARCENT Commander, came to airfield to talk about our excellence in supporting and securing the peace conference site. He talked with the BN/SQDN and BDE CDRs. The CINC apparently thought Safwan had been captured prior to the cease-fire. When it became evident that it was not, he ordered that it be seized-and seized quietly. The Squadron accomplished that mission.

5 - 13 MARCH 1991

The squadron continued to screen the DML vicinity SAFWAN. The SQDN provided humanitarian assistance to the numerous Iraqis fleeing the fighting in Basra and Kuwaitis returning to their homeland.

Numerous reporters came into the area to talk with the soldiers. Initially the country side was quiet. There were few civilians. By 10 March many civilians who had fled the area returned to their farms and began to put their lives together.

The Iraqis destroyed a number of oil wells in Northern Kuwait. Heavy smoke from the oil well fires blocked out the sun when the wind blew northward. It dropped temperatures 10 to 15 degrees. At night the oil fires were a bright glow on the horizon to our south.

6 MARCH 1991

Early in the morning, ten soldiers from 1-4 CAV began redeployment. The soldiers would first participate in an allied victory parade in Kuwait City, and then return to Ft Riley.

07 MARCH 1991

We experienced heavy rains today. There was a river of water 3" deep in the TOC. It was miserable.

10 MARCH 1991

The squadron commander assembled all the formed up soldiers and equipment for a picture on the airfield at SAFWAN. We recalled many of our attachments from the war so they could be in the picture as well.

13 MARCH 1991

The SQDN became OPCON to 4th BDE. The SQDN collapsed its screen to vicinity of TRPs' TOCs at 0800 hrs in preparation for our movement to AA GOLD in northern Kuwait. The quartering party departed for AA HUEBNER in Saudi Arabia. Their mission was to prepare AA Huebner as part of 4th Bde. 4th BDE was hoping it could move on to King Khalid Military City (KKMC).

14 MARCH 1991

The SQDN occupied AA GOLD (QU 572037) (Diagram 1), where we began to rearm and refit. While in AA GOLD, we reconnoitered a portion of the division rear area for serviceable Iraqi equipment. We marked any serviceable vehicle for destruction by our Cobra helicopters.

Throughout our time at AA GOLD, the burning oil wells lit the sky aglow every night. When the wind shifted to the west, the smoke would bring an eerie darkness to a normal sunny day.

During this time period we acquired three Iraqi Command and Control trailers. They contained refrigerators, showers, AC, as well as office work space. The SCO and the S-3 each had one. It was our intention to take them stateside with us.

15 MARCH 1991

The SQDN sent an AH-1 Cobra helicopter and an M3A2 Bradley for display at SAFWAN airfield. The display was designed to allow members of congress to talk with soldiers and see the equipment they used in the war. The displays took place 15, 16, and 18 MAR 91.

16 MARCH 1991

The squadron received the order to move with 4th BDE on 19 March to occupy an assembly area within the division's AA ALLEN. AA Allen was located vic 38RPU528243, inside southern Iraq. This was a shift of almost 90 KM to the west.

18 MARCH 1991

The SQDN conducted aerial gunnery on the marked Iraqi vehicles. The air troops used the air gunnery as an opportunity to work on identified weaknesses in the SWTs. We also reconnoitered our new location at AA ALLEN.

19 MARCH 1991

The SQDN moved to AA ALLEN (Diagram 1). It was a difficult move. The 3rd AD was moving into our (the division) sector as we moved out. The result was that the few roads in the area were clogged with convoys. The SQDN completed the 120km move to ALLEN in 9 hours. As with previous displacements the Squadron moved in

four march units: the tracked vehicles; the wheels; the aircraft, and quartering party.

The track movement consisted of 3 serials: B TRP, TOC/ALOC; A TRP. The wheel movement consisted of 2 serials: HHT and then C/D/E TRPs. The aircraft were normally split into 2 serials (by TRP). The quartering party consisted of representatives of each C2 node.

20 MARCH 1991

The division was designated as the VII Corps reserve and occupied a position behind the 2nd ACR. The squadron's mission at AA ALLEN was to continue to rearm and refit. In addition, we conducted a series of gunnery ranges. The ranges would include Bradley gunnery, M60, AT-4, claymore mines, hand grenades, and M-16 zeroing.

22 MARCH 1991

The squadron NBC officer and NBC NCO conducted training on both the M17 Sanator and the M8 alarm at the Field Trains location.

CPT Sauer and SFC Garza started planing for ranges. We had the mission of setting up the small arms ranges for 4th Bde.

23 MARCH 1991

The 4th BDE small arms range was disapproved by Division. They wanted to keep the number of ranges to a minimum. We arranged to use the 1st BDE ranges.

25 MARCH 1991

The squadron began to conduct daily range aerial sweeps of the division ranges. We would continue this mission for the following two weeks.

1-4 CAV officers defeated 4-1 Aviation officers in 2 of 3 volleyball games.

26 - 29 MARCH 1991

The squadron conducted unit-level small arms ranges. We zeroed the new soldiers on their M-16A2. We qualified soldiers on the AT-4, and M-60. We conducted a hand grenade range, as well as a pyro and claymore range.

29 March 1991

Squadron received the warning order to move north to the demarcation line (DML), as part of the 4th BDE mission to replace 2ACR in sector. The 2nd ACR sector ran from AN NASIRIYAH northwest to ALSALAFI covering almost 120 km. 4th BDE decided to occupy the eastern 40 km, with the CAV covering the western sector (which was the area southwest of NASIRIYAH), from vic

38RPV450120 to vic grid 38RNV950340.

30 March 1991 (Easter Sunday)

The squadron had a reduced working schedule which began with Chaplain Parker's sunrise service. An Easter brunch followed the service. The cooks prepared and selected officers served the meal, which included eggs, bacon, potatoes, sweet cake, french toast, coffee and juice. The second half of the day was spent working on OERs/NCOERs, and awards.

1 APRIL 1991

The SQDN conducted an M60, AT-4, and demo/pyro ranges at 1st BDE's range.

2 April 1991

The SCO and S-3 performed a sector recon of the proposed 1-4 CAV sector along the DML. They took an OH-58c north. The 2nd ACR manned a series of checkpoints along the major north-south road. Each ground Squadron occupied a sector approximated 40 KM wide and was responsible for running a number of checkpoints, POW collection points, and medical aid stations.

They were taking numerous POW's and medically treating many refugees and civilians. On the average, they took 150 POW's in each area and 80 to 100 personnel in each SQDN area.

03 APRIL 1991

The SQDN conducted an M3/M1 range. This was a zero and test fire exercise in preparation for our move to the DML.

5 APRIL 1991

The Squadron quartering party, consisting of the CSM, HHT Commander and the S-3, departed for the AN NASIRIYAH area to prepare to receive the squadron on 6 April.

6 April 1991

The squadron arrived in sector, and prepared to replace 2ACR the following day (Diagram 2&3). The air troops collocated with 4th BDE in their assembly area vic grid 38RPU230930. The remainder of the SQDN occupied an assembly area approximately 10 - 15 km north of the BDE along the oil pipeline road that paralleled HWY 8 in the area. The TOC was located vic grid 38RPV180120. The Trains located 300M south of the TOC. A TRP located vic 38RNV980180, and B TRP vic grid 38RPU380960.

7 April 1991

2nd ACR was replaced by 4th BDE at 0700 hrs. It took 2nd ACR

6 hrs to pull out. They began at 0400 hrs, withdrawing their northern most SQDN first.

The SQDN RETRANS was posted between the TOC and B troop. Several TACSAT systems were also used to connect the SQDN, Bde, Div and AA Huebner into one net. The division had the SQDN occupy only three checkpoints, instead of the ten that 2ACR manned in the area. Both A and B TRPs manned one checkpoint continually. A TRP also manned a checkpoint at the entrance to the ancient city of UR, the birth place of Abraham. B TRP also provided security for the BDE water point which was located approximately 15KM NE of the SQDN TOC. The SQDN placed medics, MPs, interpreters, and of course the squadron's soldiers at each checkpoint. Shortly after manning the checkpoints Iraqi soldiers began to surrender. Some Iraqi soldiers even drove up in taxis to surrender to us. Civilians also came to the checkpoints to have their children cared for or sick and wounded relatives treated.

The Air Troops flew scout weapons teams twice daily along the DML south of AN NASIRIYAH. The SWTs did not sight any enemy activity.

Comments on A TRPs participation in the manning of Check Point 1 and INDIA follow:

A TRP manned two check points in the Squadron sector. Check point one was manned on a rotational basis by 1st and 3rd platoons. The checkpoint controlled a key intersection along a secondary tapline road. 1st and 3rd platoons controlled this point placing barriers on the road itself and by establishing an overwatch position in a rubble solar energy facility. Checkpoint India was established by 2nd platoon with tanks. It proved far more active than CP1. CP India, just 8 kilometers south of Al Nasirayah, had a constant flow of EPW and refugees. Many refugees and EPWs were in desperate need of medical treatment. The A Troop medics and 2nd platoon handled several tragic cases, including 3 Iraqi teenagers who were seriously wounded playing soccer with a CBU. The teens were quickly and efficiently stabilized by the troop medics and medevaced. In another instance, two five year old children were terribly burned over 70% of their bodies. Once again the medic, SPC Siebel, provided excellent medical attention and stabilized the children for medevac. 4th Brigades policy of allowing parents to accompany injured children alleviated the problem of parents trying to find their children after a medevac. The policy prior to this had not allowed parents to accompany the children. Several Iraqis made daily trips to CPI searching for their missing children.

In addition to the medical cases, 2nd platoon helped in reuniting families that had been medevaced. Several hundred EPW were processed through both CPs. Most of the Iraqi soldiers simply wanted out of Iraq and saw the American Army as their best option. In addition to this, A Troop aided American refugees leaving Iraq.

The civilians and refugees often related stories of atrocities committed by the Iraqi Army in NASIRIYAH and many other cities. They related stories of rape, murder, and torture

perpetrated by the Secret Police and Republican Guard forces. Many stated that the Secret Police were working in the area controlled by the Coalition Forces and feared that once we pulled out the police would commit the same atrocities in this area.

On 9 April, 1991, the Corps Commander visited CP India and recognized several soldiers with a Corps coin.

On 10 April, 1991, the CG visited CP India. He presented SFC Cyphers, SSG Peters, and SSG Wehage with Big Red One coins for their outstanding work at CP India.

Comments on B TRPs participation in both the manning of Check Point 2, water point, and ranges that were conducted during this period follow:

Check Point 2: The check point was platoon run with shifts of 24 hours. The responsibility of the check point rested with the platoon leader and platoon sergeant. The check point covered both sides of the highway with an overpass splitting the check point. The platoon leader controlled one side of the checkpoint while the platoon sergeant manned the other. Damaged and destroyed vehicles belonging to the Republican Guards as a result of the 24th Infantry Division's move through the area, were used as part of the road block. The road block slowed oncoming traffic forcing them into a S-turn. Once the vehicles were stopped, vehicles and personnel were searched. The vehicles were cleared, the personnel were free to get water from an Iraqi water buffalo located under the bridge.

The Commanding General visited the check point and while on location, an Iraqi refugee enroute to Safwan, was searched and a 9mm pistol was found. The pistol was placed under the track of an M1 tank and destroyed.

The check point created a new perspective on the aftermath of the war. The refugees that passed through the area were either running from the secret police or the Iraqi Army in fear for their lives. Mothers would appear at the check point with their babies dead from starvation or disease. The mothers would not release them even after the translator told them that the babies were dead. Coffins were a common occurrence at the check point. Fathers would go to a set location to claim their fallen sons and place them in a coffin with an Iraqi flag. They would pass through the check point and as part of the security requirement. The bodies were wrapped in white cloth and decomposition had set in.

Medical assistance was provided to both the Iraqi soldiers and refugees. The type of injuries or sickness ranged from missing arms and legs to starvation. The combat aid station and the B TRP medics provided an overwhelming amount of support to those in need.

Water Point: We provided the security for elements of the 701st support battalion while they processed drinking water. The water point was manned by a section of either Bradleys or tanks. A number of refugees and Iraqi deserters passed through the point enroute to Safwan. They reported that the Iraqi Army was murdering both civilians and soldiers in the town of NASIRIYAH. These reports could not be substantiated because our unit could only move to a limit of advance which was 4 kilometers from the

demarcation line.

10 APRIL 1991

1-4 CAV received a warning order to be prepared to move south to Saudi Arabia not earlier than 110600 April 91. Gunfire and tracers were observed last night in the sky over Suq ash Shuyukh. There were tales of people being shot by Saddam's soldiers and police because they were suspected of fighting against him. Dog packs were becoming a problem in the area. The dogs looking for food were now moving in and out of our camps.

The SQDN conducted M-3 ranges.

A TRP also conducted 3 days of gunnery, firing Bradley Tables VI and VII. The range was run by 1LT Raynal, SSG Immel, and SSG Newell. All platoons received quality training and AARs during their rotation on the "Anvil" range.

B TRP conducted two days of Bradley Table VII modified. SSG Burnett and SSG Cowden created five engagements, three of which were defensive engagements with berms built with the M88 crew. The crews were a combination of stable crews and those who were to become new crews. This was done based on the future changes do to ETS and PCS. The targets used were Republican Guard trucks, jeeps and an MTLB.

11 APRIL 1991

The Squadron XO, MAJ Wimbish, and S-3, MAJ Burdan, who were out checking on operations took two Iraqi families with small children to medical aid checkpoint India. While performing this mission of mercy they had to reject pleas for help and assistance from several Iraqi male civilians who sought safety from Hussein in Saudi Arabia.

13 April 1991

CPT Tedesco made a route recon to AA HUEBNER. He was working on the Squadron movement order and needed the GPS waypoints for critical turns on the route south.

The CG presented valor awards to 1-4 CAV soldiers. Awards for valor were presented to the soldiers of B troop : CPT Bills (silver star), SSG Robinson, SGT Marbach (bronze star), and SSG Burnett (ARCOM). From A troop : CPT Pope, SSG Broennimann (silver star), SGT Streeter, SGT Whitehead, SPC Webb, PVT McClemore, PVT Rains, SPC Peterson (bronze star), and 2LT Copenhaver (ARCOM). From HHT : LTC Wilson, MAJ Wimbish, MAJ Burdan, CPT Morrison, CPT Johnson, Chaplain Parker, LT Vanderfeltz, SFC Garza, SGT Carpenter (bronze star)(V); CW3 Harston, SSG Seaver (ARCOM)(V).

14 April 1991

The squadron received orders at 1930 hrs to move south to Saudi Arabia by 0800 hrs 15 APRIL. This was a long awaited order. In anticipation of this order the Squadron today had torn down the tents and were ready to roll. The air troops were given the mission to assist 4th BDE in clearing the Division sector of

all US equipment after the Division began its move south. The CG wanted no US equipment left behind. CPT Philbrick, Cdr of Air Troops and FLT OPS Officer, was put in charge of the 1-4 CAV portion of the operation and worked with LTC Cook, Deputy BDE Cdr. CPT Philbrick used OH-58Cs from both C/D Troops.

15 April 1991

The SQDN started roadmarch south. We travelled south 120 km today (Diagram 4). 4-1 AVN missed its SP time this morning. 1-1 AVN who SP'd before us had an overturned trailer at 0900. These two incidents interfered with our move south. At 1000 hrs the SQDN had a maint halt and allowed 4-1 and 1-1 AVN to pass us. We spent the night in an AA vic 38RNT780950. We arrived there at approximately 1500 hrs. We were located by 1st Brigade (America's Team). The CG OPCONed us to 1st Brigade for the subsequent move south.

16 April 1991

Roadmarch began at 0445 hrs and we crossed into Saudi Arabia at 0945 hrs. We moved into a staging area vic 38RNS530580 at 1100 hrs approximately 3 KM north of Tapline road. We were instructed to cross Tapline road at 0515 hrs on 17 April and proceed south to AA Huebner.

17 APRIL 1991

The SQDN crossed Tapline road at 0515 hrs and continued directly south to AA Huebner vic 38RNS450140 (Diagram 5). The dust along the road was very thick and reduced visibility to 100M along the route of march. The air troops completed their clearing operations and were released by LTC Cook.

18 - 23 APRIL 1991

The squadron signed over the tanks and crews to 2nd BDE. We turned over all of our M3A2's to ARCENT. We also signed for five M3's that had previously belonged to us from DIVARTY and 1st BDE. The SQDN inventoried the equipment and loaded its MILVANS for shipment home. On 231700 April, the SQDN wheeled vehicles (minus trail party) drove to KING KHALID MILITARY CITY (KKMC) to use the washrack in preparation for our movement to port.

24 APRIL 1991

The wheeled vehicle convoy departed at 0400 hrs from KKMC for port (Diagram 6). Our route took us from KKMC north to TAPLINE road; east along TAPLINE road to the coast, then south to AL KHOBAR. wheels convoyed under the HHT CDR, CPT Morrison. The track vehicles were to be HETTED to PORT on 26 APR and were under control of the B TRP CDR, CPT Bills. The SXO and CSM remained behind in charge of the trail party.

The SQDN wheel convoy arrived at Khobar Towers at 1830.

The SQDN was billeted in Building 119 at Khobar Towers.

C and D Troop (Air Cav) departed for port from KKMC while the vehicles departed on ground routes for the same location. For the air cav it was a short two hour flight to KKMC. Departure time from KKMC was 0630 leaving in two groups, the Air Troops stopped for a 90 minute refuel in Bastogne and arrived at port at 1210. Upon landing, all aircraft were tied down and secured. Soldiers of the Air Troops were also billeted in the Khobar Towers and furnished rooms until final departure. The ground support and logistic tail for the Air Troops departed at the same time of their corresponding air troops. The hot and long journey for them took 11 hours. Upon arrival at port operations, guards were posted at one shifts. All other personnel were evacuated to Khobar Towers and assigned rooms.

25 APRIL 1991

Approximately 130 soldiers flew to PORT via CH-47 under control of the A TRP CDR, CPT Pope. The Squadron began picking up vehicles from the holding area at 0500 and washed our wheeled vehicles at the West Heliport washrack. Washrack operations continued until completed, through the hours of darkness. Washrack operations were very well organized with chow and drinks available throughout for troop morale and support.

26 APRIL 1991

The SQDN tracked vehicles began to arrive at port. By 1800 hours all vehicles arrived at port.

27 APRIL 1991

The wheeled vehicle wash rack closed for maint. All aircraft arrived at port NLT 1200 hours.

28 APRIL 1991

At 0730 hrs, the CSM and SXO arrived from Hubner with the last wheeled vehicles. We began to wash the track vehicles at the Desalination Wash Point about 3 miles south of Khobar Towers. At West heliport C and D Troops also began extensive aircraft depaneling and washing to meet the stringent agricultural inspections. The temperatures at the heliport camp were in excess of 120°. Division informed the SQDN that we could not take back the Iraqi trailers with us. We left one with MMC and placed one in an Iraqi vehicle display vicinity of ARCENT HQ.

29 APRIL 1991

Track washrack operations are nearing completion. Aircraft are nearing completion and some have been flown to port for shrink wrapping.

30 APRIL 1991

We completed washing the tracks and began to wash the wheels again at the West Heliport washrack. The last of helicopters completed inspections and were flown to port.

02 MAY 1991

The last 10 HMMWVS were finished at the washrack. LT Vanderfeltz and CSM Cobb led the convoy to King Fahd Air Port.

03 MAY 1991

SCO opened up Dragoon Beach, a hard packed beach located about 5 miles from Khobar Towers. Soldiers began shopping for gifts in earnest. The popular spot was the mall located in downtown AL Khobar. The merchants were friendly and the restaurants were superb. The staff and commanders continued to work to catch up on administrative awards and efficiency reports.

06 MAY 1991

D and E TRP got their call forward. They were placed in a chalk with the 1st ENG. They were to fly at 092100 MAY 91. Many of the Squadron's soldiers began to visit Half Moon Bay. It was a recreation center on the gulf that the British contracted for through the Saudi Government.

07 MAY 1991

HHT, A TRP(-), and B TRP got their call forward. CPT Morrison was selected as the Chalk Cdr. The flight was scheduled to depart at 100900 MAY 91. C TRP and the remainder of A TRP got their call forward. They were scheduled to depart with HHC, 1st ID, at 101030 MAY 91.

09 MAY 1991

The Squadron cleared Khobar Towers at 2300 hours, loaded buses and moved to Dahaman Airfield where customs inspected all baggage. D and E TRP departed Saudi Arabia.

10 MAY 1991

The Squadron soldiers waited in the hangar until 0800 hours. The officers and men of the Quarterhorse departed Saudi at 0830 on the long flight home. The flight was enjoyable. American West were great hosts. The CG and the Chief of Staff flew back on the plane with the SQDN main body. They could have flown home with anyone but chose the Quarterhorse.

The remainder of the Squadron departed for home with the exception of the supercargoes (4 pax) who will accompany our equipment on the ships and planes it will return on, and the Port

Support personnel (3 pax) who will return with the division trail party at the end of June, 1991.


The Squadron families and post had a great reception for us upon arrival at Ft Riley. The Squadron families were waiting for us in eager anticipation.

The Squadron provided the Division Honor Guard for the uncasing of the Division Colours.

11 MAY 1991









The Squadron uncased its colours at 1400 hrs. The SCO put everyone on a 72 hr pass.


"Prepared and Loyal"

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Robert Wilson", with a stylized flourish extending from the end of the name.

ROBERT WILSON
LTC, AR
Commanding

LEGEND









-  cities
-  air field
-  wadi
-  oil field
-  highway
-  ruins
-  pipeline
-  boundary



E - 55 - 1

DIAGRAM 3

LEGEND

-  cities
-  air field
-  wadi
-  oil field
-  highway
-  ruins
-  pipeline
-  boundary

1 N

E - 56 - 2





















DIAGRAM 4


LEGEND

-  cities
-  air field
-  wadi
-  oil field
-  highway
-  ruins
-  pipeline
-  boundary



E - 57 - 3


-  cities
-  air field
-  wadi
-  oil field
-  highway
-  ruins
-  pipeline
-  boundary



E - 58 - 4


E - 57 -

Diagram 6




E - 59 - 5

Squadron Organization



Alpha Troop

Desert Shield/Storm




Summary

M-3 CFV	21*	Officers	6
M-1A1	3	Enlisted	160
M-106	3		
M-577	1		
M-113	1		
M-88	1		
M-113 GSR	2		
*M-3 FIST-V	1		
M-113 Eng	4		
M-9 ACE	2		

Bravo Troop

Desert Shield/Storm



Summary

M-3 CFV	20	Officers	7
M-1A1	6	Enlisted	178
M-106	3		
M-577	1		
M-113	1		
M-9 ACE	3		
M-88	1		
M-113 GSR	3		
FIST-V	1		
M-113 Eng	4		
Stinger Sect.	1		

REGIMENTAL SONG OF THE FOURTH CAVALRY

THE SILENT COLUMN PASSES BY,
WITH HORSES HEADS HELD PROUDLY HIGH,
T'IS A PICTURE THAT MAKES YOU CERTAIN
THAT THE DEAR OLD FOURTH WILL NEVER DIE.

AND SO WE'LL DRINK THIS TOAST TO THE CAVALRY

AYE EE AYE EE AYE, AYE EE AYE EE AYE,
TO THE MEN OF THE SWORD AND THE YELLOW CORD
I DRINK AYE EE AYE EE AYE OH.


WHEN TROOPERS RIDE IN COLUMN SIDE BY SIDE,

WITH DESTINY THEIR ONLY GUIDE,
THEY CARE NOT WHAT FATE AWAITS THEM,
PREPARED AND LOYAL, DEATH THEY DO DEFY.

AND SO WE'LL DRINK THIS TOAST TO THE CAVALRY

AYE EE AYE EE AYE, AYE EE AYE EE AYE,
TO THE MEN OF THE DUST AND THE SABER'S THRUST
I DRINK AYE EE AYE EE AYE OH!
I DRINK AYE EE AYE EE AYE OH!

THE HISTORY
OF THE
FOURTH UNITED STATES CAVALRY





UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA



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FLARE

